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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
On 3 July 1988, Iran Air Flight 655 was intercepted by two Standard missiles from 
the Aegis cruiser, USS Vincennes (CG 49), killing 290 passengers. Granted, in any 
rapidly developing situation, it is often difficult to fully ascertain what is really going on, 
and military personnel have, at times, shot at contacts without being 100 percent certain 
whether the contact was a friend or a foe. Yet, how is it that a billion dollar warship 
designed to track and classify multiple aircraft in a combat environment shot down a 
commercial airliner? How is it that the system data showed the contact to be ascending, 
while many crew members in the Combat Information Center (CIC) thought the contact 
was descending? And finally, how is it that the findings of Rear Admiral William M. 
Fogarty, assigned as the investigating officer to ascertain the circumstances surrounding 
the downing of Flight 655, differed from the interpretation of Captain Will Rogers, 111, 
the Commanding Officer of the Vincennes? 
The findings of the Fogarty investigation attributed poor decision making as a result 
of stress as being a significant cause behind the disagreement in system data and the 
participants' accounts. This thesis, using both a quantitative and qualitative approach, will 
attempt to show that the issue of stress was not as significant of a factor as was originally 
diagnosed. Regarding causal factors, the failure to identify and differentiate between two 
aircraft was primarily due to the functional lack of negative feedback as a control 
mechanism to keep the system balanced and stable. Essentially, the focus of this thesis 
is to provide another interpretation as to what happened as well as attempts to provide an 
explanation as to the above disparities. 
B. STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
To address these questions, a historical case on the Vincennes incident is presented 
in Chapter I1 to provide background and to give the reader an overview as to the sequence 
of events. Chapter 111 summarizes and compares two analyses and interpretations of the 
outcome, one initiated by the investigating team headed by Rear Admiral William M. 
Fogarty and the other produced by Captain Rogers of the Vincennes. The author also 
provides her own analysis, which was limited to unclassified research materials and 
sources such as the Fogarty report, unclassified version, Senate Hearing before the 
Committee on Armed Services, and personal interviews with Captain Rogers, in which 
the results of the analysis find support for the Rogers' interpretation of the events. 
Probing for "causal factors" that produced the downing of Iran Air Flight 655, the author 
uses three different approaches to trace "causal factors" as shown in Chapter IV. The 
results of the overall probe indicated that there were a multitude of "causal factors," in 
which their relationships and the local context generated as a consequence, significantly 
contributed to the accidental shoot down of a civilian airliner. Finally, Chapter V consists 
of the conclusion and recommendations. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis employed multiple research methods in its design. Qualitative methods, 
such as interviews and archival research were used, to write a historical case on the 
Vincennes incident. Quantitative methods, such as regression and correlation analysis in 
conjunction with a graphical analysis and interpretation of the data, were used to analyze 
the discrepancies between two interpretations of the events and their outcome. Lastly, 
three models were used to ascertain "causal factors": The Events Path Model, which is 
a linear causal model that facilitates path analysis and the how context can be transformed 
over time, the Dynamic Systems Model, which is useful for identifying interdependencies 
and understanding how change affects other aspects of a system, and the Cybernetic 
Model of Mutual Causality, which is useful for flow analysis, determining the extent of 
negative feedback or for positive feedback required to facilitate a stabilization or change 
process in a system. 
D. SCOPEIBENEFITS 
This thesis is a historical examination of U.S. Naval operations in the Persian Gulf 
during the 1988 time frame, with particular emphasis on the accidental shoot down of 
Flight 655 in the Strait of Hormuz. Although this thesis examines a singular event in 
military history, the analysis involves a broad scope of inquiry concerning organizational 
and contextual factors regarding CIC decision making. This thesis is not an attempt to 
find out truth, nor is it intended to be judgmental, but rather, it attempts to develop ways 
at which complex dynamic problems as illustrated by the Vincennes can be studied and 
to emphasize the need to employ systems thinking and methodologies to augment the 
diagnostic process regarding systems problems and accidents. The hope is that the 
Vincennes incident can serve as a source of learning, because it represents the "worst case 
scenario" a military unit and commander might have to contend with during the course 
of a mission: Having to make a high risk decision based on ambiguous information in 
a volatile, uncertain task environment under tight time constraints. By incorporating a 
systems analysis approach to the naval investigation process, a more complete and 
accurate problem diagnosis of complex dynamic problems will occur and enable the Navy 
to more effectively direct its resources to solving the "real" problem versus an "apparent" 
problem. 
11. THE VZNCENNES INCIDENT 
A. OVERVIEW 
-. 
At approximately 1054 local time, 3 July 1988, the Aegis cruiser, USS Vincennes 
(CG 49), shot down a civilian airliner, Iran Air Flight 655, with two Standard missiles. 
The airliner was on a routine, international flight from Bandar Abbas, Iran, to Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates, and was flying on a designated commercial airway. The missiles 
intercepted the airliner at a range of eight nautical miles (NM) from the Vincennes at an 
altitude of 13,500 feet. All 290 passengers and crew were killed. (Fogarty, 1988, pp. 4 
and 6)' Figures 11-1 shows a geographical map of the Persian Gulf region. 
B. HISTORY 
1. U.S. Presence in the Gulf 
The U.S. has maintained a naval presence in the Gulf for over 40 years 
starting in 1948 with the establishment of the U.S. Naval Forces, Persian Gulf Command. 
This patrol force, consisting of small surface ships, was redesignated the Middle East 
Force (MEF) in August 1949. The original mission of the MEF was multi-fold: "to show 
the flag, support U.S. relationships with regional states, provide emergency services at 
sea, procure and ship fuel oil, and to conduct hydrographic surveys." (Glenn and Warner, 
1987, p. 10) From its inception, the MEF's mission and associated force structure grew 
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6 
to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War. The MEF's increased 
responsibilities included the maintenance of air and sea lines of communication, the 
demonstration of U.S. resolve, performance of maritime surveillance operations, 
interaction with local navies through participation in exercises, and the promotion of 
goodwill through port visits. (Glenn and Warner, 1987, p. 10) 
2. U.S. Interest in the Gulf 
During the 1980's, oil was the principal strategic economic interest of the U.S. 
in the Persian Gulf region, where 50 to 60 percent of the world's known oil reserves were 
located. Other reasons for U.S. interest were the potential for escalation in the Iran-Iraq 
War and possible regional destabilization. (Glenn and Warner, 1987, p. 16) 
3. Iran-Iraq War 
Hostilities between Iran and Iraq had existed for centuries, with the border 
between the two countries under constant dispute. Hoping to take advantage of internal 
disturbances in Iran that precipitated from the Iranian revolution in 1979, Iraq launched 
a strike into Iran on 22 September 1980. Iraq expected the Iranian Army to collapse and 
the government in Tehran to agree to a cease fire; however, Iran remained steadfast 
despite the advance of Iraqi forces. A year later, in a series of counter attacks, Iran 
regained most of the Iraqi occupied territory and the conflict essentially transformed into 
a static "war of attrition in which the line of battle ... moved little more than a few miles 
from the pre-war border." (Glenn and Warner, 1987, p. 8) 
4. The Tanker War 
During the first three years of the war, the ships that were attacked were 
directly involved with combat resupply (Glenn and Warner, 1987, p. 8). On 27 March 
1984, 
Iraq escalated the air war, into what has been called the 'Tanker War,' by attacking 
Iran's economic shipping and oil installations. Iraq's objectives were to prevent or 
reduce the importation of vital materials required by Iran for its war effort, to 
reduce or terminate Iran's oil revenues which helped finance the war, and to 
internationalize the war. (Glenn and Warner, 1987, p. 8) 
From 27 March 1984 to 17 June 1987, a total of 248 ships were attacked. 
Iraq initiated 153 of these attacks while Iran conducted 95. Although the Tanker War did 
not cause serious disruptions in oil flow to the West, Kuwait came under increasing 
pressure from Iranian attacks. Kuwait needed protection for her tankers and began to 
explore various options to include assistance from the Soviet Union. (Glenn and Warner, 
1987, p. 9) The U.S. response to Kuwait's requests for assistance was to 
expedite procedures for the registry of eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers under the 
American flag [and] ... to provide appropriate protection by U.S. military forces ... to 
the eleven reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers while operating in the Persian Gulf region 
and transiting the Strait of Hormuz. (Glenn and Warner, 1987, p. 12) 
5. The Stark Incident 
On the evening of 17 May 1987, the Frigate USS Stark (FFG 31) was on 
escort patrol duty in the Persian Gulf and was informed by a U.S. Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS) aircraft that an Iraqi Air Force F-1 aircraft was about 200 
miles away flying south along the Saudi Arabian coast. The Stark's on-board air search 
radar detected the Iraqi F-1 at a range of 70 nautical miles (NM) from the ship. At 43 
NM, the Stark's radar operator noticed that the ship had been locked on by the fire 
control radar for about five seconds, at which time he requested permission of the Tactical 
Action Officer TAO) to issue a standard warning to the closing Iraqi fighter. He was 
told to wait, considering the F-1 might change course. Attempts were made to inform the 
captain, but he could not be located. Meanwhile, at the 22.5 NM point, the Iraqi F-1 
fired its first Exocet missile. It appeared as a contact about 15 degrees off port bow and 
was initially identified as a surface contact. The ship was locked on again, and at the 15 
NM point a second Exocet missile was fired from the Iraqi fighter. At about 12 NM, the 
first warning message was broadcasted, and the TAO ordered the chaff launchers to be 
armed. But it was too late. By this time, the Iraqi aircraft had already fired its second 
missile. At 2109 local time (L), the first Exocet hit the Stark. About thirty seconds later, 
the second missile struck the ship. A total of 37 sailors were killed. Appendix B 
contains a more detailed account of the Stark incident. (Sharp Investigation, 1987) 
6. Increased U.S. Involvement 
After the Stark incident, U.S. naval operations in the Persian Gulf increased 
in scope and intensity. Concurrently, Iranian and Iraqi attacks on shipping escalated as 
the Iran-Iraq War continued to simmer: "Between January and June 1988, Iran conducted 
42 attacks on tankers in the Persian Gulf, primarily through speedboat and frigate gunfire 
or naval mines, and Iraq launched 27 attacks, primarily using missile armed jets." (Sagan, 
1991, pp. 97-8) Table II-1 shows the total number of attacks per year by Iran and Iraq 
in the Tanker War while Table 1T-2 shows the number of attacks each month in 1988.~ 
TABLE 11- 1 
ATTACKS ON SHIPS IN THE PERSIAN GULF BY BELLIGERENT, 1981-88 
TABLE II-2 
ATTACKS ON SHIPS IN THE PERSIAN GULF BY BELLIGERENT, 1988 
I ATTACKER I JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL ( TOTAL 
TOTAL 15 12 19 7 12 4 2 1 
-------------- 1 --------------------------------------------------lpp_ - - -  
Source: O'Rourke, 1989, p. 43 
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April 1988 was a tumultuous month for American forces in the Persian Gulf. 
Increased Iranian aggression caused a "reconsideration" of U.S. policy for that region. 
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Dr Scott D. Sagan, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, 
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provides a succinct account of events leading up to and including Operation PRAYING 
MANTIS, which commenced on 18 April 1988: 
Until April 1988, the U.S. government resisted requests from Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates to expand U.S. naval escort protection to non U.S. flagships 
in the Gulf, but the escalating conflict produced a reconsideration in Washington. 
On March 6, U.S. helicopters on a reconnaissance mission were f ~ e d  upon by 
Iranian forces, and on April 14, the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts was severely 
damaged when she struck what was believed to be an Iranian mine laid well outside 
the declared war-exclusion zone. In response, on April 18, the U.S. government 
ordered a significant retaliatory attack [Operation PRAYING MANTIS] against 
Iranian oil platforms3 ... and President Reagan personally approved a mid-battle 
request from the on-site commanders to attack other threatening Iranian naval 
vessels in the area. At the end of April, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci 
announced that the U.S. protective umbrella would be expanded to include any 
friendly or neutral vessel in the Persian Gulf outside of the war-exclusion zone. 
(1991, p. 9814 
Along with these events, Iran reportedly began building a new Silkworm 
launching facility on Abu Musa Island near the Strait of Hormuz and resumed work on 
other launching facilities on the Iranian side of the Strait. This further elevated the threat 
to seaborne traffic. Upon completion of the construction work, Iran would have the 
ability to fire Silkworm missiles into the Strait with minimal warning time to the ships 
in the area. The primary reason that prompted the deployment of the Vincennes to the 
area was to counter this emerging Iranian missile capability. The secondary reason was 
to respond to increased activity by Iranian fighters flying out of Bandar Abbas. 
(O'Rourke, 1989, p. 43) Figure 11-2 shows a chronology of events in the Persian Gulf. 
C. AIR OPERATIONS 
1. Commercial Air Activity 
The airways in the Persian Gulf were crowded despite the Iran-Iraq War, with 
18 commercial airways covering over half of the navigable waters in the region. A total 
of 12 of the 18 airways (67%) crossed the Strait of Hormuz. Although the commercial 
air picture was complex, it was described as "ordered" during naval briefings to ships 
entering the area. Consistent with the large number of airways servicing the Gulf, well 
over 1,500 flights would pass through on a weekly basis. Air carriers that did not 

approach Iran during any phase of their flight would normally fly at high altitudes (20,000 
feet and higher) over the area.5 (Fogarty, 1988, pp. 14 and 16) Another observation 
pertinent to commercial aircraft crossing the Gulf was that in-flight modification to their 
modes and codes had been noted, which was a misuse of the Identification Friend or Foe 
(IFF) system. By either intentionally or unintentionally changing these modes and codes, 
the aircraft would send out misinformation as to its real identity.6 In other words, if an 
aircraft misidentified itself and squawked an incorrect mode and code other than what was 
assigned, it could be misidentified and considered hostile or an enemy aircraft, when in 
fact it was not. Also, changing modes and codes could imply questionable intentions to 
a radar tracker tracking the aircraft's flight as well as exacerbate the radar tracker's 
deconfliction problem. The consequences of changing these assigned modes and codes 
could be lethal, especially when flying over an area that was prone to military hostilities 
with a large amount of both civilian and military aircraft flying in the same airspace. 
(Fogarty, 1988, pp. 14 and 16; Friedman, 1989, p. 73) 
Information regarding commercial airline activity was promulgated by 
Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East (CJTFME) to U.S. naval vessels in the Persian 
Gulf. On 28 June 1988, CJTFME sent a message containing commercial airline schedules 
which showed that Iran Air Flight 655 was scheduled to depart Bandar Abbas at 06202 
or 0950L every Tuesday and Sunday of each week.7 As for IFF data, "the only 
commercial IFF information available to any [Joint Task Force Middle East] JTFME unit 
was pass-down items from other Middle East Force ships." (Fogarty, 1988, p. 15) 
Other data pertaining to the commercial air picture were obtained in 
introductory briefings to the Middle East Force. The CJTFME briefers would discuss the 
commercial air picture in general, but would not focus on specific airways or particular 
commercial airline schedules. The briefers mentioned the "complex, but ordered 
commercial air picture" and emphasized caution if contacts deviated from their normal 
operating patterns. The use of international and military air distress channels was also 
briefed, and ships were instructed to contact civilian airliners through the International Air 
Distress (IAD) channel. (Fogarty, 1988, p. 14) 
Aside from the CJTFME inchop briefs, a Notice to Airman (NOTAM) was 
published on 8 September 1987 and was distributed to Persian Gulf countries through the 
International Civilian Aviation Organization (ICAO) and State Department agencies. This 
NOTAM, which was issued as a result of the Stark incident, notified all Persian Gulf 
countries of the increased defensive precautions U.S. naval ships would be taking. 
(Fogarty, 1988, p. 15) 
2. Military Air Activity 
Iranian Air Force operating patterns changed significantly at Bandar Abbas 
a month prior to 3 July 1988 (Fogarty, 1988, p. 10). Iranian F-4s scrambled daily from 
Bandar Abbas during Operation PRAYING MANTIS. On one occasion, after failing to 
respond to warnings issued from the USS Wainwright over both military and international 
air distress channels, an Iranian F-4 continued to close this ship in an attack profile. Two 
missiles were launched from the Wainwright, severely damaging the F-4. (Perkins, 1989, 
On 18 June 1988, the Vincennes was alerted by CJTFME as to the changing 
patterns and more aggressive behavior of Iranian F-4s operating from Bandar Abbas. 
Additionally, the Vincennes was forewarned of the recent deployment of Iranian F-14s to 
Bandar Abbas, which CJTFME interpreted as an increased threat to U.S. forces in the 
area. Although F-14s were not normally used for iron bomb attacks, in which unguided 
bombs would be dropped, the fighter aircraft could be modified and used in that capacity. 
Additionally, intelligence reports had underscored Iranian attempts to modify their F-4s 
and F-14s for anti-surface attack roles (Rogers, 1992). This modification would require 
the F-14 to come within two NM of the target in order to engage. On 2 July 1988, 
CJTFME also warned the Middle East Force (MEF) of increased Iranian military activity 
in a retaliatory response to successful Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil facilities. (Fogarty, 1988, 
pp. 10-1 1) The MEF was also alerted as to possible Iranian suicide or kamikaze attacks 
on shipping during the Fourth of July weekend (Friedman, 1989, p. 73). In addition to 
these warnings, Iranian and Iraqi military aircraft were observed squawking all IFF modes 
and codes, and at times following commercial air routes within the Persian Gulf. (Fogarty, 
1988, pp. 4, 11, and 16) 
CJTFME also tabulated the number of challenges and warnings conducted by 
MEF forces from 2 June 1988 to 2 July 1988. Of the 150 challenges issued, 125 or 83 
percent were directed to Iranian military aircraft while only two or 1.3 percent were 
directed towards commercial aircraft. These challenges were normally issued to aircraft 
showing a potentially hostile flight pattern or to answer questions of intent. (Fogarty, 
1988, p. 16; Rogers, 1992) 
D. THE USS VINCENNES 
The Vincennes was selected to deploy to the Persian Gulf to counter the emerging 
Iranian Silkworm missile threat. On 20 April 1988, the Vincennes received a short notice 
deployment order to the Persian Gulf while participating in Fleet Exercise 88-2 
(FLEETEX 88-2). She was directed to detach early from the exercise and return to home 
port to prepare for her new mission. By 25 April 1988, the Vincennes was enroute to the 
Persian Gulf. Her t~ansit was from San Diego, California, to Subic Bay, Republic of the 
Philippines (RP) for training, and then onward to the Persian Gulf with a projected arrival 
date of 16 May 1988. (Fogarty, 1988, pp. 17-18) Incidentally, the Vincennes was the first 
and only cruiser of its type to be deployed to the Persian Gulf region at that time (Rogers, 
1992). 
1. Training and Readiness 
Upon notice of her deployment to the Persian Gulf, a self-assessment was 
conducted and the Vincennes was found to be in the "highest state of training and 
readiness," having achieved top ratings (C-1 status) in Personnel, Supply, Training, and 
Equipment. The Vincennes also achieved M-1 status with no casualty reports (CASREPS) 
in the anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-mine warfare (AMW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), 
anti-surface warfare (ASUW), command, control and communications (C3), and electronic 
warfare (EW) mission areas. In other words, all systems were "up and operational," and 
the ship was considered fully capable of conducting her mission. (Fogarty, 1988, p. 18; 
Rogers, 1992) 
Before her deployment, the Vincennes participated in interim refresher 
training, FLEETEX 88-1, and a portion of FLEETEX 88-2. Table 11-3 summarizes the 
- 
training activities the Vincennes had undergone prior to 3 July 1988.' After completing 
interim refresher training, the Vincennes was found to be fully capable of performing 
duties as anti-air warfare coordinator in battle group operations. Although the Vincennes 
did not complete FLEETEX 88-2 or a normal MEF augmenter training schedule due to 
her accelerated transit to Subic Bay, she did participate in various training activities as 
outlined in Table 11-3, to include three Rules of Engagement exercises (ROEX). 
A highlight of the Subic Bay training experience included a two day intensive 
war at sea exercise (WASEX) conducted on 9-10 May 1988. The Vincennes was 
presented with virtually every type of scenario conceivable in order to prepare for her 
mission, which also included responding to attacking aircraft. During the post exercise 
critique session, the Vincennes' large screen display (LSD) was used to recreate the 
exercise events. This reconstruction revealed that the Vincennes had effectively 
discriminated against attack aircraft from numerous other air contacts to include normal 
air traffic and U.S. Air Force air-to-air missile participants in the area of Clark Air Force 
Base and Crow Valley, Republic of the Philippines. (Fogarty, 1988, pp. 18-19; Rogers, 
1992) 
TABLE 11-3 
TRAINING SUMMARY ABOARD VINCENNES 
TYPE OF TRAINING I DATE 1 REMARKS 
Interim Refresher Training 
FLEETEX 88-1 
FLEETEX 88-2 
1-12 Feb 88 
8-19 Apr 88 
Found fully capable in AAWC or 
LAAWC in battle group operations 
Training included anti-Silkworm and 
terrorist aircraft training, terrorist small 
boat defense and anti-swimmer defense 
training during a simulated escort 
mission 
Not completed. Training included 
WASEXs, Silkworm missile attacks, 
ROE, and fast patrol boat attack 
simulations 
Subic Bay Training Period 
WASEX 
9-12 May 88 
9-10 May 88 
Training included a WASEX, CIWS 
tracking and firing, Silkworm profiles, 
anti-intercept controlling, anti-fast patrol 
boat exercises (night and day), surface 
gunnery, and surface to air gunnery 
Discriminated threat aircraft from other 
air contacts 
Aegis Training Center Briefs 
ROEX 
JTFME CVBG Familiarization 
Source: Fogarty, 1988, pp. 18-19 
11 May 88 
6-20 May 88 
21-24 May 88 
Received lessons learned briefs on SPY- 
1A radar operations 
Tested interpretation and correct response 
to current ROE for MEF 
Training included a WASEX, Silkworm 
profiles, surface capability and aircraft 
training 
Finally, on 20 May 1988, the Vincennes transferred to the operational control 
(inchopped) of CJTFME. Again, a self-assessment was conducted regarding training and 
readiness. A C-1 rating was achieved in Personnel, Equipment, Training, and Supply, 
while an M-1 rating was received in AAW, ASW, ASUW, AMW, C3, EW and Mobility. 
While in the Gulf of Oman, the Vincennes participated in JTFME carrier battle group 
(CVBG) familiarization training from 21-24 May 1988 as shown in the above table. 
(Fogarty, 1988, p. 19) 
In sum, the commanding officer, tactical action officer (TAO) and air 
coordinator felt well prepared for their assignment in the Persian Gulf (Fogarty, 1988, p. 
19). 
2. Organization 
On 3 July 1988, the Vincennes' primary watch organization was comprised 
of the operator positions as depicted in Table 11-4. Also, a schematic of the Vincennes' 
Combat Information Center (CIC) layout is presented in Figure 11-3 with key positions 
labelled to help the reader visualize the location of operator positions in relation to each 
other: The anti-air warfare coordinator (AAWC), tactical information coordinator (TIC), 
and the identification supervisor (IDS) were located in what was commonly known as "air 
alley." (Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 7) 
TABLE 11-4 
WATCH ORGANIZATION 
11 ACRONYM I TITLE 
CO Commanding Officer 
XO Executive Officer 
TAO Tactical Action Officer 
OSDA Own Ship Display Assistant 
Golf Whiskey 
CIC Officer Combat Information Officer 
IAD Talker International Air Distress Talker 
I Combat System Coordinator 
EWS 1 MSS 
Tactical Information Coordinator 
ANISLQ-32 Operator 
Electronic Warfare Supervisor 
Missile s y s t ~ h  Supervisor 
Radar System Controller 
Air Radar Controller 
AAWC Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator 
ACS Air Control Supervisor 
........................................................................................ 
Source: Fogarty, 1988, p. 21 
During transit and throughout the duration of her tour, the Vincennes trained 
and operated under a modified Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept for 
Persian Gulf operations, for there was no aircraft carrier specifically assigned to the 
Persian Gulf. She assumed duties as "Golf Whiskeyn9 or the force anti-air warfare 
coordinator as illustrated in Figure 11-4." (Rogers, 1992) In the Persian Gulf, "Golf 
Bravo," the Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East, was located aboard the USS 





Figure 11-3. Vincennesl Combat Information Center Schematic 
Coronado. The area anti-surface coordinator function, "Golf Sierra," was assigned to the 
USS Hancock, which was responsible for surface activities. The force anti-air warfare 
coordinator function, "Golf Whiskey," was assigned to the Vincennes and was Golf 
Bravo's principal air advisor as shown in Figure IT-4. The Sides, Vincennes, and 
Montgomery were the primary ships involved with the overall 3 July 1988 scenario. 
(Rogers, 1992) 
Under normal Condition I and LU operations," Figure 11-5 outlines the 
Vincennes' basic organizational framework where the captain commands by negation. 
However, during Persian Gulf operations and various other Condition 111 situations outside 
the Persian Gulf, the Vincennes' command organization adopted the following structure 
as shown in Figure 11-6. (Rogers, 1992) This combat organizational structure essentially 
involved a watch tactical action officer (TAO) and an anti-air warfare (AAW) TAO set 
up, in which the AAW TAO was fully TAO-qualified. (Rogers, 1992) Golf Whiskey, or 
Captain Rogers, delegated air responsibilities to the AAW TAO, and this person acted on 
the captain's behalf when reporting to Golf Bravo. The AAW TAO's call sign was "Golf 
Whiskey," the military phonetic alphabet designator for the letters "G W." As considered 
by the commanding officer aboard the Vincennes, "'GW' was his primary force g& ship 
air warfare advisor." (Fogarty, 1988, p. 46) Essentially, the Persian Gulf modifications 
to the Vincennes' CIC organization resulted in the removal of the AAW coordination 
function from the AAWC to the AAW TAO, leaving the AAWC primarily as a console 
operator (Fogarty, 1988, p. 46). Although the AAW TAO would run the air picture, he 
would still defer to the watch TAO for "own ship" concerns. As shown in Figure 11-3, 
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the watch TAO was seated to the commanding officer's right, while the AAW TAO 
labelled in the diagram as "GW" sat directly to the captain's left. (Rogers, 1992; Senate 
Hearing, 1988, pp. 6-7; and Fogarty, 1988, pp. 20-21) 
3. Combat System Status 
According to the naval investigation into the incident, the overall combat 
system status was in order. The Aegis system was working "exceptionally well" with no 
"serious degradations" or anomalies noted. Equipment preventive maintenance inspections 
were properly documented and accomplished on time. (Fogarty, 1988, pp. 21 -22) 
4. Communications 
a. Internal 
Contrary to the combat systems status, the on-board communications 
network was not effective. Normally, internal net 15 or 16 was designated for warfare 
coordinators such as the commanding officer (CO), tactical action officer (TAO), officer 
of the deck (OOD), surface/subsurface warfare coordinator (SSWC), and the tactical 
information coordinator (TIC). However, on 3 July 1988, the following Combat 
Information Center (CIC) operators were also using the net in addition to the designated 
warfare coordinators: Force warfare coordinator (FWC), identification supervisor (IDS), 
electronic warfare supervisor (EWS), radar system controller (RSC), situation report 
officer (SITREP officer), electronic warfare console operator (EWCO), as well as those 
- 
stations that punched into the net as deemed necessary. The increased load caused static, 
garbling, and difficulties in hearing people talk due to inadequate volume amplification. 
As a result of circuit degradation on 3 July 1988, internal communications had to be 
shifted between circuits 15 and 16. (Fogarty, 1988, p. 22; Rogers, 1992) 
b. External 
Regarding external communications, an AWACS was flying in the 
Northern Persian Gulf area on 3 July 1988, but its radar was out of range and was unable 
to provide link information to augment the Vincennes' tactical picture (Fogarty, 1988, p. 
24). 
5. Rules of Engagement 
A copy of the current rules of engagement (ROE) for the Persian Gulf region 
was available on the Vincennes (Fogarty, 1988, p. 13). According to Admiral William 
J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the post-Stark ROE, under which the 
Vincennes was operating, emphasized the following regarding the commanding officer's 
primary responsibility: 
As a result of the Stark incident, our commanders were given a revised set of ROE 
which clarified their authority to take positive measures when hostile intent was 
manifested. It was emphasized that they do not have to be shot at before 
responding and that they have an unambiguous authority to protect their units and 
people. (Crowe, 1988, p. 1) 
E. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
1. Environmental Information 
On 3 July 1988, the air temperature was a warm 28 degrees Centigrade with 
a sea temperature of 30 degrees Centigrade. Visibility was estimated at four to eight 
miles while the ceiling was scattered at 200 feet with heavy dust haze (Rogers, 1 May 
1992). Humidity was gaged at 62 percent, and the surface pressure was 998.0 MB. 
Winds were at ten knots. An evaporation duct of 78.5 feet was also present. 
Additionally, there was strong evidence as to the presence of a surface duct reaching up 
to 485 feet, which encompassed the evaporation duct. Because of these ripe conditions 
for atmospheric ducting, radar detection ranges, when coupled with ducts, were known 
to be extended.12 (Fogarty, 1988, p. 13) 
2. Events Prior to the Surface Engagement 
Intelligence sources warned of aggressive behavior by Iranian aircraft during 
the first week of July 1988 (Greeley, 1988, p. 21). Three days prior to the Vincennes 
incident, there was heightened air and naval activity in the Persian Gulf: 
Iraq conducted air strikes against Iranian oil facilities and shipping from 30 June 
through 2 July 1988. Iranian response was to step up ship attacks .... U.S. forces 
in the Persian Gulf were alerted to the probability of significant military activity 
resulting from Iranian retaliation for recent Iraqi military successes. (Fogarty, 1988, 
P. 4) 
From the twilight hours of 2 July 1988 to the morning hours of the next day, 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was challenging merchant ships, an 
established forerunner to merchant ship attacks: 
On the evening of 2 July, a Danish merchant [Karama Maersk] in international 
waters was harassed by Iranian gunboats. The merchant requested distress 
assistance from the United States, and the frigate Montgomery responded and fired 
a warning shot to stop their aggressive behavior. 
Only hours later, during the early morning of 3 July, a Pakistani merchant 
was also harass &...[and] issued a distress call. Soon thereafter there were 
explosions heard in the vicinity of a Liberian merchant, where numerous Iranian 
gunboats were gathered .... Later that morning, a third neutral merchant, this time 
a West German ship, was being closely tracked by two Iranian gunboats. (Senate 
Hearing, 1988, p. 9) 
Prior to the surface engagement, there were three U.S. naval ships in the Strait 
of Hormuz region: USS Vincennes, USS Elmer Montomery, and USS Sides. At 0940L, 
the Sides was located 18 NM northeast of the Vincennes while the Montgomery was 
located five NM to the west of the Vincennes as shown by Figure 11-7. In the meantime, 
the USS Forrestal (not shown) was in the Gulf of Oman. (Fogarty, 1988, pp. 23-24) 
At 0942L, the Persian Gulf Surface Warfare Commander aboard the USS 
Hancock known as "Golf Sierra," directed the Vincennes to proceed north and investigate 
a report by the USS Elmer Montgomery of Iranian aggression towards a merchant ship. 
The Montgomery observed a total of 13 Iranian gunboats breaking into three groups, 
comprising three to four boats per group. Already on a routine morning patrol, the 
Vincennes' Light Airborne Multipurpose System Mark III helicopter (LAMPS MK 111), 
or OCEAN LORD 25, was vectored north to investigate the Iranian activity. At 
approximately 0945L, the helicopter received small arms fire from one of the gunboats. 
As authorized by Golf Sierra, the Vincennes took tactical control of the Montgomery and 
both ships proceeded at high speed toward the returning helicopter. Seven of the Iranian 
gunboats were observed turning towards the U.S. ships. This closing action was 
interpreted as a demonstration of hostile intent. Consequently, Captain Will Rogers, 111, 
Commanding Officer of the Vincennes, requested and then received permission from 
CJTFME to engage the small boats with gunfire. At about 1013L, the Vincennes and 
Montgomery opened fire on closing Iranian small boats which had split into two groups 
of four and three boats each and included the boats that had fired upon OCEAN LORD 
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25. The ships became immersed in a surface engagement with the Iranians. (Fogarty, 
1988, pp. 5 and 24-25) See Figure 11-8 showing the surface engagement time line in 
relation to the air engagement. 
3. Surface Engagement 
As shown in Figure 11-8, the overall surface engagement lasted about 20 
minutes, starting from 1013L and ending at 1033L. Both the Vincennes and the 
Montgomery exchanged gun fire with the IRGC boats, expending a total of 72 and 47 
rounds of 5"/54 ammunition respectively (Fogarty, 1988, pp. 25-27). 
Experience indicated that engagements with small gunboats were dangerous, 
because they were highly maneuverable and fast. IRGC small boat tactics presented the 
greatest threat to personnel and equipment due to their ability to make high speed massed 
attacks on their targets, raking the ships' superstructure with gunfire. (Fogarty, 1988, p. 
27) 
In the midst of the surface engagement, Iran Air Flight 655 took off from the 
joint civilian/military airport at Bandar Abbas at about 1017L after a 27 minute delay 
from its regularly scheduled departure time as depicted in Table 11-5. The flight was 
directed by the Bandar Abbas air traffic control tower to "squawk" or emit IFF Mode III, 
code 6760. However, during the course of Flight 655's seven minute flight, the Bandar 
Abbas tower failed to relay the IAD warnings issued by the Vincennes to Flight 655 and 
also allowed it to fly a relatively low altitude air route in close proximity to hostilities 
that had been transpiring for several hours (Fogarty, 1988, p. 42). Flight 655 began its 
normal climb out to an assigned altitude of 14,000 feet following air corridor Amber-59 
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(A-59), which had a width of 20 NM and a center line at ten NM. The total length of 
the air route was 123 NM. Flight 655 remained within the airway squawking Mode III- 
6760 and made a route position report to Bandar Abbas departure control at 
approximately 1024L. The flight was ascending through 12,000 feet and was traveling 
at 380 knots (KTS) at the time of the position report radio call. 
TABLE 11-5 
BANDAR ABBAS FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR SUNDAY, 3 JULY 1988 
11 FLT # I TO I DEFT TIME 
Dubai 0950L 
Bandarlengeh 1240L 
- - - - - - - - 
IR 236 Tehran 124OL 
Tehran 1340L 
ACFT TYPE It 
Airbus 300 
=I 
Airbus 300 11 
11 IR 134 I Shiraz I 2050L 1 737 11 
I 
While immersed in the surface battle, the Vincennes suffered a foul bore on 
mount 51, in which a round of ammunition was chambered, but could not be fired. This 
equipment casualty occurred about 1020L. The foul bore necessitated the tactical action 
IR 394 
IR 394 
officer (TAO) to employ radical maneuvering, using 30 degrees rudder at 30 KTS ship's 
speed, in order to keep gun mount 52 pointed at the most threatening of the surface 
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contacts. This high speed, large rudder angle turn caused books, publications and loose 
equipment to fall from desks and consoles in CIC. (Fogarty, 1988, p. 26) 
A minute later at 1021L, the Vincennes was ordered to take tactical control 
of the USS Sides by Golf Sierra, (the area anti-surface warfare coordinator). Thirteen 
minutes later at approximately 1033L, the Vincennes and Montgomery "disengaged" when 
the remaining small boats turned away, no longer presenting a threat to U.S. warships. 
(Fogarty, 1988, pp. 26-27) 
4. Air Engagement 
The air engagement time sequence lasted seven minutes and eight seconds, 
from 1017L, when the Airbus was detected, until 1024L, when the contact was shot down 
by missiles from the Vincennes at an altitude of 13,500 feet, 3.35 NM to the west of the 
air corridor's centerline. (Fogarty, 1988, pp. 6, 14-17) Figure 11-9 depicts the 
geographical location of Flight 655's debris. During this time, the Vincennes was actively 
involved in the surface skirmish with the IRGC boats, and the Montgomery was still 
under her tactical control. To simplify the complicated sequence of events during the air 
engagement, Tables 11-6 through 11-12 and accompanying narrative will outline the 
chronological sequence of the air engagement. 
Bandar Abbas Airport 
TABLE 11-6 
AIR ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE -- 1017L 
EVENTS - I 
P-3 62 NM west of Vincennes 
SPY-1 radar detected Flt 655 BRG 025, RNG 47 NM at 900 ft 
IDS broke Mode III as 6675 (C & D held 6760) 
Announcement of F-14 heard by at least two watchstanders on internal net 15/16 
ADT stated unidentified aircraft (Flt 655) was squawking Modes I1 and 111 
....................................................................................... 
Source: Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 10 
At 1017L, Iran Air Flight 655 departed the Bandar Abbas joint 
rnilitary/civilian airport. The Vincennes' SPY-1 radar detected Flight 655 at a bearing of 
025 degrees true from the Vincennes at a range of 47 NM. In the meantime, an Iranian 
P-3, which was approaching the Vincennes from the west, was being closely monitored. 
The identification supervisor, IDS, saw an IFF Mode I11 squawk of 6675 as the aircraft 
departed the airport, while the Aegis system saw an IFF Mode III squawk of 6760. The 
SPS-49 air detect tracker, 49-ADT, saw both a Mode I1 and III squawk from Flight 655. 
It was at this time Identification Supervisor (IDS) reported over the internal net 15/16 that 
the approaching aircraft was an F-14. At least two other Combat Information Center 
(CIC) members heard this report over the net. 
Flight 655 was also reported by the Vincennes over Link 11 as track number 
4474 (TN 4474), while the Sides saw the same contact on her radar and identified it as 
TN 4131 over the link. (Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 10; Fogarty, 1988, pp. 29-30) 
TABLE 11-7 
AIR ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE -- 1018L 
* 
EVENTS 
IDS reviewed commercial air schedule 
Flt 655 BRG 025, RNG 44 NM, CSE 202, SPD 232, ALT 2500 ft by SPY-1 radar 
Sides illuminated Flt 655 with fire control radar 
Source: Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 10 
A minute later at 1018L, the identification supervisor was consulting the 
commercial air schedule at his station. Because Flight 655 was 27 minutes late, he 
concluded that the contact of interest was not Flight 655. Meanwhile, the Aegis radar 
indicated that Flight 655 was on a constant bearing of 025 degrees true and at an altitude 
of 2,500 feet. Also, the tactical information coordinator, TIC, noted TN 4474 changed 
to TN 4131. (Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 10; Fogarty, 1988, p. 31.) 
In the midst of this activity, the Vincennes challenged the Iranian P-3 over 
both the Military Air Distress (MAD) and International Air Distress (IAD) channels. The 
P-3 replied that he was on a search mission and would stand clear of the Vincennes. 
Concurrently, the tactical information coordinator recalled seeing Mode I and Mode 11 on 
the P-3, which was TN 4472. (Fogarty, 1988, p. 30) 
The tactical action officer (TAO) aboard the Sides, which was 18 NM 
northeast of the Vincennes, directed his weapons control officer, WCO, to illuminate the 
contact with his fire control radar (Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 10). While the Sides was 
able to observe TN 4131 along with the Vincennes, the Montgomery never gained radar 
contact on TN 4131 (Fogarty, 1988, 30-31). 
At 1019L, the anti-air warfare coordinator, AAWC, ordered TN 4131 be 
challenged over the MAD. The following MAD warning message was issued: 
'Unidentified Iranian aircraft on course 203, speed 303, altitude 4000, this is U.S. 
naval warship, bearing 205, 40 miles from you. You are approaching U.S. naval 
warship operating in international waters. Request you state your intentions.' 
(Fogarty, 1988, p. 31) 
At 1020L, the Vincennes issued the first of several IAD warnings to TN 4131: 
'Unknown aircraft on course 206, speed 316 position 2702N/0561E, you are 
approaching U.S. naval warship, request you remain clear.' (Fogarty, 1988, p. 31) 
TABLE 11-8 
AIR ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE -- 1020L 
EVENTS 
Vincennes issued first warning on IAD to Flt 655 
IDS saw Mode 11 1100 on his RCI and reported possible F-14 over internal net 15/16 to all stations 
Several people heard the F-14 call 
GW reported inbound F-14 to GB BRG 025, RNG 32 NM 
GW told GB that a warning was issued and ignored 
It OSDA tagged Flt 655 as F-14 on large screen displays in front of the CO, TAO, and GW ........................................................................................ Source: Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 10 
It was at 1020L that the air engagement decision process began. The 
identification supervisor, IDS, saw an IFF Mode I1 squawk of 1100 on his remote control 
indicator (RCI) and reported possible F- 14 to all stations over internal net 15/16. Several 
CIC members heard the approaching aircraft identified as an F-14. The own ship display 
assistant, OSDA, having heard that the contact was identified as an F-14, tagged Flight 
655 with an F-14 label on the screens in front of the commanding officer (CO), tactical 
action officer (TAO), and Golf Whiskey or the AAW TAO. (Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 11; 
Fogarty, 1988, p. 32) 
I 
The AAW TAO, "Golf Whiskey," proceeded to inform higher headquarters 
of this development. Here, the AAW TAO, who was the officer sitting next to the 
commanding officer and charged with overseeing the air picture, informed Golf Bravo 
(the call sign for Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East) that an F-14 was 
approaching the Vincennes at a bearing of 025 degrees and range of 32 NM. During this 
radio transmission, he told Golf Bravo that a warning was already issued to TN 4131 and 
that there was no response from the contact. (Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 11; Fogarty, 1988, 
P. 32) 
Also, at 1020L, there were various accounts of Modes II and 111 having been 
seen by several watchstanders (IDS, AIC-3, AAWC and TIC); however, the Vincennes' 
system still held no IFF Mode II, only Mode III-6760 for TN 4131 (Fogarty, 1988, p. 32). 
Additionally, Golf Sierra, who was aboard the USS Hancock, the area anti- 
surface warfare coordinator, ordered the Vincennes to take tactical control of the Sides. 
The Montgomery was already under the Vincennes' tactical control. (Fogarty, 1988, p. 32) 
TABLE 11-9 
AIR ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE -- 1021L 
11 EVENTS 
GW told GB his intention to engage F-14 at 20 NM 
GB told GW to issue warning before engaging 
AAWC directed continuous warnings (one MAD and one IAD warning issued) 
Flt 655 BRG 025, RNG 30 NM, CSE 207, SPD 350, ALT 7000 ft by SPY-1 radar 
CO acknowledged CICO's report that approaching aircraft was a possible commercial aircraft 
.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 11 
As indicated earlier, Golf Whiskey or the AAW TAO informed Golf Bravo 
that the contact was identified as an Iranian F-14. However, Golf Bravo could not verify 
this information on TN 4131 due to time constraints. At 1021L, Golf Whiskey stated his 
intentions of engaging TN 4131 at 20 NM unless it turned away. He requested Golf 
Bravo's concurrence. Golf Bravo approved the request with one stipulation: The 
Vincennes must warn the aircraft first before firing. (Fogarty, 1988, p. 33) 
A series of continuous warnings began. There was no response from Flight 
655 as it remained on a constant bearing, now at 31 NM at 350 KTS climbing through 
an altitude of 7,000 feet. (Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 11; Fogarty, 1988, pp. 33-34) 
Towards the end of this minute, "the combat information officer told the 
commanding officer that the approaching aircraft was possibly a commercial airliner," a 
comment acknowledged by the commanding officer (Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 11). 
TABLE 11- 10 
AIR ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE -- 1022L 
EVENTS 
Radio warnings issued 
Attempts to illuminate Flt 655 with f i e  control radar began 
The "contact" was observed to be descending by various CIC members 
Flt 655 at 9000 ft and ascending by SPY-1 radar 
....................................................................................... 
Source: Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 11 
At 1022L, two minutes prior to firing, the Vincennes continued to issue 
warnings over both IAD and MAD channels. Still no response. The AAWC console 
operator attempted to illuminate the aircraft with fire control radar; however, due to a 
procedural error, the contact could not be illuminated until the actual time of engagement. 
(Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 11) The commanding officer inquired as to the status of TN 
4474, not realizing that the track number had changed. The contact of interest had 
arrived at the critical 20 NM decision point, and an unidentified console operator reported 
the contact was descending from 12,000 feet at 459 KTS. (Rogers, 1992) Also during 
this minute, the first reports of descending altitude occurred. The air detect tracker, 49- 
ADT, observed an IFF Mode I1 appear on his remote control indicator, not on his 
character read out; which occurred at about the 20 NM point. He also noticed that the 
contact was descending in altitude. (Fogarty, 1988, p. 35) In addition, the identification 
supervisor and tactical information coordinator saw that the contact was descending and 
said it aloud over the net. Meanwhile, the Aegis system showed that an unidentified crew 
member manning the watch console of FC-1 "hooked" TN 4474 for five seconds, showing 
a range of 110 NM, a bearing of 139 degrees, altitude of 11,900 feet and speed of 448 
KTS. It was not clear that this information was conveyed over the net. However, Flight 
655 had been and always was ascending. (Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 11; Fogarty, 1988, p. 
34) 
Contrary to what was being seen in the Vincennes' CIC, the tactical action 
officer (TAO) on the Sides noticed that TN 4131 continued to ascend to 11,000 feet as 
it reached closest point of approach (CPA). Also, there was growing excitement and 
yelling in the Sides' CIC about the contact being a commercial aircraft. According to 
Captain Rogers, "When an attempt by the Sides' air tracker to get the TAO's attention 
was made, he was told to 'Shut up, you're making too much noise."' (Rogers, 1 May 
1992) The TAO on the Sides looked at the weapon control officer's IFF box, which read 
in the Mode LII, 6700 block, indicating commercial air. The contact was at 11,000 feet 
and about 15 NM on a course paralleling the Sides. Meanwhile the commanding officer 
of the Sides evaluated the contact "as a non-threat based on CPA to USS Sides, F-14 
ASUW capability, lack of ESM and precedent. He noted an altitude of 11,000 feet and 
shifted his attention to the P-3 to the west." (Fogarty, 1988, p. 36) This evaluation was 
not passed to the Vincennes (Rogers, 1 May 1992). 
TABLE 11- 1 1 
AIR ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE -- 1023L 
- - 
EVENTS 
No radar emissions detected from Flt 655 
Flt 655 BRG 018, RNG 16 NM, SPD 371 KTS, ALT 11230 ft by SPY-1 radar 
TIC began to update range of Flt 655 at every open spot on internal net 15/16 
By SPY-I radar, Flt 655 RNG 14 NM, ALT 12000 ft, SPD 382 KTS 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
Source: Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 11 
At 1023L, the contact was within the 20 NM critical decision point. The 
commanding officer of the Vincennes continued to hold his fire while searching for any 
kind of electronic emission that might help identify the "unknown-assumed hostile" 
contact that was steadily closing in range. Flight 655 was at 16 NM, bearing 018 
degrees, and climbing through an altitude of 11,000 feet at 371 KTS. (Senate Hearing, 
1988, p. 12) 
Concerned that the aircraft continued to close despite repeated warnings, the 
tactical information coordinator, TIC, began to update the aircraft's range at every 
opportunity on the internal net 15/16. (Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 12; Fogarty, 1988, p. 36) 
In reality, at 14 NM from the Vincennes, Flight 655 was climbing through 12,000 feet at 
a speed of 382 KTS a minute prior to missile impact. However, the international air 
distress operator (IAD) recalled the contact being at a height of 7,700 traveling at a speed 
of 450 KTS. Golf Whiskey or the AAW TAO indicated that he "heard continuous reports 
of declining altitude." (Fogarty, 1988, p. 36) 
AIR ENGAl 
TABLE 11- 12 
GEMENT SEQUENCE -- 1024L 
EVENTS 
IDS observed Flt 655 at 7800 ft at 455 KTS descending 
Spy-1 radar held Flt 655 at 12000 ft ascending at 380 KTS 
Firing key turned 
AAWC recalled altitude of 6000-7000 ft 
14 seconds after firing key was turned, MSS started launch sequence 
Three seconds later the first missile was launched followed by the second missile 
Two missiles intercepted Flt 655 BRG 001, RNG 8 NM at 13500 ft at 383 KTS 
....................................................................................... 
Source: Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 12 
At the beginning of this minute, (1024) the Vincennes' system data indicated 
TN 4131 was at a range of 12 NM, speed of 380 knots, and was climbing through an 
altitude of 12,000 feet. The identification supervisor, IDS, observed TN 4131 at 445 KTS 
and descending at 7,800 feet. (Senate Hearing, 1988, 12; Fogarty, 1988, p. 37) 
The commanding officer turned the firing key, initiating the Standard missile 
launch sequence. The anti-air warfare coordinator, AAWC, recalled seeing an altitude of 
6,000-7,000 feet at engagement, while the air intercept coordinator, AIC-3, recalled TN 
4131 at an altitude of 7,000-8,000 feet at missile launch. Meanwhile, the international 
air distress operator, IAD, was in the process of issuing another challenge over the IAD 
when the missiles were launched. By the end of this minute, both missiles struck the 
aircraft, eight NM from the Vincennes at 13,500 feet. (Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 12; 
Fogarty, 1988, p. 38) 
NOTES 
1. The mechanics for citing references is in accordance with the Naval Postgraduate 
School Thesis Manual and is as follows: If a cited reference, (author, date, page), refers 
to only the sentence, the period comes after the cited reference. If the cite refers to the 
paragraph, the cited reference is placed after the period. If the cite follows material in 
quotes, the cited reference follows the period and closing quotation mark. 
2. Tables TI-1 & 2 were found in "Gulf Ops," by Ronald O'Rourke in the U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedinns, Naval Review 1989 edition, page 43. O'Rourke's sources included 
The Washington Post, 13 October 1987, p. 12, The New York Times, 10 January 1988, 
p. E3, and the Center for Defense Information, 6 July 1988 and 13 January 1989. In 
Table 11-2, separate figures for July and August were not available. Also, the Iran-Iraq 
War lasted nearly eight years, starting in 1980, and on 20 August 1988, a United Nations 
sponsored cease fire went into effect. (O'Rourke, 1989, p. 42) 
3. Operation PRAYING MANTIS was the largest battle fought at sea since World War 
11. PRAYING MANTIS' significance was that it showed that the Standard missile can 
be used in a surface-to-surface engagement as a "quick-draw, supersonic, anti-ship 
missile" and verified the reliability and effectiveness of several other modern weapon 
systems. (O'Rourke, 1989, p. 44) For more information regarding air and surface 
engagements during Operation PRAYING MANTIS, see "Operation PRAYING 
MANTIS," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1989, pp. 54-70. 
4. Carlucci made the following announcement: 
Aid will be provided to friendly, innocent, neutral vessels flying a non-belligerent 
flag outside declared war-exclusion zones that are not carrying contraband or 
resisting legitimate visit and search by a Gulf belligerent. Following a request from 
a vessel under attack, assistance will be rendered by a U.S. warship or aircraft if 
this unit is in the vicinity and its mission permits rendering such assistance. 
(O'Rourke, 1989, p. 47) 
5. Also, commercial aircraft usually did not carry radar homing and warning (RHAW) 
equipment, which meant that civilian aircraft would be unaware and could not reply if 
locked on by a fire control radar aboard a military platform. (Fogarty, 1988, p. 16) 
6. In general, IFF systems consist of interrogator and transponder equipment, which are 
used to determine the identity of a radar contact. Upon interrogation by a coded signal, 
an aircraft's transponder will electronically respond with a particular mode and code, such 
as Mode 111-XXXX. The four digit number after the mode is merely a numeric code of 
numbers further identifying the aircraft. Normally, this information is filed on a flight 
plan and processed through air traffic control channels prior to the aircraft's departure. 
Basically, the aircraft can be electronically interrogated by anyone having an IFF system 
tuned to the appropriate frequency. (Friedman, 1989, p. 73) For simplicity purposes in 
this case, Mode I1 will be considered an Iranian military aircraft while a Mode III reply 
would be considered a commercial aircraft. 
7. All times are in local time based on a 24 hour clock. To convert Zulu time to Iranian 
local time, add three hours and thirty minutes, not four hours, to Zulu time i.e., 06472 
equals 1017L. Tehran is 11 112 hours ahead of California time. 
8. Evaluations as to exactly how well the Vincennes performed in the training exercises 
were not available. Results were not entirely outlined in the unclassified report of the 
naval investigation. However, according to an interview with Captain Rogers (U.S. Navy 
retired) on 8 April 1992, the Vincennes received high ratings regarding her performance 
in preparing for the Persian Gulf mission. 
9. The word "gulf' as in the Persian Gulf refers to a body of water. However, in the 
military phonetic alphabet, which is primarily used for clarity in radio communications 
when referring to the English alphabet, the phonetic pronunciation for "G" is "golf' and 
is spelled accordingly. The words "gulf" and "golf' have two separate meanings and are 
spelled differently. Throughout this thesis, other phonetic alphabet references are made 
such as: 
"AW" -- "A": Alpha 
"W": Whiskey 
10. Under the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept of operations involving 
an aircraft carrier, the Persian Gulf's "Golf Whiskey" was equivalent to an "Alpha 
Whiskey," who was the air advisor, and "Golf Sierra" was the same as an "Alpha Sierra," 
the surface advisor. The Vincennes was also Golf Echo, or the Electronic Warfare advisor 
to Golf Bravo as well, but "GE" was not depicted on the Persian Gulf command 
organization diagram, Figure 11-4. 
11. There are five condition codes on-board Navy vessels: 
Condition One is General Quarters with all crewmen manning battle stations and 
all non-combat oriented activities, such as the mess, halted. Condition Two is 
applied when a ship has been operating at General Quarters for a long period, and 
it is necessary to take some crewmen off their battle stations in order to provide 
food or essential repairs. Condition Three puts one-third of the crew at battle 
stations at all times. It is the normal wartime operating state. Condition Four is 
used for routine steaming from port to assignment or in untroubled waters. 
Condition Five applies when a vessel is in port and only partly manned. (Staff 
Investigation, 1987, p. 12) 
12. According to the Siletzky and Campbell Masters Thesis entitled, Comparison of 
~lectromagnetic Propagation p re dictions from REPS and RPO Across a Coastal 
Transition, the following excerpt and Figures It-10 and 11-1 1 describe ducting: 
Electromagnetic waves are refracted, or bent, as they propagate through the 
atmosphere. Strong refraction can produce anomalous EM propagation. While 
refraction occurs at all frequencies, it is particularly important at frequencies from 
30 MHz to 30 GHz, which includes the VHF, UHF, and RADAR bands ... [where] 
the majority of RADARS and communication links utilize this portion of the 
spectrum .... Trapping refers to the refraction of an EM wave for which the wave's 
radius is less than that of the radius of the curvature of the earth. The EM wave 
is then refracted back towards the surface of the earth; if it is then reflected off the 
surface, it will again be refracted back to the earth. This produces ducting, which 
is the channelling of radio or RADAR waves. The EM energy is thus confined to 
a vertical region, instead of spreading normally.(1992, pp. 5 and 7) 
As shown in the following figures, ducting can be categorized into three basic types: 
Evaporation, surface, and elevated duct with various duct thicknesses (1992, p. 10). 
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III. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
A. ADMIRAL FOGARTY'S ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
By order of General George B. Crist, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander in Chief, U.S. 
Central Command, Rear Admiral William M. Fogarty, U.S. Navy, Director, Policy and 
Plans (J-5), U.S. Central Command, was appointed to conduct the formal investigation 
into the circumstances surrounding the downing of a commercial airliner by the 
Vincennes. Because of the divergence between recorded data on the system tapes and the 
recollection of the witnesses concerning what they saw and when, Admiral Fogarty 
requested a psychiatrist and a psychologist from the U.S. Navy Medical Corps to come 
to Bahrain and augment the seven member investigation team to help "determine whether 
the dynamics of the situation, which confronted the crew of the USS Vincennes impacted 
on their ability to perceive and relay the data that was available to them." (Fogarty, 1988, 
pp. 1 and 2) 
There were two categories of data that were employed in the Fogarty report 
pertaining to the air engagement (1988, pp. 28-29): 
System or "actual" data that was extracted from the data tapes of the Aegis 
Command and Decision (C & D) system; 
Recollected or "perceived" data based on witness recall of events as gathered from 
witness statements and testimony. 
Since there were no voice tape recordings that recorded the crew members' dialogue 
over the Vincennes' internal net 15/16 (Rogers, April 1992), the investigation team had 
to literally reconstruct the sequence of events based on both the data extracted from the 
system tapes and witnesses' recollection as to what they "saw" and when they saw it.' 
Because of the short time window involved with the air engagement, both types of 
information were used by the team to assess what happened and when. (Fogarty, 1988, 
P. 2) 
The findings of the Fogarty report2 can be summarized as follows: 
In general, the Vincennes did not intend to shoot down an Iranian commercial 
airliner, but rather it engaged an aircraft the commanding officer (CO) believed to be 
hostile and a threat to his ship. "Based on the information used by the CO, the short time 
frame in which to make his decision, and his personal belief that his ship and the 
Montgomery were being threatened, he acted in a prudent manner." (1988, p. 42) Also, 
based on the information available to Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East 
(CJTFME) or "Golf Bravo," his confidence in Captain Rogers and the capabilities of the 
Vincennes, his concurrence to engage TN 4131 was correct. Essentially, the shoot down 
of Flight 655 was not the result of any negligent or culpable conduct by any Navy 
personnel. (1988, pp. 42-43) 
More specifically, however, time compression played a significant role. From 
the time the CO first became aware that the contact was a possible threat until he made 
his decision to engage, the elapsed time was about three minutes and 40 seconds. Most 
of the CO's time was devoted to the ensuing surface engagement against Iranian gun 
50 
boats, which left very little time for him to personally verify th 
being provided to him. (1988, p. 43) 
~e information that was 
Captain Rogers had great confidence in his Combat Information Center (CIC) 
team's abilities. The Fogarty investigation also felt that the "fog of war and those human 
elements which affect each individual differently--not the least of which was the thought 
of the Stark incident--were factors that must be considered." (1988, p. 43) 
The Aegis weapon system functioned as designed. Had the CO used the 
information generated by his Command and Decision (C & D) system3 as the sole source 
of his tactical information, he might not have engaged TN 4131. Also, the digital data 
extracted from the data recording tapes were valid, providing invaluable insights to 
include the evaluation of individual CIC console operator actions. (1988, p. 43) 
According to the investigation team's interpretation, Captain Rogers based his 
decision to engage TN 4131 on the following: The aircraft took off from a joint 
rnilitary/civilian airfield in Iran, heading directly towards his ship at a relatively low 
altitude that was lower than what the Vincennes observed commercial flights to fly 
previously. Also, the contact was not flying exactly on the airway center line. Not only 
did TN 4131 appear to veer towards the Montgomery upon fire control radar illumination, 
but it was reported to be increasing in speed, decreasing in altitude and closing range. 
These characteristics signified that the aircraft was maneuvering into an attack position. 
No radar transmission was detected from track 4131, and the aircraft was not responding 
to verbal warnings over the Military Air Distress (MAD) and International Air Distress 
(IAD) channels. Personnel aboard the Vincennes reported the aircraft to be squawking 
5 1 
Mode 11-1 100, which was historically correlated to Iranian F-14's. Iranian fighter aircraft 
had flown coincident with the surface hostilities between U.S. and Iranian forces as 
demonstrated on 18 April 1988 during Operation PRAYING MANTIS. There were no 
combat air control aircraft in the area to provide a visual identification. Also, an Iranian 
P-3 was airborne to the west of the Vincennes had turned inbound. Warnings from 
intelligence cautioned U.S. forces to prepare for increased hostile activity over the 4th of 
July weekend. Other factors included the Stark incident that had occurred a year prior, 
and the possibility of the aircraft contact being on a suicide mission. And lastly, Iranian 
F-14s had an air-to-surface weapons capability. (1988, pp. 43-44) Captain Rogers' 
decision to delay engagement until the aircraft was within 15 NM demonstrated an 
appreciation for the consequences of his actions, which was balanced with his 
responsibility to defend his ship. (1988, p. 45) 
The Vincennes was adequately trained to perform her mission as a unit in the 
Joint task Force Middle East. She properly applied the rules of engagement (ROE) to 
both surface and air engagements. With the exception of the AAWC position, the 
Vincennes' Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) watch organization was experienced and qualified. 
Regarding the rest of the watch organization, "Golf Whiskey" was considered by the CO 
as his primary force and ship air warfare advisor. The Fogarty investigation team made 
the following observations: 
The Persian Gulf modifications to the Vincennes' CIC organization moved the 
ship's AAW coordination function away from AAWC and left him acting largely 
as a console operator. Assignment of 'GW' to Force AAW, Ship AAW, and 
[deleted] talker for surface and air [Situation Reports] SITREPS degraded his ability 
to independently assess the actual profile and [identification] ID of TN 4131. (1988, 
P. 46) 
The ensuing surface engagement was a significant factor that increased the 
tension within the CIC as well as the foul bore on mount 51. The subsequent high speed 
maneuvering of the ship to keep Mount 52 in a position to engage the gunboats 
complicated the situation and prevented the CO from devoting full attention to TN 4131. 
(1988, p. 47) 
The Fogarty team indicated that the information made available to the CO 
conflicted in some cases with the data available in the Aegis Command and Decision (C 
& D) system. This conflict involved two areas: The C & D system contained no Mode 
I1 IFF information on TN 4131; yet, operators in the CIC used Mode I1 as a means of 
declaring TN 4131 as an Iranian F-14. Also, the C & D system showed TN 4131 
continuously ascending, while the CO received reports of descending altitude prior to 
enabling the firing key. (1988, p. 44) 
Regarding the air engagement, at no time did Flight 655 descend in altitude 
prior to engagement. It was on a normal climb-out from Bandar Abbas and was flying 
within an established air route, albeit 3.37 NM west of the centerline. It was still in the 
assigned airway, but not exactly on the centerline. Additionally, Flight 655 was not 
squawking Mode II-1100, but Mode 111-6760 during the entire flight. Although IFF codes 
were not absolute determinants for engagement, Mode III was the least reliable, because 
all aircraft were capable of squawking Mode III. (1988, p. 47-48) Regarding this IFF 
issue, the Fogarty investigation concluded the following: 
The IDS mis-correlated a [Remote Control Indicator] RCI readout of Mode 11-1 100 
with TN 4131. This occurred, according to analysis of data, when the IDS hooked 
TN 4131 as it departed Bandar Abbas and left it hooked for almost 90 seconds. 
This meant that as the hooked symbol moved toward the USS Vincennes, the read- 
gate for the RCI remained near Bandar Abbas. A Mode 11 transmission from an 
aircraft on the ground in Bandar Abbas would then be displayed in his RCI if the 
signal could get to the ship. The un-correlated IFF Mode 11-1100 obtained by IDS 
could have been generated by a military aircraft (C-130, F-4, F-14) located on the 
ground at Bandar Abbas. This was supported by his IDS' RCI set up and the [radio 
frequency] RF ducting condition in effect on 3 July 1988. Therefore, any number 
of military aircraft present at the airfield could have responded to a Mode I1 IFF 
interrogation by USS Vincennes due to the ducting conditions prevalent that day. 
(1988, p. 48) 
Incidentally, TN 4133, which was an Iranian C-130 (Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 53), 
departed Bandar Abbas simultaneously with the Vincennes' missile launch squawking 
Mode 1-1 1. This could have been a potential source of confusion between Mode 1-1 1 and 
Mode 11-1100 on IDS and AAWC's RCI. (1988, p. 48) 
Another source of confusion could be attributed to the impending engagement. 
It is entirely possible that decreasing altitude passed over the net by TIC after the 15 NM 
point could have occurred if TIC passed range values only. These range values could 
have been interpreted as altitude values. Another possibility could be that the TIC 
misread his character read out (CRO) and interchanged altitude and range. (1988, p. 48) 
The investigation team indicated that the ship's air controller supervisor's 
(ACS) recollection of 7800 feet at six NM was actually the altitude of TN 4131 33 
seconds after missile intercept. This individual was essentially recollecting the planes' 
altitude as it plummeted to the water. In addition, the team also attributed the recollection 
of Mode III IFF responses other than 6760 for TN 4131 were caused by imperfect recall 
by the IDS, ACS, AAWC console operators as well as the post incident situation report 
writer. And lastly, the range and altitude information passed to the CO on Net 15 was 
correct until TN 41 3 1 reached approximately 15 NM--approximate time 1023L. (1 988, 
P. 48) 
Regarding commercial aircraft, the investigation team felt that current verbal 
warnings and challenges were not specific enough, for they did not clearly identify to 
pilots which aircraft the ship was attempting to contact. Also, there were a limited 
number of very high frequency (VHF) radios on surface units that seriously limited their 
capability to simultaneously monitor the IAD frequency and communicate with civilian 
air traffic control towers. Although the warnings could be transmitted over the IAD and 
MAD and be heard by other ships in the area, it is not clear to the ship issuing the 
warning whether a particular aircraft has heard a particular challenge, unless it replies or 
turns away. (1988, pp. 48-49) 
And finally, the Fogarty team assessed CJTFME involvement as the following: 
The CJTFME's confidence in Captain Rogers, the Aegis weapon system, and the 
information available to him from the Flag Plot were factors that led to his concurrence 
with the Vincennes' decision to engage. The CJTFME exercised good judgement in 
directing the Vincennes to warn the aircraft before firing. However, due to the fact that 
the CJTFME did not have a real time data link, he could not have independently verified 
the data regarding TN 4131. (1988, pp. 49-50) 
In summary, Admiral Fogarty indicated that his investigation team was 
"unsuccessful in satisfactorily reconciling the conclusion that the contact was descending 
when in fact the Aegis weapon system showed the aircraft always to be climbing." 
(Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 16) The investigation team felt there were some psychological 
factors involved with the incident. As they discovered disparities between the C & D 
system data tapes and what various CIC members believed they saw, Admiral Fogarty 
requested the professional advice of the USN Medical Corps who were experts in the area 
of combat stress. The Medical Corps' opinion was reflected in the Fogarty report: 
Stress, task fixation, an unconscious distortion of data may have played a major role 
in this incident. [Tactical Information Coordinator] TIC and [Identification 
Supervisor] IDS became convinced track 4131 was an Iranian F-14 after receiving 
the IDS report of a momentary Mode 11. After this report of the Mode 11, TIC 
appearred] to have distorted data flow in an unconscious attempt to make available 
evidence fit a preconceived scenario. ('Scenario fulfillment') TIC'S perception that 
there was an inexperienced, weak leader in the [Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator] 
AAWC position led to the emergence of TIC in a leadership role. TIC'S reports 
were accepted by all and could have influenced the final decision to launch 
missiles. (1988, p. 45) 
By primarily attributing this divergence to "...the misreading of altitude" (Senate Hearing, 
1988, p. 16) due to "...combat induced stress on personnel" (Fogarty, 1988, p. 51), 
Admiral Fogarty recommended that the Chief of Naval Operations direct further study 
concerning the impact of stress factors on personnel aboard naval ships with highly 
technological and sophisticated command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) 
systems as well as address the possibility of establishing a psychological profile for 
personnel who must function in this type of environment. (Fogarty, 1988, p. 51). The 
Fogarty investigation team could not account for the divergence between system and 
recollected data, and it still remained a puzzle at the time of the Senate Hearing before 
the Committee on Armed Services. Essentially, the Fogarty interpretation considered this 
disparity as a result of stress. 
B. CAPTAIN ROGERS' ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
1. Introduction 
Captain Rogers' account corresponds with the Fogarty version, except for two 
aspects: His analysis and interpretation points to a confusion over track numbers and the 
existence of a second aircraft. The information obtained in this section was derived from 
several meetings starting from a classroom presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School 
in Monterey, California, by Captain Will Rogers, 111, to C3 students held on 9 August 
1990 and a series of personal interviews on 9 October 1991, 13 February 1992 and 8 & 
9 April 1992. During the interviews with Captain Rogers, he specifically emphasized that 
the track number issue was just one piece of the puzzle. Additionally, Captain Rogers 
indicated that the remarks made by Senator John Glenn succinctly summarized "six 
fundamental considerations" that he had to consider prior to his decision to engage. 
According to Senator Glenn, in a statement submitted at the Senate Hearing, the following 
remarks were made: 
It has been said that there were six critical fundamental considerations to the 
incident that the CO of the Vincennes could neither control nor discount: Vincennes 
was engaged in intense surface action with Iranian gunboats. The unidentified 
assumed hostile contact had taken off from an airfield used by military aircraft. 
The flight was heading directly at Vincennes and its range was relentlessly closing. 
The unknown aircraft radiated no definitive radar emissions. Vincennes' warnings 
went unacknowledged and unanswered. The compression of time gave him an 
extremely short decision window, less than 5 minutes. Additionally, it was only 
prudent for Captain Rogers to assume that the contact was related to his 
engagement with the Iranian boats until proven otherwise--the proof never came. 
(Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 56) 
2. Naval Tactical Data System 
The air engagement was a complicated sequencing of events. One of the most 
difficult aspects of this sequence was to understand how the track number issue fit in. 
The following description, written in coordination with Captain Rogers', was deliberately 
simplified to give the reader a flavor of what happened without getting swamped with 
detaL4 
The Naval Tactical Data System's Link 11 allows tactical data to be 
transmitted and received between various ships and aircraft in a battle group. The link 
is a real time data transfer, which allows all participating units to share an expanded 
picture. This sharing of information enlarges the tactical picture available to the battle 
group. (Rogers 1992) 
In general, when a contact is detected by radar, the link input operator will 
acquire the target and designate it to the system which assigns the track a four digit track 
number. Each ship or aircraft is assigned a block of numbers that is specific to that ship 
or aircraft. The track numbers from this block of numbers are used to identify the 
contact. Once the contact is identified by track number, information regarding the 
contact's kinematics such as speed, range, course, altitude and IFF, is continuously 
updated by the entering participating unit (PU), unless the contact is dropped from the 
link. These track numbers allow all units to track the same contact using the same 
common reference number. Within this system, a link controller manages the link, and 
a protocol of written and machine based "dos and don'ts" is utilized to control system 
operation. (Rogers, 1992) 
3. Aegis Command and Decision System 
In the case of the Aegis Command and Decision (C & D) system, the operator 
can obtain kinematic information on the contact of interest (COI) by either "hookingr" the 
contact by rolling the ball tab to the COI and depressing the "hook" button or by entering 
the track number on the digital display entry unit key pad. An overview of the 05-194 
PPI display console is presented in Appendix C. By either method, kinematic information 
will be displayed in an alpha numeric manner on the character read out (CRO). This 
detailed information does not reflect on the large screen display (LSD). (Rogers, 1992; 
Mosher6, 1992) 
The Vincennes is equipped with a state of the art weapon system called Aegis, 
which is capable of rapidly developing track data for several hundred contacts virtually 
simultaneously. Because of the speed with which the track file is built, a feature was 
designed into the system that automatically correlates link track numbers entered by other 
units and compares these with its "own ship" information. If its "own ship" track can be 
correlated, the track number assigned by Aegis is retrieved and returned to track stores. 
This feature allows track management of numbers of contacts greater than the size of the 
assigned track block. This track number correlation and management is accomplished 
automatically. However, there is no alerting mechanism that calls the operator's attention 
to the fact that an auto-correlation had taken place on a contact. (Rogers, 1992) 
Another aspect of the Aegis system is that once a contact is generated, the 
computer will assign an internal number called a control track storage number (CTSL) 
to that track. The CTSL is transparent to the operator. In the Vincennes' case, the CTSL 
assigned to the contact that got shot down remained the same from the time the aircraft 
was detected to missile impact. On the other hand, the common track number changed 
three times during the detect to engage sequence as will be described. (Rogers, 1992) 
4. Track Number Sequence 
The USS Vincennes was assigned track block 4400-4576. The USS Sides was 
assigned block 3400-3576, while the British ship, HMS Manchester, was assigned 6400- 
6576. As discussed, these numbers allow all units in the link to call up and display 
which participating unit entered the track. (Rogers, 1992; Rogers, 1990) 
At about 1017L, the Vincennes and the Sides detected the same contact 
originating from Bandar Abbas practically simultaneously. The Vincennes assigned the 
contact TN 4474, and the Sides assigned it TN 4130 over the link using a track number 
from the wrong block. The Sides was in the link for a short period, but briefly dropped 
from the link. Upon the Sides' rejoining the link, she re-reported the contact, this time 
as TN 413 1, which was another link protocol violation. Meanwhile, the Vincennes had 
identified this contact as TN 4474. The Aegis system auto-correlated this information and 
adopted TN 4131 as the new common track number. Again, this correlation was done 
automatically by the system, not by the operator, which was a standard operating 
procedure inherent in the Aegis system. Track number 4474 was assigned initially by the 
Aegis system and was the number later used when the track information was requested 
by the commanding officer. So, TN 4474 went back into the system as an unused track 
number. (Rogers, 1992) 
In the Gulf of Oman, there were three ships that came into play: the USS 
Spruance, a destroyer, the USS Forrestal, an aircraft carrier, and a British ship, HMS 
Manchester, which was over 100 NM southeast of the Vincennes in the Gulf of Oman. 
When TN 4131 was nearing the 20 NM critical decision point as to whether to engage 
the contact or not, an A-6 was flying a surface combat air patrol (SUCAP) mission and 
was checking in with the E-2 from the Forrestal. At this time, the A-6 was descending 
and accelerating during check in. The A-6's track number was issued by the Spruance 
and was designated, coincidentally, as TN 4474. In the meantime, the HMS Manchester, 
which was just entering the Southern Persian Gulf link (that was comprised of the 
Vincennes, Sides and Montgomery) included the Spruance's track of 4474 in her reported 
track file. The kinematics of TN 4474, now, once again, in the Vincennes' tactical picture 
indicated high speed (459 KTS) and descent from an altitude of 12,000 feet. This track 
number (TN 4474) re-entered the link at about the time the actual contact of interest (TN 
4131) was at the critical 20 NM decision point, at which point the Commanding Officer 
of the Vincennes asked the question, "What is 4474 doing?" An unidentified console 
operator entered the numbers 4-4-7-4 onto the remote control indicator key pad rather 
than "ball tab and hooking" the contact of interest on the console scope. Neither the 
operator nor the captain were aware at that moment that the track number had changed 
from TN 4474 to TN 4131. When the key pad was utilized to input the numbers, the 
system brought up the kinematics of the A-6 contact associated with TN 4474. 
Consequently, reports to the command console that the contact was descending from 
12,000 feet at 459 KTS were generated. This information was conveyed over internal net 
15/16. Throughout the remaining minute, more reports from other console stations 
indicated that the contact was in fact descending and closing. (Rogers, 1992) At ten NM 
the missiles were launched, with the first missile intercepting TN 4131 at a range of eight 
NM, speed of 383 KTS and altitude of 13,500 feet. (Fogarty, 1988, p. 39) 
5. Summary 
In sum, Captain Rogers offered a different interpretation of the incident, in 
which he introduced the confusion in track numbers as well as the existence of two 
aircraft. Not that the track number issue was an overriding contribution to the airliner 
shoot down, it was but one small piece of a complex puzzle that was compounded by 
other equally as important contributing factors. 
C. AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
1 Introduction 
Considering both the Fogarty and Rogers' interpretations of the incident, the 
divergence between system and recollected data still remains a problematic issue in that 
the system data showed the aircraft always to be ascending, while recollected accounts 
from witnesses indicated the aircraft was descending. To address this issue, relationships 
between range, altitude, time, speed, and track number variables as obtained from the 
Fogarty investigation report are presented and compared. The driving force behind this 
analysis was to determine whether there were two aircraft involved in the Vincennes 
incident or not. 
2. System Data 
The first step taken in performing the analysis was to construct scatter plots 
of the data presented in the Fogarty report regarding the air engagement, in which a 
comprehensive data set listing is comprised in Appendix D. Each (x,y) entry represents 
a point plotted on a two dimensional coordinate system. The plots were then analyzed 
for trends regarding their clustering tendency or lack thereof and for any other pattern that 
emerged. Also, Appendix E presents a correlation coefficient summary of all scatter plots 
and Appendix F contains regression equations for all graphs having a linear fit line drawn 
through the data. 
The information presented in Table 111-1 is a composite of all system data 
entries that were presented in the air engagement "Time Line" section of the Fogarty 
report (1988, pp. 28-39). System data entries were extracted from the text and compiled 
in tabular form. The system data as presented in the Fogarty report were originally 
obtained from the Vincennes' data reduction tapes, depicting a second-by-second account 
of the position, kinematics, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) information and Link 11 
message flow of all contacts held by the Vincennes' Aegis weapon system. Furthermore, 
the data enabled the reconstruction of all "button actions" by the Command and Decision 
(C & D) console operators and the information available to them on their console read 
outs. (Fogarty, 1988, pp. 8-9) Table III- 1 is a summary of all information that could be 
reasonably assimilated from the Fogarty report, regarding the above relationships. 
TABLE 111- 1 
I RANGE, ALTITUDE, TIME, SPEED AND TRACK 
NUMBER VARIABLES 
RANGE ALTITUDE TIME SPEED 1 47 900" 1017 --- 
I I I I 
8 13500 1024 383 4131 
..................... ..................... ---------_-- ------------- ------------ 
a. Altitude obtained from Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 10. 
b. Aegis auto-correlated the Vincennes' track number of 4474 and the Sides' track number of 4131, 
resulting in TN 4131 as the new track number for the air contact originating from Bandar Abbas. 
c. FC-1 hooked TN 4474. 
As displayed in Table IH-1 and as confirmed in Admiral Fogarty's report: 
The data from the USS Vincennes' tapes, information from USS Sides and reliable 
intelligence information, corroborates the fact that TN 4131 was on a normal 
commercial air flight plan profile, in the assigned airway, squawking Mode 111 
6760, on a continuous ascent in altitude from takeoff at Bandar Abbas to shoot 
down. (1988, p. 8) 
Therefore, based on the above assessment regarding the system data, the flight profile as 
represented by the "X" symbol is actually Iran Air Flight 655 in Figures 111-1 through HI- 
The system data in the above table shows that the TN 4474 data point at 
1022L is not consistent with the other data points representing Flight 655. There are 
several interesting observations that stand out just by scanning the table: First, the 
labelling of the track number as TN 4474 is not consistent with the other labels of TN 
413 1 between 1019L and 1024L. Secondly, the track number label of TN 4474 is the 
same as the track number of the contact when it was originally detected by the Vincennes 
at 1017L. Thirdly, the speed of the TN 4474 data point at 1022L is 63 knots faster than 
the highest speed reached by TN 4131 at that time. Also, the range is not even close to 
the furthest point at which the contact was originally detected at 47 NM. And, lastly, the 
altitude is nearly 2,000 feet higher than the highest point reached by TN 4131 at 1022L. 
Not shown on the table is bearing. The FC-1 hook of TN 4474 at 1022L indicated a 
bearing of 139 degrees, while the rest of the data indicated TN 4131 was maintaining a 
constant bearing of 025 degrees. 
In sum, the system data as presented in Table 111-1 suggests the existence of 
two aircraft, which will be further demonstrated graphically. 
a. Altitude versus Range 
Three scatter plots were created from the system data to illustrate the 
relationships between altitude versus range, altitude versus time, and range versus time. 
In Figure 111-1, altitude entries ranged from a height of 900 feet to 13,500 feet (y-axis), 
while the range entries were in nautical miles (x-axis). These altitude and range entries 
include the FC-1 data point as extracted from the system tapes and is designated with the 
following symbol, "*", on the scatter plot. Overall, the negative slope as depicted by the 
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Figure 111-1. System Data--Altitude versus Range 
"Xu symbol indicates the aircraft was ascending: As the range decreased or as the contact 
got closer to the Vincennes, the contact was continuously climbing. However, the 
correlation coefficient, -.293, was weak. It appears FC-1 data point of TN 4474 had an 
adverse influence on the degree of linear relationship among the variables. To assess the 
extent of this influence, the correlation coefficient was re-computed without the FC-1 
hook of TN 4474, and a strong linear relationship was realized as shown by a coefficient 
of -.997. (Refer to Appendix E, Correlation Coefficient Summary, Groups 1 and 3 for 
a comparison of correlation coefficients.) This magnitude of change from a weak to a 
strong linear relationship suggests the FC-1 hook of TN 4474 is not related to the 
remaining data. Its removal strengthened the linear relationship among the rest of the 
data points, which happen to be data points from Flight 655's flight profile. 
b. Altitude versus Time 
Altitude entries were depicted height in feet (y-axis) while time 
increments were based on a 24 hour clock spaced at minute intervals (x-axis). A total of 
15 observations were provided by system data. The "*" symbol in Figure ID-2 represents 
the TN 4474 data point at 1022L, 11,900 feet, as identified in Table ID-1. The positive 
slope represents a rate in feet per minute that Flight 655 was ascending. As time 
progressed, the contact continuously gained in altitude as it approached the Vincennes. 
This trend is also revealed by the correlation coefficient of +.979, which shows a strong 
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igure 111-2. System ~ata--~ltitude versus Time 
tendency of the data to reflect a linear relationship. Without the FC-1 hook of TN 4474, 
there is an even stronger linear relationship. 
Also, the data points tended to cluster at the time of 1022L, which is 
a significant time period in the air engagement. At this time, the TN 4474 data point was 
nearly 2,000 feet higher than the rest of the data points for that minute. Regarding 
Rogers' interview data, he asked, "What is 4474 doing?" at the 20 NM point, which 
correlates to the time frame of 1022L. An unidentified console operator stated the contact 
was at 12,000 feet and descending, which was only 100 feet higher than the altitude 
obtained by the hook of TN 4474 by the FC-1 at 1022L. 
c. Range versus Time 
The last plot in this series involves range in nautical miles (y-axis) 
versus time based on a 24 hour clock in minute increments (x-axis). The significance 
of Figure 111-3 is not necessarily the fact that as time progressed, range decreased, but the 
lack of relationship between the FC-1 hook of TN 4474 and the rest of the data points 
signifying Flight 655. The FC-1 data point was at a range of 110 NM, while the next 
most extreme range value at 1022L was at 25 NM. 
d. Summary of System Data 
When comparing all three graphs as consolidated in Figure 111-4 and the 
system data as provided in Table 111-1, it is evident that the FC-1 hook of TN 4474 at 
1022L is not congruent with the rest of the data. On the other hand, there is congruence 
between the variables of time and their track number designation exists between the FC-1 
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hook of TN 4474 at 1022L, the remaining system data points, and Rogers' interpretation. 
The nature of this congruence is outlined in the following: 
TN 4474 was the Vincennes' original track number designating Flight 655 and was 
labelled as "unknown-assumed enemy. " 
The Aegis system automatically correlated the track numbers from TN 4474 to TN 
4131. 
The Spruance coincidentally designated TN 4474 to an A-6. 
At 1022L, Rogers inquired at to the status of TN 4474, and an unidentified operator 
responded with kinematic information characteristic of an attack profile. 
The Manchester entered into the Southern Persian Gulf link bringing with it the 
Spruances' track of 4474. 
And, kinematics associated with the hook of TN 4474 by an unidentified 
watchstander manning the FC-1 console are not congruent with the Flight 655 
profile. 
Even though range seems to be problematic in Figure III-3 with the FC-1 data point, it 
really serves to strengthen the argument that Aegis operators were obtaining information 
about the A-6 that was over 100 NM away, and that the A-6 kinematics were already in 
the system even though the duration of the FC- 1 hook lasted five seconds. At first glance 
at the graphs, the TN 4474 hook by the FC-1 seems as if it was an anomaly and that it 
should be "thrown out" from the "good" data. But, in actuality, it is a lynch pin that 
helps to ascertain why crew members were reporting descending altitude readings and 
increasing speed, when the contact of interest was ascending. This relationship will be 
further discussed in recollected data section. Based on Captain Rogers' interview data 
and the kinematics of the FC-1 hook of TN 4474 as shown by the system data, the 
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following pattern emerges: The kinematics of the FC-1 hook is not related to the system 
data, but is related to Captain Rogers' interview data. There is a strong possibility that 
the kinematics associated with the FC-1 hook of TN 4474 was the kinematics associated 
with the A-6 in the Gulf of Oman. 
3. Recollected Data 
A second data set was created based on recollected data by witnesses as 
extracted from the text in the Fogarty report (1988, pp. 29-39). There were 18 different 
observations that were detailed enough to plot on a graph. Before delving into the 
graphical analysis, it should be noted that there may be some bias inherent in the data by 
virtue of the type of data that it is--recollections from witnesses. This bias involves the 
extent of witness recall and how accurate the recollection was. Another source of bias 
resides in the investigation team as they placed the events in sequential order based on 
their interpretation of what the witnesses said through statements and testimony. 
The Fogarty report did not state in all instances where Combat Information 
Center (CIC) members were obtaining this information. Typical dialogue in the report 
was "AIC-3 recalled an altitude of 9000 feet at 20 NM" (Fogarty, 1988, p. 20), but did 
not indicate where or from what instrument he was obtaining this information. Some 
entries contain more detailed information than others, which again goes back to the 
accuracy of the testimony and witness statements and their interpretation by the 
investigation team. 
Despite these apparent limitations, it is assumed that the witnesses' 
recollections were reasonable and that the information in the report was comprehensive. 
Also, it is assumed that the investigation team integrated witness accounts with that of 
the data tapes to reconstruct the sequence of events with minimal deviation from reality. 
As shown by Table 111-2, the recollected or "perceivedt1 data from witness 
accounts are presented in composite form; however, it should be noted that there was no 
recollected data provided in the Fogarty report by the crew member manning the FC-1 
console (FC-1) stating what he believed he saw. Since there was no witness testimony 
from that individual available, there was no data that could be entered into Table 111-2 
from FC-1. As already shown with the system data, TN 4474 was hooked by FC-1. The 
FC- 1 hook is a system data point extracted from the data reduction tapes, not a data point 
based on witness recall. 
TABLE III-2 
RECOLLECTED DATA BY WITNESSES WITH RANGE, ALTITUDE, TIME, 
SPEED AND TRACK NUMBER VARIABLES 
11 WHO I RANGE I ALTJTUDE 1 TIME [ SPEED 1 TN 
obtain a single value in order to plot the data point. 
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a. Altitude versus Time 
The recollected data as depicted with the hourglass symbol was derived 
using all "perceived" altitude versus time entries regarding the crew's recollection of 
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Hourglass -- Recollected data by witnesses 
Slope : Negative 
Correlation Coefficient: - .488 
the contact descended as it approached the Vincennes. However, the clustering tendency 
of this data is not strong, but in the weak to moderate range as revealed by the correlation 
coefficient, -.488 as shown in Appendix E, Group 2, Correlation Coefficient Summary. 
b. Altitude versus Range 
The next graphical presentation, Figure 111-6, contains recollected 
altitude versus range entries regarding the perceived flight of "Iran Air Flight 655" by 
various Vincennes crew members. The altitude is in feet (y-axis), while range is in 
nautical miles (x-axis). The correlation coefficient is +.483, which is in the weak to 
moderate range. The slope is positive, indicating that the contact was decreasing in as 
it approached the Vincennes. 
c. Summary of Recollected Data 
Overall, the recollected data suggests the existence of one aircraft. The 
trends emerging from the data show a weak-to-moderate clustering tendency and that the 
contact was descending in altitude. The weak-to-moderate clustering tendency of the 
recollected data sparked further inquiry. 
4. Comparative Analysis between System and Recollected Data 
Before continuing with more graphical analysis, a comparison was made 
between system data and recollected data as shown in Table III-3, using the following 
question as a guide: How much disparity was there between actual and perceived data 
entries? Data points in the recollected data set that were reasonably close to actual data 
entries were those entries with a 2,000 foot maximum disparity in altitude and three NM 
- 
- 
Figure 111-6. Recollected Data by Witnesses--Altitude versus 
Range 
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Hourglass -- Recollected data by witnesses 
Slope : Positive 
Correlation Coefficient: +.483 
maximum disparity in range. All other entries outside this "disparity range" were 
considered highly disparate entries. 
There were minimal disparities between the variables of time and range. 
However, the disparities in altitude ranged from no disparity, 0 feet, to a maximum 
disparity of 7,000 feet between system and recollected data. Hence, the last column 
consists of altitude disparities, since it was the largest source of disparity of the variables 
analyzed. Interestingly, over time, the disparity between actual and perceived data 
altitude entries tended to increase. 
TABLE III-3 
VARIANCE TABLE BETWEEN ACTUAL AND PERCEIVED DATA 
- -- 
* AAWC 29/30 7000/8500 
* OSDA 29/29 7000/8000 
? 49 ADT 25/25 840011 2000 
* CSC 22/22 9200/10300 
CIC 
Member 
* IAD 20120 lOOOO/lO500 
* AIC-3 20120 1ooOO/9000 
* TIC 15/15 11000/11000 
? AIC-3 15/15 1 1000/7700 
A time 1 Disparity 
?? GW 4013 9 4000/9800 
A range 
P range P time I 
A altitude 
P altitude 
? IAD 15/15 11000/7800 
? RSC 12/12 12370/5500 11 ? IDS 1211 1 12370/7800 
I I 11 ? 49 ADT I lO/lO 1 12950/7800 
11 ?? TIC 1 10/10 I 12950/10000 
11 ? AAWC I 818 I 135W/65W 1024/1024 7000 ft 
I I I I 11 ? MSS 1 816 13500/7000 1024/1024 6500 ft 
I I I I 
?? - Data entries that appeared out of place with both recollected and system data. 
* - Recollected data entries that were reasonably close to actual data entries--within 2000 feet and 3 
NM 
? - Highly disparate entries from actual data entries--in excess of 2000 feet and 3 NM 
"A" - Actual or system data entries 
" P  - Perceived or recollected data entries by witnesses 
a. Comparative Scatter Plots within Recollected Data 
( I )  Altitude versus Time 
There were 18 different observations regarding altitude versus time 
from 12 CIC members who were the following: GW, AIC-3, AAWC, OSDA, 49 ADT, 
CSC, IAD, TIC, RSC, IDS, MSS and UBS. Multiple observations were provided by 
AIC-3 consisting of three entries, and two entries each from the AAWC, 49 ADT, TIC 
and IAD. On several graphs these multiple entries will be connected by a dashed line to 
show their trend. 
Figure III-7 shows a scatter plot of all "perceived" or recollected 
data entries, with data points in close proximity to system data entries being labelled. 
These data entries were tagged with a "*" symbol in Table III-3. The following trend 
was revealed: At 1021L, the AAWC, OSDA and AIC-3 entries were "reasonably close," 
within 2,000 feet, to entries from the actual system data tapes. The data points as 
provided by the CSC, IAD, AIC-3 were also reasonably close at 1022L. The TIC'S input 
at 1023L indicated no disparity with the system data. Just by focusing on the labelled 
entries, a pattern emerges as demonstrated by the linear fit drawn through the labelled 
data points, which shows as time progressed, the altitude increased. This trend was 
commensurate with what the real Flight 655 was doing. Appendix F contains the 
regression equation for this and all subsequent linear fits drawn. However, when 
analyzing the recollected data points labelled in Figure 111-8, which represent the highly 
disparate entries as designated with a "?" symbol on Table 111-3, another linear 
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Hourglass with operator label -- Recollected data by witnesses 
in close agreement wf th system data. Corresponds to .** symbol 
in Table 111-3. 
Hourglass without operator label -- Remaining recollected data 
relationship appears. The scatter plot in Figure 111-8 illustrates that as time progressed, 
especially after 1022L, the altitude of the contact decreased. A more descriptive picture 
is presented when Figures III-7 and 111-8 are consolidated on one graph, Figure ID-9. 
Here, another pattern emerges within the recollected by witnesses data set: Both 
ascending and descending observations were made by crew members as shown by the 
empty and solid hourglass symbols, respectively. Up until 1023L, most of the recollected 
data entries were matching system data entries. In fact, at 1023L, the TIC'S observation 
matched exactly with the system data. As shown in Figure 111-9, the 49 ADT recollected 
that the contact was at 12,000 feet at 1022L--an unusually high altitude. It was also at 
this time that the system data indicated the FC-1 hooked TN 4474 having an altitude of 
11,900 feet. At 1023L and 1024L the IAD, AIC-3, RSC, AAWC, UBS, MSS, IDS and 
49-ADT were all recalling entries that were over 2,000 feet below system data entries. 
The majority of these low altitude readings occurred at 1024L, the minute of missile 
impact. Additionally, at 1022L, Captain Rogers asked, "What is 4474 doing?" The 
response he received was that the contact was at 12,000 feet and descending at 459 knots 
(Rogers, 1992). It is entirely plausible, due to the track number issue and the reentry of 
TN 4474 into the Vincennes' tactical picture, that personnel were still thinking TN 4474 
was still a valid track. Consequently, eight individuals could very well have been seeing 
kinematic information regarding the A-6 in the Gulf of Oman on their character read out 
displays. 
However, when the recollected data set is analyzed in aggregate, 
with no labelling, the overall tendency for this data set shows a negative slope, suggesting 
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Solid hourglass -- Recollected data by witnesses not in close 
agreement with system data. Corresponds 
to "3" symbol in Table 111-3 representing 
highly disparate entries. 
Empty hourglass -- Recollected data by witnesses in close 
agreement with system data. Corresponds 
to "*" symbol in Table 111-3. 
Hourglass with "? "  next to operator label -- Data points that 
were not in agreement with either system or 
recollected data entries. 
that there was one aircraft that was descending in altitude. But, upon further analysis and 
labelling, the existence of two aircraft become apparent. Consequently, this divergence 
I among the recollected data points probably accounts for the weak to moderate correlation 
coefficient of -.488. 
To recap, patterns in the altitude versus time recollected data 
scatter plot show the existence of two aircraft. It was only until the data points were 
physically labelled and a disparity comparison was accomplished did this data set finally 
reveal some significant patterns. The first pattern as shown in Figure III-7 indicated that 
the contact was climbing. These data entries were within 2,000 feet of the system data 
set. The second pattern emerged in Figure 111-8, where the highly disparate entries from 
Table 111-3 were physically labelled on the graph. These entries were in excess of 2,000 
feet of the system data, showing that as time passed, the contact was descending. Figure 
111-9 is a composite of Figures III-7 and 111-8. Essentially, line "a" designates the flight 
path of Flight 655, which was climbing, and line "b" designates a descending flight 
profile. 
(2)  Altitude versus Range 
The next scatter plot, Figure ID-10, involves another in depth 
analysis of recollected data. The empty hourglass symbols are those data points where 
crew member observations were in reasonable proximity to that of the system data on 
Flight 655 as extracted from the Aegis system data tapes. The entries with the solid 
hourglass symbol represent those data points, that when compared to the system data 
entries there is a large disparity as summarized in Table 111-3, In Figure HI-10, several 
crew members were within reasonable proximity to the data tape entries. However, as 
Flight 655 neared the Vincennes at about the 15 to 20 NM point, increased observations 
indicating that the aircraft was descending were noted. This tendency was particularly 
evident by the dashed lines among CIC members with multiple observations, which was 
directly contrary to what was happening in with Flight 655. 
As depicted in Figure Ill-10, the TIC recalled that TN 4474 was 
changed to TN 4131 "somewhere beyond 30 NM." (Fogarty, 1988, p. 31) However, it 
is not clear whether he communicated this information over the net. It is interesting to 
note that CIC members were matching system data entries up until 1022L. After 1022L, 
their entries diverged from system data. Five CIC personnel who had double or triple 
entries all observed decreases from previous observations made a minute or two earlier 
as shown on Figure III-9. 
It has been mentioned several times that 1022L was a critical time. 
It was critical for several reasons: 
Vincennes entered into the 20 NM weapons envelope for air-to-surface missiles. 
Captain Roger's asked, "What is 4474 doing?" He was not aware of the track 
number change. (Rogers, 1992) 
HMS Manchester entered into the Southern Persian Gulf link at or slightly before 
1022L, bringing with it kinematics from an A-6 on a surface air combat patrol 
mission in the Gulf of Oman. The A-6 was coincidentally assigned a track number 
of TN 4474 by the Spruance. The track kinematics indicated high speed, 459 
knots, and descending from 12,000 feet as the A-6 reported in to an E-2. (Rogers, 
1992) 
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Solid hourglass symbol with operator label -- Recollected data by 
witnesses not in close agreementwith system data. Corresponds to 
" 7 "  symbol in Table 111-3 representing highly disparate entries. 
Empty hourglass symbol with operator label -- Recollected data by 
witnesses in close agreement with system data. Corresponds to ""' 
symbol in Table 1 1 1 - 3 .  
Empty hourglass symbol with "?"  next to operator label -- Data points 
that were not in agreement with either system or recollected data entries. 
Solid thick line depicts Flight 655 climbing in altitude. 
Thin line between operator labels demonstrates trend. 
Area between dashed line approximates the minute of lO22L which is 
based on system range entries correlating to the time of 1022L, which 
is the range between 2 5  to 20 NM. See Table 1 1 1 - 1 .  
Dotted area beyond 3 0  NM corresponds to TIC remarks recalling the 
track number change to TN 4131 having occurred "somewhere beyond 30  NM." 
(Fogarty, 1988,  p. 3 1 )  
At 2 0  NM, CO asked: What f s 4474 doing?" (Rogers, 19921 
VBS/MSS depicts two entries at the same (x,yl coordinate location. 
Additionally, according to the data as presented, the minute 
encompassing the time of 1022L is comprised of a nautical mile range of about 20 to 25 
NM as illustrated in Figure III-10. The 49 ADT entry, the first of the highly disparate 
data entries, occurred at the 25 NM point at 1022L. He recalled an altitude of 12,000 
feet, which is 3,600 feet higher than system data. According to Captain Rogers' 
recollection, reports were conveyed to the command console that the contact was 
descending from 12,000 feet at 459 knots. It was also at this time, as shown in Table El- 
l ,  FC-l hooked TN 4474 at an altitude of 11,900 feet, range of 110 NM and speed of 448 
knots. It should also be noted that the FC-1 hook of TN 4474 was only 100 feet lower 
than the 49 ADT altitude data point, which occurred in the 1022L time frame. 
(3) Summary 
To summarize, the scatter plots demonstrate the existence of two 
aircraft within the recollected data set. Comparisons were made between the recollected 
data entries and Captain Rogers' interview data as well as the FC-1 hook of TN 4474 
from the system data set. These comparisons strongly suggest that the second aircraft was 
the A-6 in the Gulf of Oman. Further evidence supporting this statement will be 
presented when the speed variable is analyzed in the following section. 
b. Comparative Scatter Plots between System and Recollected Data 
( I )  Speed Variable 
Another relationship that has not yet been discussed involves 
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gure 111-11. System Data--Range versus Speed 
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the following relationship: As the range decreased between the Vincennes and Flight 655 
as indicated by the "+" symbol, the aircraft's speed was increasing steadily. Flight 655's 
lowest speed recorded by system tapes was at 232 knots at a range of 44 NMs. The 
highest speed that Flight 655 achieved was at 385 knots, ten miles from the Vincennes 
and two nautical miles prior to its shoot down. Meanwhile, the FC-1 hook of TN 4474, 
was traveling at a speed of 448 knots. 
In addition to the above information, the speed recollected by the 
IDS and IAD were 450 and 445 knots, respectively. The FC-1 hook of TN 4474 data 
point along with the IDS and IAD entries are summarized in Table III-4. The speed 
values between all three entries are within five knots of the lowest and highest values and 
are depicted in aggregate in Figure In-12, which shows a close relationship among 





system data is plotted against the recollected speed data entries regarding speed and time, 
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entries. In addition to the preceding information, Captain Rogers indicated that at the 20 
NM point, he asked, "What is 4474 doing?" In reply to his question, he stated that 
an unidentified console operator reported the contact was at 12,000 feet and descending 
at 459 knots. (Rogers, 1992) This speed value Captain Rogers recalled fits well with the 
speed values obtained from the FC-1 hook of TN 4474 and the IAD and IDS 
observations. Based on the graphical analysis along with Captain Rogers' account 
regarding the A-6 aircraft, the IAD, IDS, and the FC-1 hook entry of TN 4474 appear to 
be related. 
(2 )  Altitude versus Range 
A comparative graphical analysis between system and recollected 
data was accomplished using the variables of altitude and range. Figures 111-14a and III- 
14b demonstrate an interesting trend using all "raw" data points as provided in Tables III- 
1 and 111-2. In both graphs, the "+" symbol represents Flight 655, while the hour 
I glass symbol represents recollected data points. The "*" symbol represents the FC-1 hook 
of TN 4474, which is a system data entry. As shown by the linear fit in Figure 111-14b, 
the range decreased as the Flight 655's altitude increased. Also, a line was fitted through 
the recollected data points, which shows that as the range decreased, the altitude also 
decreased. 
In addition, a further distinction between system data and 
recollected data is demonstrated in Figure HI-l4b, where the empty hourglass symbol 
means reasonable recollected data entries and a solid hourglass symbol means highly 
disparate recollected data entries. The empty hour glass symbology shows that CIC 
O b  r b i o  jo i o ' s b '  $ O ' 7 0 1  8 b  s b i ~ b o ' 1 i o '  
RANGE (nautical miles) 
LEGEND 
-- TN 4474 hooked by PC-I at 1022L for 5 seconds with RNG 110 NX, 
BRG 139, ALT 11,900, SPD 448 (Fogarty, 1988, P. 3 4 ) -  
+ -- Flight 655 
Hourglass symbol -- Recollected data points 
~ltitude versus Range 
and Recollected 
LEGEND 
-- TN 4474 hooked by PC-1 at lO22L for 5 seconds with RNQ 110 hW, 
ERG 139, ALT 11,900,  SPD 448 (Pogarty, 1988, p. 34). 
+ -- Flight 655 
Hourglass symbol -- Recollected data points 
Solid hourglas~ symbol -- Recollected data by witnesses not in close agreement 
with system data. Corresponds to " 7 "  symbol in Table III-3 representing highly 
disparate entries. 
Bmpty hourglass symbol -- Recollected data by witnesses in close agreement with 
system data. Corresponds to "*" symbol in Table III-3. 
Bmpty hourglass symbol with circle -- Data points that were not in agreement with 
either 8yStefn or recollected data entries. 
Altitude versus Range 
96 
personnel were in agreement with system data, while the solid hourglass symbology 
demonstrates that CIC crew members were seeing the contact descend. As shown by the 
comparative scatter plots, an aircraft cannot be simultaneously ascending and descending, 
which is a paradox and further confirms the existence of a second aircraft. The next 
section provides further analysis of this seemingly contradictory event. 
(3) Altitude versus Time 
A comparative graphical analysis is conducted between system 
data entries from Table 1.1-1 and recollected data entries from Table III-2 and are 
depicted in Figures HI-15a and 111-15b using altitude and time variables. At 1022L, 
there is an intersection and subsequent divergence between actual and recollected data 
entries. This type of divergence was observed within the recollected data set itself 
(Figure 111-9) in that up until about 1022L, crew members' observations were congruent 
with the system data. After 1022L, the witness data points became progressively less 
congruent with system data entries. 
Upon viewing these figures, it is also pertinent to note that at 
1022L, 49 ADT recalled Flight 655 at 12,000 feet, which was an exceptionally high data 
point when compared with the other altitude entries, both actual and perceived, with the 
exception of the FC-1 hook entry. The FC-1 data entry reflected the kinematics of an 
aircraft associated with a track of 4474. Its altitude is practically the same as the 49 ADT 
observation. This also coincides with Captain Roger's account regarding altitude. 
In Figure 111-15b, the system data, "+" symbol, shows that Flight 
655 was ascending over time while the perceived data entries, the solid hourglass symbol, 
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indicates that the contact was descending over time. The "*" symbol represents the FC-1 
hook of track 4474, which is practically superimposed over the 49 ADT data entry. 
Kinematic information concerning TN 4474 from the Manchester was already in the 
system in order for the FC-1 to hook TN 4474 and actually obtain kinematic information. 
Otherwise, TN 4474 would have still been in track number storage. The next question 
is whether the FC-1 hook of TN 4474 data point, 49 ADT, IDS, IAD, RSC, AAWC, TIC, 
AIC-3, MSS, and UBS entries are related or not. How do they compare with Captain 
Rogers' account? To answer these questions, some refinement of data had to be 
accomplished. This is the topic of discussion for the next section. 
c. Summary 
In summary, the comparative analysis between system and recollected 
data show a strong indication that CIC personnel were actually seeing kinematics from 
another aircraft having the same track number as the Vincennes' original track number 
initially designating Flight 655 departing Bandar Abbas at 1017L. The inclusion of the 
speed variable augments this assessment when compared with the FC- 1 hook of TN 4474 
and is further corroborated with the interview data from Captain Rogers. 
5. Further Refinement of Recollected Data 
When analyzing the data, it appeared that there was latitude for further 
refinement, particularly in the recollected data set. This assessment was based on the 
degree of disparity between actual and perceived data entries as shown in Table III-3. 
(See Appendices D and E, Groups 7 and 8, for the refined data set listing and conelatian 
coefficient summary and Appendix F for regression analysis.) 
Basically, the refinement process resulted in the removal of several data 
points. First, the GW and TIC entries that seemed "off" or out of place were removed, 
for they lacked synchronization with the both the recollected and system data. This could 
possibly be due to GW and TIC'S unclear recollection or could be the result of the 
investigation team having difficulty in estimating chronologically when and where these 
observations occurred in conjunction with other events going on at the same time. These 
entries were designated with a "??" in Table 111-3. 
Secondly, the data points in the recollected data set that seemed reasonably 
close (within 2000 feet or 3 NM) to the actual entries as extracted from the system data 
tapes were also removed. This included various entries from AIC-3, AAWC, OSDA, 
CSC, LAD and TIC all designated by an asterisk "*" in Table 111-3. The rationale behind 
this action was to assess the linearity of the perceived data that was highly disparate with 
the system data obtained from the Aegis data reduction tapes as designated with a "?" 
symbol in Table 111-3. In other words, the six reasonable entries were distorting the 
"highly disparate" perceived data entries. The data that were out of place (GW and TIC 
entries) and the data that matched what was going on in the real ascent of Flight 655 
were removed, leaving behind a "filtered" data set of recollected observations of the 
perceived Flight 655. This was accomplished to assess the remaining recollected data's 
linearity and compare it with the actual flight path based on the system data tape entries. 
As can be seen in Appendix E, Correlation Coefficient Summary, all coefficient values 
from Group 7, Refined Recollected Data from Witnesses data set, indicate a strong 
correlation between, altitude versus range, altitude versus time and range versus time. 
This is especially apparent when compared to the correlation coefficients in the 
recollected data by witnesses, Group 2, data set. 
Figure 111-16 shows the refined recollected data in a scatter plot. Again, 
altitude is provided in feet (y-axis), while time is in minutes and based on a 24 hour clock 
(x-axis). The negative slope indicates that as time progressed, the aircraft's height was 
descending. The correlation coefficient is -342, indicating a strong linear tendency. 
Essentially, these data appear related. 
This refinement was taken one step further by adding the system data outlier, 
FC-1 hook of TN 4474, to the reconstructed recollected data as shown in Figure 111-17. 
The negative slope indicates that as time progressed, the altitude decreased, which means 
that the contact was descending. The correlation coefficient is strong at -399 as visually 
evidenced by the scatter plot. 
In summary, the refined recollected data shows an even tighter relationship 
among the data points. These graphs also display an aircraft as seen by eight crew 
members descending in altitude, which is contrary to the flight path of Flight 655. The 
FC-1 hook of TN 4474 fits well with the refined recollected data, and a strong 
relationship among the data points is also realized. Essentially, the data point associated 
with the FC-1 hook of TN 4474 that appeared to be an anomaly in system data "bridges 
the gap" between system and recollected data regarding the existence of two aircraft. 
Although the FC-1 data point is not related to the system data, it is related to the refined 
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Figure 111-17. Refined Recollected Data with the PC-1 Hook of 
TN 4474--Altitude versus Time 
recollected data. This indicates that the second aircraft's kinematics were in the Aegis 
system. Coupling this information with Captain Rogers' interview data, the crew 
members were probably seeing kinematics from the A-6 that happened to be assigned a 
track of 4474, which was the Vincennes' original track designation of the "unknown- 
assumed enemy" contact from Bandar Abbas. All these relationships and their 
interrelationships with each other emphatically demonstrate that the other aircraft was the 
A-6 in the Gulf of Oman. This is explicitly shown in the next section. 
6. Comparison between System and Refined Recollected Data 
A comparison between system and refined recollected data, altitude versus 
range data points, is illustrated in Figure ID-18. Line "a" shows that as the range 
decreased, the altitude increased, delineating the flight pattern of Flight 655 ("+" symbol). 
As signified by line "b," as range decreased, the A-6 ("Xu symbol) decreased as well. 
The "*" entry is the FC-1 hook of TN 4474. The majority of witnesses recalled Flight 
655 as descending, starting at 15 NM, which also corresponds with general exclamations 
being made within the CIC that the aircraft was descending. 
Altitude versus time entries from system data and reconstructed recollected 
data were merged as shown in the following scatter plot, Figure 111-19. Again, another 
distinct pattern emerges, showing a clear linear ascent on one hand, and on the other, a 
clear linear descent. The kinematic information and the analysis provided so far indicates 
that two separate aircraft were being tracked, one that was climbing, which in reality was 
Flight 655, and another that was diving, which was the A-6 in the Gulf of Oman. 
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In summary, system data show Flight 655 continuously climbing and suggests 
the existence of two aircraft. Although recollected data show the contact to be 
descending and points to the existence of only one aircraft, further analysis on the 
recollected data by witnesses data set again suggests the existence of two aircraft. 
Up until 1022L various CIC crew members matched system data entries, 
indicating a climbing profile; but, after 1022L, they progressively diverged from the 
system data entries, indicating a descending flight profile. This finding called for further 
comparative analysis between system and recollected data. This additional analysis 
clearly demonstrated the existence of two aircraft, especially when the speed variable was 
included in the analysis. 
Because of the disparity between system and recollected data, additional 
refinement of the recollected data was needed. The highly disparate data points were 
analyzed and compared with the FC-1 hook of TN 4474 data point. The results of this 
comparison show a distinctly descending flight profile and a strong linear relationship. 
And, lastly, the system data were compared with the refined recollected data and an even 
more definitive set of trends emerges showing the existence of two aircraft. 
The question as to the other aircraft's identity is inferred when compared to 
Captain Rogers' interview data. Namely, it is probable that various crew members aboard 
the Vincennes were detecting kinematic information from a second aircraft, an A-6, 
having the same track number as was originally designated to the unknown-assumed 
enemy contact of interest initially detected from Bandar Abbas. Even without Captain 
Rogers' interview data to serve as an avenue of comparison, the graphs still indicate the 
existence of a second aircraft, but its identity may not have been known. 
Additionally, the above graphical analysis and conclusion also supports 
Captain Rogers' account regarding the track number sequence as presented earlier in this 
chapter. Although the FC-1 hook entry of TN 4474 appeared as an anomaly throughout 
Chapters I1 and III, in reality it was not. The same goes for the 49 ADT, AIC-3, IAD, 
RSC, IDS, AAWC, UBS and MSS observations. It is the opinion of this author that the 
eight CIC members listed above were not in all instances "misreading altitude" (Senate 
Hearing, 1988, p. 16) due to "stress" and "scenario fulfillment", which were originally 
identified as being primary causes for this divergence between recollected and system data 
entries (Fogarty, 1988, p. 45). The reIationships are too consistent. The cause of this 
divergence and subsequent chain of events is attributed to the CIC's inability to identify 
and detect that there were two aircraft involved, which is one part of an overall systemic 
problem to be discussed in detail in the Chapter IV. 
NOTES 
1. As a result of the integration of these two categories of data to produce a chronology, 
there may be inconsistencies in the sequencing of events--they may not be an exact 
replication of what happened. 
I 2. Recommendations from the Fogarty report also included: 
No disciplinary of administrative action should be taken 
Send a message to Iran recommending aircraft fly at an altitude of 25,000 feet to 
minimize the risk of another accidental shoot down 
No change to existing Rules of Engagement 
Urge the International Civilian Aviation Organization to issue an immediate NOTAM 
Revise voice warnings to be more specific to include geographical positional references 
and IFF mode 
Strengthen the Middle East Force "inchop briefs" to include an in depth review of the 
unique problems associated with the commercial air picture for that region 
Continue the liaison efforts with Air Traffic Control agencies and American Embassies 
to resolve commercial air problems 
Strengthen the AAWC position in the CIC organization 
Incorporate the CIC organization modification required by Persian Gulf operations into 
the existing Battle Doctrine. Golf Whiskey should not be given the responsibility as 
a radio telephone talker 
Determine cause of net 15/16 degradation due to loading 
Redesign Aegis large screen display (LSD) to allow for altitude to be directly 
displayed on the LSD 
Devise a means to slave the Remote Control Indicator (RCI) challenge gate to a 
hooked track 
Train in a low intensity environment, real or simulated 
Develop a fleet wide identification matrix for dense air traffic environments 
Conduct exercises that challenge the deconfliction capabilities of surface ships with 
and without VID 
Review Aegis IFF operator training procedures and ensure operator familiarity of pros 
and cons of various RCI selective modes (1988, pp. 51-53) 
3. C & D System from page 4. The following information concerning the Aegis 
Command and Decision System is extracted from the Configuration Definition Document 
for Aegis Guided Missile Cruiser Combat System (CG 65-73), Second Issue, CG 47 Class 
CDRL 5016, November 1991, as prepared by the Government Electronic Systems 
Division, General Electric Company: 
The Command and Decision (C & D) System performs control and integration functions 
for the Aegis Combat System. It is the focal point for the collection, correlation, analysis, 
and presentation of tactical data required to effectively employ the Aegis Weapon System. 
C & D integrates sensor data, data link information, threat data, operator inputs, and 
weapons status in a manner responsive to battle management and task force defense 
requirements. Figure 111-20 is a schematic of the Aegis Combat System. 
More specifically, C & D collects and correlates sensor data from ship sensors and data 
links, and disseminates these data to the appropriate console operators. C & D manages 
the track file, performs track identification, issues automatic engagement orders when 
authorized by doctrine, and provides weapon assignment recommendations to the console 
operators to aid them in making efficient use of sensor data and the weapon systems. 
Figure 111-21 is a schematic of the C & D System. 
4. The air engagement was a complicated sequencing of events. One of the most 
difficult aspects of this sequence was to understand how the track numbers fit in. Not 
that the track numbers were an overriding contribution to the airliner shoot down, they 
were but one small piece of a complex puzzle that was compounded by other equally as 
important contributing factors. The description was deliberately simplistic to give the 
reader a flavor of what happened without getting swamped with detail. This description 
does not insinuate that the NTDS Link 11 or Aegis weapon system are trivial. 
5. When the terms "hooked" or "in close control" were used in conjunction with a track 
number, it means that the operator has the track number, identification (ID), grid 
coordinates, course, speed, altitude, ID amplifying information, Mode UD[/m IFF received, 
tracking quality, bearing and range. A characteristic that could not be displayed nor 
discerned on the Vincennes' radar console was the size of the contact, regardless of aspect 
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Figure 111-21. Command and Decision System pictorial Diagram 
(Government Electronic Systems Division, 1991, g. 3.2-2) 
6. Also, another interview was held on 14 April 1992 with Lieutenant Terry Mosher, who 
served aboard an Aegis cruiser, the USS Mobile Bay (CG 53), in his previous assignment 
as Fire Control Officer, to help clarify some of the technical issues. Additionally, both 
the case, Chapter 11, and the "Rogers' Interpretation" section of Chapter III were 
personally reviewed by Captain Rogers himself on 1 May 1992 to ensure accuracy. 
7. Read graph legend carefully, "xu and "+" symbols will be used interchangeably, 
especially on the different comparative graphs. 
IV. "CAUSAL FACTORS" 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter ID, Analysis and Interpretation, the primary goal was to identify "the 
problem" in a quantifiable way. Based on both system and recollected data from 
witnesses as well as interview data from Captain Rogers, the data strongly suggested the 
existence of two aircraft, which led to the following question: How was it that the 
Vincennes could not identify and differentiate between two aircraft and consequently 
shoot down a commercial airliner, Iran Air Flight 655? To address this research question, 
Chapter IV is divided into three major sections. The first section primarily focuses on 
an event analysis of the Vincennes' air engagement; the second section, using a modified 
version of the Harvard Business School group dynamics model, takes a systemic approach 
to an analysis of the incident; and the third section develops a cybernetic model of the 
same events based on the concept of mutual causality. 
B. IDENTIFICATION OF "CAUSAL FACTORS" USING AN EVENTS PATH 
MODEL 
1. Introduction 
Figure IV-1, Events Path Model of the Vincennes' Air Engagement, depicts 
a series of events/factorsl that are arranged in chronological sequence fiom 1017L, the 
time that the contact was first detected by the Vincennes, to 1024L, the time when the 
contact was shot down. This linear model is broken down into external contextual and 
internal factors. External contextual factors were external to the Vincennes and are 
labelled alphabetically, while internal factors occurred within the Vincennes' Combat 
Information Center (CIC) and are labelled numerically. Additionally, it is assumed that 
some factorslevents had a direct influence on others, such as, X brings Y into being, or 
makes Y smaller or larger, while other factorslevents had an inverse effect. 
2. Narrative 
The main external contextual factors as recalled by Captain Rogers included 
the following environmental conditions: Intelligence warned of a possible Iranian 
retaliation for recent Iraqi victories (D) and of an increased threat over the Fourth of July 
weekend (C). Intelligence briefings prior to the Vincennes' transfer to the Middle East 
Force specifically cautioned about aircraft not following normal, established patterns (E). 
Iranian F-14s were recently deployed to Bandar Abbas (A) having an air-to-surface 
missile capability (H). During Operation PRAYING MANTIS on 18 April 1988, Iranian 
fighters flew in conjunction with the surface engagement (B), and Iranian P-3s were 
known to provide targeting information to third party forces during hostile activities (G).  
Also, during this time, U.S. carriers remained outside the Persian Gulf, leaving no 
immediate means for visual identification to positively confirm aircraft identity (F). 
Basically, this highly uncertain and potentially volatile environment was the local context 
within which the Vincennes was operating. (Fogarty, 1988, pp. 40-41) 
As described, the external contextual factors serve as an overall backdrop for 
the subsequent set of internal factors with which the CIC organization had to contend. 
Naturally, the simultaneity between internal and external factors and the impact that they 
had upon each other demonstrate the complexity inherent with a low intensity conflict2 
(LIC) combat situation as already shown pictorially and as will be reinforced through a 
narrative account outlining these causal relations. 
Before proceeding further, it is essential to note that time is a contextual 
factor in and of itself, regarding the sequencing of events and the short time window 
within which Captain Rogers had to act. The most critical time of the air engagement 
occurred during the last 189 seconds, which was compounded by the 20 NM critical 
decision point at 1022L. It must be emphasized that Captain Rogers was under tight time 
constraints to synthesize a large amount of ambiguous, disjointed information and to make 
a decision as to whether to engage the aircraft or not. There was no time for information 
verification. (Rogers, 1992; 1990) 
Before focusing on the air engagement, the surface engagement will be briefly 
discussed. As can be discerned from the Figure IV-1, the surface engagement was 
already in progress (S) when the air engagement sequence started and was still 
progressing after the contact was shot down. In actuality, the surface engagement was 
Captain Rogers' primary concern due to the danger to personnel and equipment resulting 
from massed attacks by highly maneuverable gun boats. Gunfire between the Vincennes 
and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) forces was being exchanged, when at 
1021L, gun mount 51 aboard the Vincennes malfunctioned (T), which led the TAO to 
conduct radical maneuvers at high speed and large rudder angle to counter the threat (20). 






within the CIC (23). The significance of this event was that it was a disruptive factor that 
momentarily distracted personnel in the performance of their combat duties, which created 
a more intense atmosphere within CIC (23). Also, this event occurred at a key point in 
the air engagement sequence where reports of Possible F-14 activity were being heard (21, 
24, & 25). To further amplify the gravity of the tactical situation, there was an indirect 
connection between the Iranian P-3 that was detected 62 NM west flying towards the 
Vincennes and the surface engagement regarding targeting (4 & G),  and the fact that there 
was an "unknown-assumed enemy" contact that had lifted off from Bandar Abbas (B, I 
& 3). 
At 1017L, an aircraft departed the Bandar Abbas joint rnilitary/civilian airport 
on a southerly route (I), As it took off from the airport, its lift-off pattern deviated from 
previously observed commercial flights (J). Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Modes I1 
and 111 were also observed by members (49 ADT, UBS and AIC-3) within the CIC (2). 
These factors (2, J & I) combined with the intelligence warning (E), led the 49 ADT to 
designate the contact as "unknown-assumed enemy" (3). In the meantime, the Vincennes 
assigned TN 4474 to the contact that departed from Bandar Abbas (1). 
As stated earlier, a surface engagement was in progress (S), and the Vincennes 
detected an Iranian P-3 with a heading of 085 and assigned it a track number of 4472 (4). 
The P-3 was not emitting any radar emissions (L), and the TIC saw Modes I and 111 IFF 
from the P-3 (8). These conditions (S, L, 4 & 8) led the Vincennes to challenge the P-3 
(9). Although the P-3 responded that it was on a search mission (M), it was being 
closely monitored. 

At about 1017L, reports of "F-14" were heard in the CIC (5), which could be 
indirectly linked to the Mode I1 detection (2), 49 ADT declaration of the contact as 
"unknown-assumed enemy" and the fact that the contact departed Bandar Abbas (I) where 
Iranian F-14s were recently moved (A). These F-14 reports played a key role in the IDS' 
specific report of F-14 Mode II-1100 over the internal net at 1020L (IS), which 
perpetuated the F-14 mind set even further (C & D). 
It was also at 1017L that the Sides detected and assigned the contact from 
Bandar Abbas as TN 4131 (K), which was the same contact as detected by the Vincennes 
(1). According to Captain Rogers, this resulted in two track numbers being assigned to 
the same contact, which triggered the Aegis weapon system on the Vincennes to perform 
an automatic correlation of t~rack numbers (6), which resulted in the assignment of TN 
4131 to the contact from Bandar Abbas (12) and the return of TN 4474 back into storage 
as an unused track number (11). In other words, TN 4474 was dropped from the system, 
which had an adverse impact at the critical 20 NM decision point five minutes later (40). 
Efforts were being made by CIC personnel to positively identify the aircraft. 
A visual identification by another U.S. aircraft was not feasible due to the location of the 
USS Forrestal in the Gulf of Oman (F). However, a commercial airline schedule from 
Bandar Abbas was consulted by the IDS (7) who determined that the contact was not Iran 
Air Flight 655 (10) because it was 27 minutes late from its regularly scheduled departure 
time of 0950L (N). The 49 ADT's determination of the contact as "unknown-assumed 
enemy" (3) as well as reports of possible F-14 being heard in CIC (S), led to the first of 
five Military Air Distress (MAD) verbal challenges (13). In this instance, as in all 
challenges issued henceforth, there was no response received from the contact (W). This 
lack of response over the MAD channel led to another warning issued over the 
International Air Distress (IAD) channel (15) which was the first of four challenges. Still 
no response (X). There were a total of nine challenges issued to the contact from the 
Vincennes. 
Returning back to the IDS, at 1020L, he saw Mode 11-1100 and Mode III- 
6675 indications on his remote control indicator (RCI) (16), while a minute earlier, he 
determined that the contact was not a commercial airliner (10). Both factors primarily 
led to his decision to report F-14 and Mode II-1100 over the internal net (18). Indirect 
factors included: Other CIC members were seeing Mode 11 readings (19), reports of F-14 
were being heard in the CIC (9, and in-flight modifications to aircraft modes and codes 
(U). These Mode I1 reports (19 & 16) also resulted in the TIC'S re-challenge of TN 
4131, who still obtained a Mode I11 reading (22). The IDS' report contributed to "GW's" 
report of an inbound F-14 to "GB" (25) and the OSDA's tagging of TN 4131 as an F-14 
on the large screen display located above the command console area (24). "GW" also 
stated to "GB" that the Vincennes' challenges were being ignored (25, W & X), who in 
turn ordered the Vincennes to take tactical control of the Sides (CC). 
At 1021L, "GW" identified TN 413 1 as an Iranian F- 14 to "GB" (27), leading 
to "GW's" request to engage TN 4131 at 20 NM, unless it turned away (31). "GB" 
concurred with his request (Z), but stipulated that prior to f ~ n g ,  the Vincennes must warn 
the aircraft (AA). However, "GB" could not verify "GW's" information due to time 
constraints (BB). 
To compound matters, the CIC Officer observed TN 4131 rising at around 8- 
9000 feet (28) after the IDS declared that the contact was an F-14 (18). He reported to 
- the CO and "GW" that the contact was possibly a commercial airliner (29), at which time 
the commanding officer acknowledged his remark. Concurrently, radio warnings 
continued (30), and the contact was observed slightly west of the A-59 center line as 
shown on the large screen display (0). These were more deviations from normal patterns 
and operating procedures as flown by commercial airliners (E). 
Meanwhile, according to Captain Rogers' interpretation, the USS Spruance 
had coincidentally assigned a track number, TN 4474, to an A-6 on a surface combat air 
patrol (SUCAP) mission in the Gulf of Oman (P), which happened to be the same track 
number the Vincennes originally assigned the contact departing Bandar Abbas at 10 17L 
(1). This tactical picture containing TN 4474 was also held by the HMS Manchester, 
who entered the Southern Persian Gulf link at around 1022L, bringing with it the 
kinematics of the A-6 associated with TN 4474 (Q). Consequently, the TN 4474 
kinematics entered back into the Vincennes' tactical picture (DD), which had a direct 
impact on the response to Captain Rogers' question when the Vincennes approached 
weapons envelope window of 20 NM (36 & H), at which time Captain Rogers asked, 
"What is 4474 doing?" (1 & 40) He was also not aware of the auto-correlation of track 
numbers (6,11 & 12) nor was he aware of the HMS Manchester's entry into the link (P, 
Q & DD). Captain Roger's question (40) invoked a response from an unidentified 
operator that the contact was descending from 12,000 feet and closing at 459 knots (43), 
which happened to be the kinematics of the A-6. Also, reports of descending altitude 
were recalled by various CIC members--MSS, 49 ADT and SITREP WRITER (41). It 
was during this time that the system tapes revealed that the FC-1 hooked TN 4474 (37), 
which showed TN 4474 at a range of 110 NM, an altitude of 11,900 feet, speed of 448 
knots and bearing of 139 (42); however, it is not clear whether this person communicated 
this information. There is a strong relationship between the information the FC-1 
obtained when he hooked TN 4474 and the response Captain Rogers recalled receiving. 
Therefore, the connection will be labeled as a weak connection (dotted line) as to the FC- 
1 actually being the individual who responded to Captain Rogers' question (40,37 & 42). 
Additionally, during this 20 NM critical decision point, the 49 ADT saw a 
Mode I1 IFF indication on his remote control indicator (38). He also saw the contact 
descending (59) which led to his announcement over net 12, another internal 
communications net, that the contact was descending, but did not refer to it by track 
number (60). Radio warnings continued to be issued with no response being received 
(45). 
The AAWC requested and received permission to illuminate the aircraft at the 
20 NM point; however, the AAWC was not successful in illuminating the aircraft with 
fire control radar until the minute of engagement (52). Upon the aircraft's illumination, 
Captain Rogers recalled that it appeared to veer towards the USS Montgomery (55). 
Another unusual characteristic was that the Vincennes detected no radar 
emissions from the contact (R). "GW" heard continuous reports of deceasing altitude (49) 
and the TIC started to interject range updates on every open spot on the internal net 15/16 
(48), which led him to make reports once a mile after 11 NM (51). The IDS and LAD 
both observed the contact going at a high rate of speed (50 & 53). And, lastly, the final 
warning (AA) was issued over the MAD (54) again, no response (AA). After the final 
warning, Captain Rogers turned the firing key (57), enabling the MSS to initiate the 
launch sequence (58) which led to a direct hit of an aircraft that happened to be a civilian 
airliner (V). 
To recap, the basic factorslevents contributing to Captain Rogers' decision to 
engage were the following: 
The contact did not respond to verbal warnings (13, W, 15, X, 30, 45, 54 & Y) 
The contact demonstrated an attack profile of increasing speed, decreasing altitude, 
and closing range (41, 42, 43, 49, 50,51 & 53) 
No radar emissions were detected (R) 
Mode II IFF indications were reported historically correlating to Iranian F-14s (2, 
16, 18, 19, & 38) 
The contact was alluded to and reported as an F-14 (A, B, D, H, 3, 5, 10, 18, 21, 
24,25,27 & BB) 
The aircraft deviated from normal commercial patterns (E, J, N, 0, R & 55) 
Suspicious presence of a P-3 and its inbound heading (G, S, 4, L, 8, 9 M, 3, I & 
B) 
Warnings from Intelligence (A, C, D & E) 
Not being aware of a change in track numbers from TN 4474 to TN 4131 (1, K, 
6,11, 12, P, Q, DD, Z, 40,43, 37 & 42) 
Positive visual identification was not feasible (F) 
The contact was within the air-to-surface weapons envelope of 20 NM (31, AA, Z, 
DD, 40 & 43) 
In summary, there were a myriad of internal and external factors that 
contributed to Captain Rogers' decision to engage. Captain Rogers had to contend with 
a multi-dimensional, simultaneous threat involving surface and air forces, while being 
provided fragments of information under extremely tight time constraints. At the risk of 
his ship and crew, he waited until the aircraft was within 15 NM for it to demonstrate that 
it was not hostile before taking proactive measures. However, no sign from the aircraft 
ever came to discount the information he was being provided. 
3. Discussion 
Figure IV-1 is a path analysis of the overall Vincennes incident, tracing the 
sequence of events over to time. In a pictorial sense, this linear model depicts the 
complexity of activities that took place over a seven minute period. It also portrays the 
evolving context that was being created as a result of the interactions between the internal 
and external factors, which contributed to Captain Rogers' decision to engage what he 
believed to be an F-14. 
Additionally, at certain points in time, seemingly unrelated, independent 
eventslfactors impacted the Vincennes' system. By following the arrows, one can trace 
when an event occurred, where the event made its impact, and the way the system 
adjusted to its occurrence. Essentially, the crew's concept of reality was an evolutionary 
process fueled by random variations of eventslfactors occurring both internally and 
externally entering and leaving the Vincennes' system. According to Morgan, "These 
random modifications [were] introduced through ... the combination of chance interactions 
and connections that give rise to the development of new system relations (1986, p. 239). 
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This autopoietic concepe has similar undertones to the recent scientific developments by 
the 1978 Nobel Prize recipient, Illya Prigogine, for his research on "dissipative structures" 
in chemical reactions, which demonstrate that random change in a system can lead to new 
patterns of order and stability (Morgan, 1986, p. 239). An extension of this research can 
be applied to the Vincennes incident, in which a new state of order (context) was created 
with each occurrence of a random, independent event. Essentially, the context 
progressively evolved with each "kick" to the Vincennes' system. By using the path 
model, one can detect the varying degrees to which the context was redefined in terms 
of individual crew members and in terms of the CIC as a system. This is particularly 
evident with the IDS, TIC, and 49 ADT recollected accounts as well as with track number 
and IFF issues. One can effectively see the interrelationship between internal and external 
factors, in which the nature and outcome of their interaction invoked a new backdrop with 
each occurrence. Metaphorically, this is analogous to the creation of a new setting for 
every subsequent act in a play without a defined script, whereby the stage design is 
dependent upon the random nature of events and their interrelationships that had already 
been presented and acted out. Along the same lines, during the last 189 seconds prior to 
missile impact with the civilian airliner, the F-14 context was progressively amplified, 
culminating in a new order of reality to the extent that Captain Rogers and his CIC 
organization eventually engaged what they believed was an F-14. 
Although different states of being can emerge from random events, when 
applied to a combat environment characterized by ambiguity, time compression and 
uncertainty, this state of being or perceived context may become distorted due to the 
misinterpretation of events or the fact that events can be misleading in and of themselves. 
This distortion can be attributed to the nature of a combat environment that compels the 
decision maker, who is an "intendedly rational" actor, grappling with ill-defined, complex 
situations, having to make a decision and implement it based on incomplete information 
as to what is actually occurring. (Daft, 1986, p. 364) Here, the garbage can model4 
attempts to explain how decisions are made when the organization is subjected to this 
high degree of ambiguity that typifies "organized anarchyn5 (Daft, 1986, p. 364). 
According to March and Olsen, 
In pure form, the garbage can model assumes that problems, solutions, decision 
makers and choice opportunities are independent, exogenous streams flowing 
through a system (Cohen, et al., 1972). They are linked in a manner determined 
by their arrival and departure times and any structural constraints on the access of 
problems, solutions and decision makers to choice opportunities. In the absence of 
structural constraints within a garbage can process, solutions are linked to problems, 
and decision makers to choices, primarily by their simultaneity. (1986, p. 17) 
The path analysis demonstrates that the sequencing of events is not necessarily a logical 
process, but are random processes that are linked with respect to the time at which they 
occurred and their simultaneity of occurrence. This is particularly evident at 1022L, the 
20 NM critical decision point. Essentially, "[s]olutions appear before problems, or in 
search of problems to attach themselves to, and problems may exist without ever being 
solved." (Swain, 1990, p. 14) 
The Vincennes incident as depicted by the Events Path Model in Figure IV-1 
exemplifies the situation under which the garbage can decision making process takes 
place: 
The unique and important characteristic of the garbage can model is that the 
decision process is not a sequence of events that begins with a problem and ends 
with a solution ....[ Tlhe problem-identification and problem-solution stages may not 
be connected to each other. Ideas may be proposed as a solution when no problem 
is specified. Problems may exist and never generate a solution. The reason 
problems and solutions are not connected is that decisions are the outcome of 
independent streams of events within an organization .... When a problem, solution, 
participant and choice happen to connect at one point, the problem may be solved. 
But it also may not be solved. The solution may not fit. [Figure IV-2 is a diagram 
of the Garbage Can Model.(Daft, 1986, pp. 364-365) 
The problem in the Vincennes incident was not necessarily the fact that a 
civilian airliner got shot down. The real problem involved aircraft identification that led 
to the shoot down. Practically the entire seven minute air engagement process involved 
efforts taken by CIC personnel to identify the aircraft. At the jeopardy of his ship and 
crew, Rogers waited until the last possible moment for an indication from the aircraft that 
signified the contact was not hostile. There was no feedback. The information gathered 
and presented to Rogers were contributing factors that further confirmed the identity of 
the aircraft as being an F-14 showing hostile intent, except for one input from the CIC 
Officer, who stated the aircraft was "possible COMAIR." However, the preponderance 
of information indicated otherwise. Based on the choice opportunities available to 
Captain Rogers, with "solutions" existing independently of the "problem," an improper 
solution (F- 14) became "attached" to the problem of aircraft identification. This 
mismatch, which can occur under extremely uncertain conditions, contributed to the 
amplification of the F-14 context within the Vincennes system, and was a key factor in 
Rogers' decision to engage. Obviously, the garbage can process employed under these 
conditions led to an undesirable outcome for a civilian airliner was shot down. 
Choice 
opportunities 
C. IDENTDFICATION OF "CAUSAL FACTORS" USING A DYNAMIC 
SYSTEMS MODEL 
1. Dynamic Systems Model 
The systems map in Figure IV-3 is a combination of the "Leavitt Diamond" 
as presented by Harold J. Leavitt in his paper entitled "Applied Organizational Change 
in Industry: Structural, Technological and Humanistic Approaches," (Leavitt, 1965, pp. 
1144-1 170) and the Group Behavior Model as presented by Michael B. McCaskey in his 
case, "Framework for Analyzing Work Groups." (1985, p. 11) This hybrid model will 
also be used to analyze the "causal factors" that contributed to the accidental shoot down 
of the civilian airliner. 
Before discussing the Vincennes incident in relation to this model, a brief 
explanation of the model will be provided: 
Starting from left to right, the first block, context, involves the following 
question: What is the nature of the tactical environment? Context and/or environment 
are "the background factors out of which a group arises and in which a group operates." 
(McCaskey, 1985, p. 3) The environmentJcontext consists of social and political forces, 
the purpose for which the group/organization was created, physical setting, size, 
competitors (threat/enemy), allies/friends, suppliers, regulators, and history. 
Along with context, the next category in the Dynamic Systems Model involves 
key success factors. The question at hand is: What does it take to be successful? 
Generically, key success factors involve responsiveness, accuracy, and innovation to just 

name a few items. In the military setting, key success factors can be effective 
employment of force, tactics, and decision making strategies; effective allocation of 
combat power; being able to out think the enemy and anticipate to affect surprise; being 
able to identify who to "attack effectively first." (Hughes, 1986, pp. 34-35) 
The largest block in the model is consists of the "Leavitt Diamond," which 
is comprised of task, technology, people and structure. These design factors are important 
to the behavior of groups, which involve the people who form the group, the tasks they 
are required to perform, the technology or means available to them, and the formal 
structure and operating mechanisms of the organization to which they belong. The key 
is to arrange these factors in such a way to enhance an organization's effectiveness and 
chances of success (McCaskey, 1985, p. 4; Leavitt, 1965, p. 1144). These design factors 
are described in the following: 
Task: What needs to be done? Tasks usually involve the production of goods and 
services and all operationally meaningful sub-tasks required to accomplish the mission. 
(Leavitt, 1965, p. 1144) Task requirements entail interactions among people and 
equipment; variety of activities; novelty or routineness; and varying degrees to which 
the tempo (work pace) is under an individual's control. (McCaskey, 1985, p. 5) 
People: What human resources are available? Human beings are composed of a 
myriad of subtle and shifting characteristics. Some key characteristics on which to 
focus include skills and interests of individual members; learning styles; values, 
assumptions, and experience; expectations of leadership; and preferences regarding 
degree of autonomy and individual challenge. (McCaskey, 1985, pp. 4-5) 
Technology: What are the means by which a task can be accomplished? In broad 
terms, technology is a process by which inputs are converted to outputs (Robey, 1986, 
p. 137). The technology of an organizational system consists of "tools, techniques, 
devices, artifacts, methods, configurations, procedures and knowledge used by 
organizational members "to acquire inputs, transform inputs into outputs and provide 
outputs or services to clients or customers ..., The primary function of technology is 
to enhance the amount of work an individual can accomplish and the reliability of 
individual performance. (Pasmore, 1988, pp. 55-56 and 57-58) 
Structure and Operating Mechanisms: What are the basic groupings of people and 
activities, and how do they operate? Organizational structure boils down to "systems 
of communication, systems of authority, and systems of work flow." (Leavitt, 1965, 
p. 1144) Integrating devices such as coordination, hierarchy, information systems, 
plans and procedures are affiliated with structure, while control systems, reward 
systems, training and development, and recruitment and selection are associated with 
operating mechanisms. (McCaskey, 1985) 
In addition to the design factors, the next category of interest involves culture. 
What are the prevalent norms and values in an organization, and does the culture enhance 
or detract from effectiveness? The patterns of behavior and values that members create 
for themselves constitute a group culture. These are ways of thinking and behaving that 
a group evolves over time. (McCaskey, 1985, p. 8) A more specific definition is 
provided by Edgar Schein: 
The pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered, or 
developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration, and that have worked well enough to be considered valid, and, 
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and 
feel in relation to these problems. (Robey, 1986, p. 425) 
The last category involves outcome. What is considered a good or bad 
outcome? An outcome is simply a result. It can be defined in terms of productivity, 
quality, goal achievement, etcetera. Outcomes can be multi-dimensional and also serve 
as a source of feedback to the system. (McCaskey, 1985, p. 12) 
As displayed in Figure IV-3, not only are the categories comprising the design 
factors highly interdependent in and of themselves, but the environment, key success 
factors, design factors, culture and outcome are also interdependent with respect to each 
other as shown by the arrowheads and feedback loops. This means that a change in any 
one category could result in varying degrees of compensatory or retaliatory change in 
others. (Leavitt, 1965, p. 1145) 
. In sum, this Dynamic Systems Model indicates that what a group produces, 
$ 
its outcomes, are influenced by a set of factors called group culture. Group culture refers 
to the patterns of behaving and thinking that develop in the group. Group culture arises 
from the interaction of four design factors--the people in the group, the tasks they are 
required to perform, means by which inputs are transformed into outputs, and the 
structure and operating mechanism of the organization where the group operates. The 
design factors and how they interact are in turn shaped by key success factors and the 
context or environment--the unit, its history and traditions, political, social and tactical 
contexts, and geographical location. These factors and their interactions can ultimately 
affect the outcome of a given group/organization. It is important to note that the whole 
system is dynamic. Changes to any one part of the model can eventually lead to changes 
throughout the model. Depending on the complexity of the system, changes, adjustments, 
or disturbances sometimes percolate through the system in unanticipated ways, resulting 
in unexpected outcomes. 
2. Application 
Elements comprising the Dynamic Systems Model along with their 
relationship to the Vincennes incident are primarily discussed in this section. 
a. Context 
The contextual element in the Dynamic Systems Model was primarily 
addressed in the events path model. However, to briefly recap, the local environment in 
which Captain Rogers and his CIC organization were operating were far from ideal. - 
Extreme ambiguity and uncertainty, time compression coupled with chaotic, unpredictable 
conditions contributed to the fusion of misleading information fragments. The 
preponderance of evidence provided to Captain Rogers met the criteria of a hostile contact 
flying an attack profile to the extent that two Standard missiles were launched in self 
defense. The local context set the stage for the eventual shoot down of a civilian airliner 
mistakenly identified as an F-14. 
b. Key Success Factor 
Regarding block two of Figure IV-3, a key success factor in any military 
activity is accurate target identification, especially when the "character of the tactical 
environment is shared by friend and foe." (Hughes, 1986, p. 238). In the "half-war, half- 
~ peace" atmosphere of the Gulf, there were no clear absolutes about the nature of the 
1 threat. In a cramped air space, harmless passengers and deadly enemies commingled, 
creating a tough deconfliction problem (Time, 1986, pp. 15-16). Additionally, in such an 
unpredictable environment, Captain Rogers and crew could not be sure that, even if the 
contact was seen as an Airbus, it was not an airborne equivalent of the explosive laden 
buck that destroyed the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut (Friedman, 1988, p. 123). 
Essentially, the Vincennes incident exemplifies the "classic military problem of identtfying 
the guy you're shooting at." (Horgan, 1988, p.14) 
Table 1 ' - 1  shows th le crew's attempts at IFF to positivel! 1 identify the 
contact of interest through the IFF process. 
TABLE IV-1 
ATTEMPTS AT IDENTIFICATION THROUGH IFF 
Mode 111-6760 
"TN 4 4 7 4  
"Track of interest" 
Mode "C" 
-- 
By AIC-3; ID-6765; on CRO 
By 49 ADT; II & Q no code provided or means -- 
"TN 4474" 
By IDS; III-6765; no means provided 
By UBS; III-66??; Last two digits unknown and later 
saw an unspecified Mode 11 
By TIC; III; on CRO; no code provided -- "TN 413 1" 
By TIC*; I & III, on CRO; no code provided --"TN 
"TN 4 4 7 4  4 4 7 2  or Iranian P-3 
1019L No mode data provided No mode data provided during this minute from I during this minute in I witnesses 
report 
1020L Mode III-6760 By IDS; II-1100 & III-6765; on RCI; Reported 
possible F-14 and Mode 11-1100 over net 15/16 to all 
"TN 4131" stations -- "TN 4131" 
By AIC-3; 11-1100 & 111-6675; on CRO -- "TN 413 1" 
By AAWC; 11-1100; means not provided 
By TIC; ZII; no code or means provided -- "TN 4131" 
1021L No mode data provided No mode data provided 
1022L No mode data provided By 49 ADT; 11; on RCI; announced over net 12 
contact was descending, but did not refer to it by 
I I track number 
1023L No mode data provided No mode data provided 
1024L Mode "C" By AIC-3; II-1 100 & III-6760; no means provided; 
wrote this on his console before intercept 
"TN 4131" 
Source: Fogarty, 1988, pp. 29-39 
* -- ~ranians'known to change their modes and codes as they cross the Gulf 
I, II & 111 -- Abbreviations for Mode I, Mode II, Mode 111 
Note: Track number was included if it was specifically referred to in the text 
"Recollected data" consists of the following sequence as segregated by semicolons: Who; what mode 
and code; by what means; and track number designation. 
Mixed readings were being detected, which made the identification process even more 
difficult. The P-3 was squawking Modes I and I11 and the contact of interest as recalled 
by various witnesses was squawking Modes I1 and III. However, according to the 
Fogarty report, the system data always showed the contact to be ascending and Mode III- 
6760. These multiple IFF readings and their association with each other along with recent 
historical precedent created an atmosphere of suspicion as to the pilot's intent. 
This identification process was further confounded by the enhanced 
ducting conditions that were prevalent in the Gulf. For example, during his testimony 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Captain George N. Gee, Director, Surface 
Combat Systems Division, discussed the effects of ducting on radar in the Gulf, in which 
the normal 18-20 nautical mile radar horizon of the ship was extended. Here, the contact 
was over-the-horizon and was detected at 47 NM at low altitude (Senate Hearing, 1988, 
p. 49). This enhanced radar range and the fact that the airport was a joint 
rnilitarylcivilian airport, meant that crew members were possibly obtaining IFF detections 
that were not necessarily from the track of interest, especially if the remote control 
indicator (RCI) was used. Considering the ducting conditions and use of the RCI, more 
uncertainty was introduced into the identification process. More specifically, since the 
RCI interface was not slaved to a hooked track, it essentially became a source of 
misleading information, especially when it was inadvertently correlated with a hooked 
track: 
The IDS rniscorrelated an RCI readout of Mode 11-1 100 with TN 4131. This 
occurred, according to analysis of the data, when the IDS hooked TN 4131 as it 
departed Bandar Abbas and left it hooked for almost 90 seconds. This meant that 
as the hooked symbol moved towards the USS Vincennes, the read gate for the RCI 
remained near Bandar Abbas .... Therefore any number of military aircraft present 
at the airfield could have responded to Mode I1 IFF interrogation by USS Vincennes 
I due to the ducting prevalent that day. (Fogarty, 1988, p, 47) 
Incidentally, at 1024L, the time of missile impact, an Iranian C-130 took off from Bandar 
Abbas, squawking Mode I1 prior to and during its departure (Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 
As can be seen with the IFF process, it was nearly impossible to get 
reliable identification on the contact. Consequently, in a military operation where the key 
success factor cannot be achieved, it then transforms into a key factor for failure, 
ultimately contributing to a bad outcome. The inability of the Vincennes to obtain reliable 
identification was a contributing factor to the shoot down and highlights the problem 
entailing 
the inability to distinguish between friend or hostile aircraft or ships at the distances 
high-tech weapons systems operate, distances that are beyond the visual range of 
the systems' operators. Aegis is not designed to make that distinction, nor is any 
other currently deployed system. It was this weakness that led to the destruction 
of the airliner, and to the carnage inflicted on the USS Stark in 1987 when a Iraqi 
plot fired two missiles at an unidentified blip on his cockpit radar screen. (Hill, 
1989, p. 200) 
c. Task 
According to Martin van Creveld in Command in War, uncertainty is 
the main problem all command and control systems must deal with and is best understood 
as the product of two factors: 
the amount of information available for decision making and the nature of the task 
performed .... Everything else being equal, a larger and more complex task will 
demand more information to carry it out. Conversely, when information is 
insufficient (or when it is not available on time, or when it is super abundant, or 
when it is wrong...), a fall in the level of performance will automatically ensue. 
The history of command can be thus understood in terms of a race between the 
demand for information and the ability of command systems to meet it. (1985, p. 
265) 
The nature of the task (countering the emerging Iranian Silkworm missile threat) as faced 
by the Vincennes was a task riddled with uncertainty, especially with the Iran-Iraq War 
in progress and the controversial U.S. involvement in the protection of reflagged ships. 
According to Admiral Crowe, the Persian Gulf was like "fighting in a lake," where 
maneuverability was greatly reduced and the time available for important decisions was 
greatly compressed (Apple, 1988, p. A8). The Aegis system is a highly sophisticated, 
effective system; however, it was designed to detect targets at great range, which 
sacrificed the ability to distinguish the size of a target: 
'In combat on the open sea, size doesn't matter much; a small plane or missile can 
sink a ship. But in the Gulf, where big civilian planes share airspace with small 
warplanes, size can be a crucial clue.' (Watson, 1988, p. 20) 
Due to this reduction in maneuverability and decision making time combined with the fact 
that the Aegis weapon system was originally designed for the open ocean environment 
(Fogarty, 1988, p. 49), an optimization problem was created with respect to the ability to 
effectively accomplish the task at hand. A key constraint to this "product mix" of 
minimizing the "cost" of target misidentification involved the issue of being able to 
determine size. In broad terms, the size constraint was problematic and contributed to the 
adverse outcome of the deconfliction aspect of the task. Regarding the uncertainty 
involved with a highly ambiguous, unstructured task, a high degree of risk on the part of 
the decision maker was incurred, not only at Captain Rogers' level but at the policy level 
in government as described in the following: 
'In these tough situations, things sometimes go wrong,' a longtime Presidential 
advisor said yesterday. 'You know that. You have sophisticated machines and 
young sailors operating under hard conditions. So you take what you consider 
reasonable chances on behalf of important goals, and you hope for the best.'(Apple, 
1988, p. A8) 
The consequences of human error or systems failure are usually the greatest when the 
tolerance for error is slightest, particularly in an uncertain task environment where the 
task is not structured and the environment is unpredictable. The propensity for error 
becomes magnified. 
d. Structure 
Regarding the organizational structure (Figure 11-6), the AAW TAO was 
an effective approach to handling the fast paced, dynamic air environment. However, the 
demands placed on external communications between Golf Bravo and Golf Whiskey were 
unexpected. Basically, Golf Whiskey, or the AAW TAO, became engrossed in the relay 
of information to higher headquarters such that he could not perform his primary duties 
to the extent required. According to the Fogarty report, Golf Whiskey lost his "ability 
to independently assess the actual profile and [identification] ID of TN 4131." (1988, p. 
46) Since Golf Whiskey was involved in keeping Golf Bravo informed, the added 
workload was passed down to the AAWC console operator who was not the most 
experienced and qualified in his position (Fogarty, 1988, p. 46). He in turn could not 
take up the slack and verify the identification and track profile information. Essentially, 
there was a breakdown in these "gatekeeper" positions which serve as a "filtering 
function ...[ that] exercise control over the information flow to all subsequent receivers." 
(Krone, Jablin and Putnam, nd, p. 23) They could not provide the "sanity check" that was 
necessary due to task overload with extraneous and unforeseen demands. Since they 
could not perform the primary duties as effectively as intended and provide an 
independent assessment of information that they were geared for, a communications 
1 breakdown was experienced: There was no time for the captain to personally verify the 
information being provided to him; there was no time for Golf Bravo to independently 
verify the information being provided to their headquarters by the Vincennes due to the 
lack of a real time link; there was no visual identification provided by air support; and, 
since the AAW TAO and AAWC console operator were overloaded and could not provide 
information verification as originally intended, misleading and erroneous information was 
being perpetuated throughout the system, ultimately impacting the commanding officer's 
decision as shown in Figure IV-4 in the next section. 
Additionally, the internal communication net 15/16 was also overloaded 
due to an unexpected surge in personnel on the net. Not only were there static and noise 
interfering with the communications flow, but it was also difficult to hear what 
watchstanders were saying because the amplifiers could not physically handle the load. 
Due to the physical impairment of the internal communications equipment, watchstanders 
resorted to shouting so that they could be heard (Rogers, 1992). Essentially, 
communication and information flow, which are key integrating devices in an 
organizational structure, became hampered. 
Along with communication and information flow, the adherence to 
procedures was also lacking. Based on Captain Rogers' account regarding track numbers, 
a critical procedural problem involved the misuse of track numbers/blocks and lack of 
compliance to the link protocol system. This procedural problem was a contributing 
factor that led to the misidentification of the aircraft. Another procedural problem 
involved internal net communications in which net 15/16 became saturated with 
unauthorized personnel interjecting information over the net. Sometimes, this information 
was conveyed without console operators relating it to a specific track number. These 
types of issues added to the confusion of an already chaotic environment. 
With respect to operating mechanisms, sources of control will be 
discussed. As mentioned earlier, the AAW TAO organizational set up for Persian Gulf 
operations aboard the Vincennes was in essence a controlling mechanism to help keep the 
fast moving anti-air warfare tactical picture in order. However, due to task overload, time 
compression and uncertainty, the verification function was rendered ineffective. 
A slightly different angle with respect to another control mechanism will 
be presented regarding the use of the rules of engagement (ROE). Control is necessary 
in an organization, for without it, members may not act in ways that lead to the 
attainment of organizational goals (Robey, 1986, p. 313). Using this as a baseline, the 
military ROE are a source of control that combine top level guidance with lower level 
discretionary power. ROE are an attempt to balance two sources of competing 
requirements: "The need for initiative and flexibility in the field and the need for political 
control over the use of military force." (Sagan, 1991, p. 101) Although the Fogarty report 
stated the CJTFME and the Commanding Officer of the Vincennes properly selected and 
applied the correct rules of engagement (Fogarty, 1988, p. 46), there is an element of 
I concern that they were "hair trigger" rules in which "the new ROE contributed to the 
Vincennes tragedy by encouraging a more rapid response to ambiguous warning than 
occurred in the Stark attack6." (Sagan, 1991, p. 101) Blaming the "hair trigger " rules in 
the Vincennes tragedy would not be accurate, but they did play a role in what Sagan calls 
"a 'permissive cause' or a 'necessary, but not sufficient' cause." (1991, p. 100) The 
difference between the Stark and the Vincennes situations involves inaction on one hand 
(error of omission), while on the other hand, preemptive action (error of commission). 
Both situations were bound by a narrow range of action as authorized by the rules (Hayes, 
1989, pp. 54-55). 
As discussed so far, one can appreciate the explosive mix of 
circumstances the Vincennes was under. Yet, did the rules of engagement make a 
significant difference in the decision to use force to deal with the presumed threat? 
According to Bradd C. Hayes, in "Naval Rules of Engagement: Management Tools for 
Crisis," they probably did not for the hostile environment and the ongoing engagement 
among other factors played as a significant role in the decision as did the rules of 
engagement (1989, p. 55). In the long run, however, ROE cannot be discounted: 
If civilian authorities do not thoroughly review or fully understand ROE, the 
resulting rules might not conform to political requirements. If ROE are not adjusted 
in a crisis, inappropriate military activities may be instigated by lower level 
commanders. Yet, if rules are changed at the last minute, there might be inadequate 
time to communicate the changes to all relevant commanders. Finally, if unclear 
or contradictory ROE are issued to military forces, rnis-signalling, undesired 
vulnerabilities, and inadvertent escalation might occur. (Sagan, 1991, p. 101) 
The main point pertaining to ROE as a control is that they cannot serve as a "substitute 
for good training and prudent judgment on the part of individual commanders in such 
dangerous and ambiguous situations." (Sagan, 199 1, p. 102) 
e. People 
As stated in the previous section, people are a key variable in the battle 
equation. It is important that they are trained and exercise good judgment. The Fogarty 
report stated: "Had the CO used the information generated by his C & D system as the 
sole source of his tactical information, the CO might not have engaged TN 413 1." (1988, 
p. 43) This may be true, however, organizations are comprised of people and their innate 
talents as well as frailties, and their decision making involves bias. Referring back to 
the concept of decision making under conditions of uncertainty, it basically amounts to 
a matter of perception, or what a decision maker inside an organization can see from that 
vantage point (Robey, 1986, p. 313). 
Captain Rogers was influenced by numerous factors that comprised a 
mix of crew member perception's, environmental inputs (internal and external) as well 
as his own perceptions as he synthesized this information in order to make his decision 
at the critical 20 NM point of the air engagement. His perceptions were influenced by 
a large number of personnel and organizational 'filters', which allowed some of the 
environment to be understood, but masked other parts. As illustrated in Figure N-4, 
... a decision maker's values, cognitive limits and previous experience can influence 
perception of the environment. Additionally, the organizational structure and 
processes that may act to limit a decision maker's perception are also included. 
Because organizations are specialized and departmentalized, individual members are 
exposed only to a limited part of the environment and are trained to see it in a 
particular way. (Robey, 1986, p. 313) 
With respect to the Vincennes incident, the CIC was highly 
departmentalized in its set up, with each member developing his own view of the tactical 
picture based on limited access to the "big picture." Members provided inputs to the 
captain that reflected their version or interpretation of the tactical picture. The 
commanding officer, in turn, processed, synthesized, and fused this information, which 
was sometimes incomplete and erroneous. As the decision maker, Captain Rogers, 
developed a perspective that was more global, but was still dependent on the nature and 
quality of the information provided. The captain did not have time to personally verify 
the information provided, but did have great confidence in his CIC team (Rogers, 1992). 
Therefore, the captain relied on the information provided by his people and sensors. The 
quality of his decision was as good as the quality of the information he was provided as 
well as his ability to exercise good judgment, which is a function of training and 
experience. 
f. Technology 
The last element to be discussed in the "Leavitt Diamond" portion of 
the Dynamic Systems Model is technology. As stated earlier, technology is the process 
by which inputs are turned into outputs. Van Creveld makes the following conclusion 
about technology, "understand what it [technology] cannot do and then proceed to find 
a way to do it [the mission] nevertheless." (Hughes, 1986, p. 193) The key point here 
Organizational 
filters 
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processes 
is to know the limits of one's technology and work around those limitations to accomplish 
the mission. Before discussing technological issues, a brief description of the Aegis 
system is in order: 
The Aegis command and control system puts up an electronic shield of radar around 
itself and any ships within a 250 mile radius. It thus acts as a defense system for 
the whole battle group. The heart of the system is the phased array radar, SPY-1, 
which sends out multiple pulses capable of simultaneous tracking of hundreds of 
targets. Its data is fed to the Combat Information Center. Other equipment 
identifies friend or foe ... conducts surface searches, guides missiles to selected 
targets, provides long range air searches and tracks submarines. The second 
function of Aegis is to control the weaponry on board .... The computers take 
information from the ship's own sensors and from other craft in the area, [and] 
then ...[ determine] intercept times for enemy missiles, ships and aircraft. The chief 
armament on the USS Vincennes is the Standard SM-2 missile, which was used 
against Flight 655. (TIME, 1988, p. 12) 
In a nutshell, the basic problem of the Aegis weapon system involved limitations in the 
manlmachine interface. According to William P. Gruner, the basic issue is that the 
system was poorly suited for use by human beings during rapid military action: 
... the brain has one basic and serious shortcoming when applied to rapid-action 
warfare as typified by the Vincennes incident. Simply put, the rate at which the 
brain can comprehend information is too slow under fast-paced action. It has 
neither the time to understand all the inputs it receives, nor the ability to effectively 
perform all the other functions it would be capable of in a less harried environment. 
This performance limitation causes the brain to 'forget' data inputs, overlook stored 
data, draw hasty conclusions, and produce flawed answers for the human being it 
serves. (1990, p. 40) 
Electronic data subsystems process and display information at extremely 
high rates, while, on the other hand, the comprehension capability of operators has 
remained more or less stagnant. Consequently, when operators interface with electronic 
data subsystems, the users become overwhelmed by large amounts of changing data. 
Using a metaphor in electronic circuitry, the designers of the system created an impedance 
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mismatch between the operatorfuser and the electronic data subsystem (Gruner, 1990, p. 
40). One way to remedy this problem is to distribute the workload among the operators 
so that no one operator is overloaded. However, this created another problem with the 
Aegis weapon system which involved "distributing, correlating, and integrating the outputs 
and inputs of the resultant multi-operator system." (Gruner, 1990, p. 40) To compound 
this problem, electronic subsystems oftentimes rely on data bases that contain inaccurate 
data or entirely lack data elements that are vital to solving operational problems such as 
contact classification, identification and threat analysis. The net result can be errors that 
cause accidents. (Gruner, 1990, p. 41) 
As can be seen thus far, many of the problematic issues encountered by 
the Vincennes are integration oriented, but are ultimately rooted in the lack of human 
factors considerations in the design phase. Dr David Meister, a resident scientist at the 
Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC), conceded that "human error probably did play a 
major role in the Vincennes incident, but not in the way the Fogarty report contend[ed]. 
'It was human error...on the part of the people who designed the system."' (Hill, 1989, 
p. 204) Surprisingly, only a few examples of man/machine interface oriented 
recommendations were made by the Fogarty team, such as making the RCI slave to a 
hooked track, reassessing the Aegis large screen display (LSD) to allow the option of 
displaying altitude directly on the LSD, and determining the cause of net 15/16 
degradation (Fogarty, 1988, p. 53). Table IV-2, Man-Machine Interface Human 
Engineering Problems, is a breakdown of typical design problems inherent with the 
current naval NTDS system as presented by Glenn A. Osga, Naval Ocean Systems Center: 
TABLE IV-2 
MANNACHINE INTERFACE HUMAN ENGINEERING PROBLEMS 
Terminology is mis-matched between functions, displays and manuals. 
Terms are vague and inconsistently used. 
Error messages are uninformative. 
Errors force task restart. 
Errors may render system inoperative. 
Alerts are too numerous. 
Displays are "data dumps" and not task supportive. 
Procedures force numerous shifts between displays and controls. 
Procedures are inconsistent and force rote memorization. 
Users must memorize (up to 12) procedural outcomes. 
Visual feedback during task processing is non-existent. 
Controls force an inefficient menu hierarchy. 
Display cursor velocity is inversely related to trackball velocity. 
Tactical displays are "cluttered and dense. 
No help information on-line. 
No database query facilities, information extraction burden is on the user. 
Displays are primarily text with no graphics. 
Related information is divided among numerous small displays. 
Information is not integrated to support critical decisions. 
Source: Osga, "User-Computer Interface Issues for Future Ship Combat Consoles," p. 2 
In sum, according to Captain Wayne P. Hughes, U.S. Navy (retired), 
"[Tlechnology advances keep weapons in a state of change, and tactics must mate with 
the capabilities of contemporary weapons." (1986, p. 32) However, Captain Hughes' 
remarks should be taken one step further as a result of the Vincennes incident, ",..tactics 
and human factors considerations in systems design must mate with the capabilities of 
contemporary weapons." The most advanced weapon system can be rendered useless if 
it is too difficult to employ under normal circumstances, let alone combat conditions. 
Therefore, another contributing factor to the Vincennes incident lies in the poor interface 
between the Aegis weapon system and the operator due to procedural complexity, 
problematic presentation of information, as well as other user hostile aspects inherent with 
Aegis system design. The nature of the interface between man and machine should 
compensate for human weaknesses as a result of information overload, particularly during 
combat where task uncertainty, time constraints, and chaos are at their extreme. 
Otherwise, the system will not be used to its full potential and could become more of a 
detriment than an asset. 
g. Culture 
The author was unable to assess the culture of the Vincennes due to the 
inability to interview crew members. Because of the esoteric nature of culture and the 
lack of interview data, a determination as to its impact could not be made. 
h. Outcome 
The outcome was that the Vincennes mistakenly shot down a civilian 
airliner. This accident was not the result of any one particular error, event, breakdown, 
act of omission or commission, individual equipment or personnel limitation, but rather, 
it was the culmination of all the above. A negative synergy aimed towards system failure 
was achieved, in which a combination of small "errors" and their interactions within the 
system compounded to become one large scale error. The Dynamic Systems Model 
illustrates to some extent how this type of outcome is achieved. Again, the mode1 is 
dynamic in which the elements such as environment, key success factors, task, structure, 
people, technology and culture are interactive producing an oftentimes unexpected 
outcome. The interaction of elements within a system are critical and are oftentimes 
overlooked, particularly when an accident occurs in which simple solutions are sought to 
complex dynamic problems. According to Lloyd R. Amey, in A Conceptual Approach 
to Management, 
Interrelatedness of parts is the essential characteristic of a system. The fact that 
(some of) the parts are interrelated means that the whole can behave in ways that 
none of the parts can: consider a human being and a single limb. We say the 
whole possesses certain 'emergent properties9--the whole is more than the sum of 
its parts. The effect of this kind of parts-whole relationship (2 + 2 = 5) is 
sometimes referred to as synergy or gestalt. (1986, p. 4) 
In sum, the aggregate error resulting from the interaction and 
interdependencies of the various organizational and contextual factors as depicted by the 
Dynamic Systems Model contributed to the Iranian Airbus tragedy. As can be discerned, 
there were numerous causes that contributed to the accidental shoot down of Flight 655, 
that were magnified by their interaction with other problematic issues. 
D. IDENTIFICATION OF "CAUSAL fACTORS" USING A CYBERNETIC 
MODEL 
1. Cybernetics 
Cybernetics is an interdisciplinary science focusing on the study of 
information, communication and control. The term was coined in the 1940s by a 
mathematician from MIT, Norbert Wiener, as a metaphorical application of the Greek 
word, kubernetes, which means steersman. "Wiener used this imagery to characterize 
processes of information exchange through which machines and organisms engage in self- 
regulating behaviors that maintain steady states." (Morgan, 1986, pp. 84-86) The main 
concept emerging from Wiener's research was that the ability of a system to engage in 
self-regulating behavior depends on processes of information exchange involving negative 
feedback. Referring to the above metaphor, negative feedback is pivotal to the process 
of steersmanship: 
Systems of negative feedback engage in this type of error detection and correction 
automatically, so that movements beyond specified limits in one direction initiate 
movements in the opposite direction to maintain a desired course of action. 
(Morgan, 1986, p. 85) 
The concept of negative feedback allows one to view routine behavior in an 
unconventional way as shown in Figure IV-5. For example, one would think that when 
a person picks up a pencil from a desk, that his hand, guided by his eye, moves directly 
toward the pencil in order to pick it up. Cybernetics suggest otherwise. For in 
cybernetics, this simple action occurs through a process of error elimination where 
deviations between hand and pencil are reduced at each and every stage of the process 
so that in the end, no error remains. He picks up the pencil by avoiding not picking it 
up. Similarly, this same process applies to riding a bike. A person manages to ride a 
bicycle by a means of a system of information flows and regulatory actions that help 
hirn~her to avoid falling off. To put it another way, negative feedback involves more 
leading to less and less to more. (Morgan, 1986, pp. 85-6) 
We pick up an object by avoiding not picking it up! 
In a similar way, we manage to ride a bicycle by means of a system of 
information flows and regulatory actions that help us to avoid falling 
off. 
Negative feedback eliminates error: it creates desired system states by 
avoiding noxiant states. 
Cybernetics paves the way to a theory of communication and learning, stressing four 
key principles: 
Systems must have the capacity to sense, monitor, and scan significant aspects of 
their environment 
Systems must be able to relate this information to the operating norms that guide 
system behavior 
Systems must be able to detect significant deviations from these norms 
Systems must be able to initiate corrective action when discrepancies are detected 
(Morgan, 1986, p. 86-7) 
If these four conditions are satisfied, a continuous process of information exchange is 
created between a system and its environment, allowing the system to monitor changes 
and initiate appropriate responses. In this way, the system can operate in an intelligent 
and self-regulating manner. (Morgan, 1986, p. 87) 
Now, where does learning fit in? The above conditions have led cyberneticians to 
draw a distinction between the process of learning and learning to learn. A thermostat 
is a simple cybernetic system and an example of a "single-loop" learning process as 
shown in Figure IV-6. A thermostat is able to learn in the sense of being able to detect 
and correct deviations from predetermined norms. But, a thermostat is unable to question 
the appropriateness of what it is doing. If the thermostat setting was changed to a new 
setting of 32 degrees Fahrenheit, the thermostat is unable to question whether this 
temperature setting is appropriate to the inhabitants' preferences and is unable to make 
adjustments to account for this deviation from the norm. Consequently, the inhabitants 
Sirrgle-loop leamirig rests in an ability to detect and correct error in rela- 
tion to a given set of operating norms: 
Step 1 
Step 3 Step 2 
Double-loop leamirzg depends on being able to take a "double look" at 
the situation by questioning the relevance of operating norms: 
w 
Step 1 = the process of sensing, scanning, and monitoring the 
ronment. 
envi- 
Step 2 = the comparison of this information against operating i 
norms. 
Step 2a = the process of questioning whether operating norms are 
appro riate. 
Step 1 = the process of initiating appropriate action. 
experience discomfort. On the other hand, more complex cybernetic systems such as the 
human brain are able to detect and correct errors in operating norms and thus influence 
the standards that guide their detailed operations. "It is this kind of self-questioning 
ability that underpins the activities of systems that are able to learn to learn and self- 
organize." (Morgan, 1988, p. 87) The basic difference between these two types of 
learning is identified in terms of "single-loop" learning as in the thermostat example and 
"double loop learning" as in the human brain as displayed in Figure IV-6. 
"Can organizations learn and learn to learn?" As depicted in the single loop 
diagram, many organizations have become proficient at this type of learning. They have 
developed the ability to scan the environment, to set objectives, and to monitor general 
performance of the system in relation to these objectives. This includes controls such as 
budgets, exception reports, and/or any mechanism that highlights critical deviations. The 
ability to achieve proficiency at double loop learning often proves to be elusive. While 
some organizations have been successful in institutionalizing systems that review and 
challenge basic norms, policies and operating procedures, in relation to changes occurring 
in their environment, many fail to do so. This failure is indicative of bureaucratic 
organizations since their operating principles oftentimes obstruct the learning process. 
(Morgan, 1986, pp. 87-89) 
2. Cybernetic Loops 
Cybernetic theory requires the reader to think in terms of loops, rather than 
lines, and to replace the idea of mechanical causality, that A causes B, with the concept 
of mutual causality, which suggests that A and B may be co-defined as a consequence of 
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belonging to the same system of relations (Morgan, 1986, p. 247). The methodology used 
to analyze the Vincennes incident is adopted from Magorah Maruyama's research, who 
focuses on positive and negative feedback in shaping system dynamics: 
Processes of negative feedback, where a change in a variable initiates changes in 
the opposite direction, are important in accounting for the stability of systems. 
Processes characterized by positive feedback, on the other hand, where more leads 
to more, and less to less, are important in accounting for system change. Together 
these feedback mechanisms can explain why systems gain or preserve a given form, 
and how this form can be transformed over time. (Morgan, 1986, p. 247) 
Maruyama's loop analysis shows how positive feedback accounts for differentiation of 
complex systems in the following example: 
... a large homogeneous plain attracts a farmer, who settles on a given spot. Other 
farmers follow, and one of them opens a tool shop. The shop becomes a meeting 
place, and a food stand is established next to the shop. Gradually a village grows 
as merchants, suppliers, farmhands, and others are attracted. The village facilitates 
the marketing of agricultural products, and more farms develop around the village. 
Increased agricultural activity encourages the development of industry, and the 
village gradually becomes a city. (Morgan, 1986, pp. 248) 
In the above example, the homogeneous plain was transformed by a series of positive 
feedback loops that amplified the initial effects of the differentiation process (Morgan, 
1986, p. 249). The growth of the city was not instigated by any one single cause, but by 
a "deviation-amplifying process." Maruyama argues that the processes of positive 
feedback characterized by deviation-amplification explain the "evolution" of things, 
whereby positive feedback produces changes that are out of proportion with the initial 
"kick" or incident that activated them. This kind of analysis can be used to foster a better 
understanding of events and processes that shape organizations and their contexts and can 
be used to understand the dynamics of many different types of organizational problems. 
(Morgan, 1986, p. 249) 
3. Cybernetic Model of Mutual Causality-The Vincennes Incident 
Figure IV-7 presents a cybernetic view of the Vincennes incident. Many of 
the links presented in this diagram are deviation-amplifying (solid lines). These positive 
feedback relations mean more leads to more and less leads to less, while the negative 
feedback relations (dashed lines) mean changes in one direction are associated with 
changes in the opposite direction. The dotted lines mean that there is an implied 
connection between the set of relations. Also, the letters and numbers of the Cybernetic 
Model correspond directly to the letters and numbers labelling the various events and 
factors in the Events Path Model, Figure IV-1. To recap, the letters represent 
eventslfactors that had occurred external to the CIC, while the numbers are eventslfactors 
that took place within the CIC. 
A means for interpreting this model is demonstrated in the following 
description: A strategic node, which is a large ellipse with a bold outline, containing the 
contents "Iranian P-3 challenged by Vincennes" is located at the top left hand corner of 
the model. The number inside the ellipse refers to it as a factor that had occurred internal 
to the CIC--the Vincennes issued a challenge to the P-3. The numeric designation of "9" 
to this ellipse is equivalent to the labelling used on the Events Path Model, Figure IV-1. 
In fact, all labelling in the Cybernetic Model can be mapped back to the Events Path 




in terms of loops and nodes to show flow and interaction. By tracing the lines entering 
and leaving the strategic node as in Node 9, one can get an idea of how this particular 
node impacts other nodes as well as how other nodes and loops impact it. For example, 
Node "B", which is an external factor to the Vincennes' CIC as it is labelled with a letter, 
is related to Nodes "G" and "S." Not only are all three nodes related to each other, but 
their individual relationships as well as their combined association to Node 9 affect this 
strategic node. Another example of this type of contributing factor involves Node "R L," 
I 
which is a combination of similar "blocks" or factors from the Events Path Model 
pertaining to ESM. Node "RL" contributed to the challenge of the P-3, but also had a 
significant impact on Node 57, which was Rogers' decision to fire, because the contact 
of interest, like the Iranian P-3, was not emitting any radar. Although some relationships 
are stronger than others, one can follow the nodes and loops and trace their relationships. 
The important point to this model is to get an understanding of how events are 
1 interrelated to each other without the constraints of time. 
Upon viewing Figure IV-7, we see that negative feedback relations (dashed 
lines) are practically nonexistent, except for one event involving the CIC officer notifying 
the commanding officer and Golf Whiskey or the AAW TAO that the contact was 
"possible COMAIR." (Fogarty, 1988, p. 34) Here, positive feedback loops characterized 
the Vincennes' air engagement, and the process became a deviation-amplifying process, 
with minimal impact from the negative feedback loop to keep the system stabilized. The 
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best way to think of this process is like flying an airplane: If a pilot flies off course by 
using too much rudder in a particular direction, then to get back on course, hetshe must 
move the rudder in the opposite direction. However, if no negative feedback is applied 
via the rudder, the pilot will find himself further and further off course. When left 
unchecked, positive feedback engages in a deviation-amplification process in which the 
error becomes progressively more pronounced, To keep the system in check or the 
aircraft on course, a series of negative feedback loops or small rudder movements in the 
opposite direction are required upon detection that the system or airplane is veering off 
course. Continual adjustment through the use of negative feedback as a control 
mechanism enables the system to stay within bounds and assures that the pilot arrives to 
hisher planned destination. 
Systems can be viewed as "dynamic systems of loops," whereby change is the 
antithesis of organization and organization is the antithesis of change: "Change is the 
result of deviation amplifying loops (Maruyama, 1963; Watson, 1963), [while] 
organization ... is the result of deviation countering loops (Weick, 1969; Crozier, 1963, 
1970)." (Bougon and Komokar, 1990, p. 137) Nodes link together to form loops, in 
which the deviation amplifying loops are responsible for change, and the deviation 
countering loops are responsible for maintaining stability and control (Bougon and 
Komokar, 1990, p. 137). Viewing the Vincennes incident as a system of loops as 
depicted in Figure IV-7, the loops, in essence, created the organization. In cybernetics, 
"to change organizations is to change loops, and to change loops is to change 
organizations." (Bougon and Komokar, 1990, p. 137) Therefore, to effect change to an 
organization is really to effect change to its loops, which can be accomplished in three 
phases: 
1. Identify the strategic nodes 
2. Identify the strategic loops 
3. Use the plasticity of many of the loops to direct the dynamics of the system's 
strategic loops in the desired direction. (Bougon and Komokar, 1990, p. 143) 
In the Cybernetic Model of the Vincennes Incident, Figure IV-7, the strategic nodes are 
identified by the large ellipses and the strategic loops are those loops that contain the 
strategic nodes. Some loops are stronger than others, or they may be loosely or tightly 
coupled to the whole system. The problem is that the nodes and loops of interest to 
strategic change are the ones likely to coincide with strong, tightly coupled nodes as well 
as with the nodes and loops directly responsible for the system's identity. (Bougon and 
Komokar, 1990, p. 147). If this is the case, then attempts to directly or by incremental 
fashion to change these strategic nodes and loops will end in failure due to the intense 
amount of conflict generated. However, the solution is to focus change efforts on 
peripheral and/or weak loops rather than those directly responsible for system identity as 
presented in the following: 
[Allter enough weak loops so that the strong nodes and loops defined by the initial 
whole become indirectly redefined by a new, emergent whole .... When loops are 
weak and loosely coupled, nodes can be added to, or removed from loops with 
reasonable effort .... [However,] by simply adding a node to a loop is not sufficient, 
to bring about change in the action of a loop, the addition must change its sign.,.. 
[In other words,] when adding or removing a node, to effectively change the action 
of the loop, a replacement node must reverse the effect of the node preceding it on 
the node following it. (Bougon and Komokar, 1990, p. 149) 
By attacking the change process from an indirect, more subtle approach, the conflict 
generated as a result of the change will be low (Komokar and Bougon, 1990, p. 151). 
Conversely, by the "brute force" method of affecting change on strong nodes and links, 
great conflict will ensue and the change process, more than likely, will fail 
4. Application 
In the case of the Vincennes incident, there was minimal negative feedback 
to keep the system from going out of control: 
There was no aircraft in the area to provide a positive visual identification 
concerning the unknown-assumed enemy contact of interest. 
Although the Vincennes' combat organizational structure for Persian Gulf operations 
(Figure 11-6) was intendedly designed to provide negative feedback with respect to 
the fast moving AAW environment, due to task overload and distractions from their 
primary duties, the AAW TAO and AAWC console operator could not verify the 
information being provided to the captain, ,It was what they did not do that became 
the problem. 
Golf Bravo could not interject into the system and provide an independent 
assessment because of the lack of a "usable real time data link."(Fogarty, 1988, p. 
50) 
Although the Sides was a detached participant during the air engagement and 
evaluated the contact as a non-threat, the commanding officer did not attempt to 
dissuade the Vincennes from shooting.' 
Air Traffic Control did not interject after numerous attempts on the part of the 
Vincennes and Sides in trying to contact and warn the aircraft. 
Although the CIC officer made the remark "possible COMAIR to the commanding 
officer and Golf Whiskey, his remark, which was a source of negative feedback, 
was not forceful enough to counteract the momentum gained. The preponderance 
of evidence that suggested the contact was an F-14 on an attack profile amplified 
the process rather than provided a counterbalance to it. 
What appears to be a possible solution to this problem is to design negative feedback 
loops in order to contribute to double-loop learning. This would provide a "double look" 
that questions the relevance of operating norms and what is going on in the system. (See 
Section 2) According to Morgan, "[slystems of negative feedback engage in this kind of 
error detection and correction automatically, so that movements beyond specified limits 
in one direction initiate movements in the opposite direction to maintain a desired course 
of action." (Morgan, 1986, p. 85) 
This overall negative feedback process, which is a modified version of the 
"double-loop learning" process, is characteristic of a cybernetic system. By ensuring 
negative feedback is an integrated, automatic part of the system, then one has designed 
into the system a means by which organizations can learn. According to Cohen and 
Gooch in Militarv Misfortunes, the failure to l e a d  is a "taxonomy of misfortune." (1990, 
P. 26) 
5. Summary 
By following the arrows of the Cybernetic Model of Mutual Causality--The 
Vincennes Incident, one can trace events, their impact, and their relationships with other 
events. One can see how both internal and external factors affected the Vincennes system 
and, in turn, how the Vincennes system affected the context. In essence, the Cybernetic 
Model of Mutual Causality enables one to understand from a systems perspective the 
nature of the problem inherent with the Vincennes incident--the lack of negative feedback. 
It is not like the linear process of tracing a cascading error to its origin to account for the 
wrong answer, as in a complex thermodynamics problem. Unlike the cascading error 
analogy, the Vincennes incident does not boil down to a singular cause, like a simple 
"sign error," but rather, the "cause" is a far more complex interrelationship of causes and 
events, transcending the "misreading of altitude" (Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 16) attributed 
to "combat induced stress on personnel." (Fogarty, 1988, p. 51) 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Cybernetic Model of Mutual Causality depicting the Vincennes incident of 
Section D, demonstrates the importance of negative feedback to the maintenance of 
stability in a system. It also illustrates that outcomes are the products of a complex set 
of relationships. We also see, as shown in the Dynamic Systems Model of Section C, the 
existence of separate factors, that when taken in aggregate, can also lead to an undesirable 
outcome. Additionally, this model is an example of a highly interdependent system, in 
which a change in one element results a change in another. Finally, the Events Path 
Model of Section B, a linear model, reveals how a series of events over time culminated 
in the downing of the Airbus. 
However, by dwelling on the linear map too long, one could to fall into the trap of 
"thinking in lines," searching for simple cause(s) that lie at the root of the problem 
(Morgan, 1986, p. 249). Although linear thinking used in the investigation process is 
pragmatic in its own right, it can lead to misleading conclusions. It can generate a linear 
solution when the actual problem is systemic. Upon dissection of the Path Model, Figure 
IV-1, one finds that even with this linear map, the problem cannot be attributed to just 
one cause that launched a chain reaction. 
Consequently, an assortment of models, such as the Events Path Model, Dynamic 
Systems Model, and the Cybernetic Model of Mutual Causality, should be used to 
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diagnose complex problems in order to effectively develop a more complete map the 
"causal factors." Of equal importance is to prevent the misapplication of methodologies 
and their associated models which often leads to an incomplete and/or erroneous 
diagnosis. This misapplication is evident in the Fogarty report, whereby the investigation 
team used a linear approach to diagnose a systemic problem. Due to this mismatch in 
methodologies, the investigation team could not accomplish a complete diagnosis as they 
could have if they employed a combination of models to help them assess "causal 
factors." The systems approach in analyzing complex dynamic systems is a necessary 
approach to problem identification and problem solving. The linkage between events, 
their interaction, and impact on the system are critical aspects of the diagnostic process. 
NOTES 
1, The events are not entirely inclusive, although they cover the major factors Captain 
Rogers specifically considered when he made his decision. These factors and events were 
derived from: the Fogarty report, pages 40-41; two personal interviews with Captain 
Rogers, 13 February and 8 and 9 April 1992; and excerpts from the Senate Hearing, 1988. 
2. The formal definition of low intensity conflict (LIC) was adopted in 1985 by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and is defined as the following: 
Low-intensity conflict is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, 
social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from 
diplomatic, economic, and psycho-social pressures through terrorism and 
insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and 
is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of 
violence. (Klare, 1988,~. 53) 
3. Autopoiesis is a new approach to systems theory developed two Chilean scientists, 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. They maintain that all living organisms are 
organizationally closed, autonomous systems of interactions that make reference only to 
themselves. Their argument is based on the premise that living organisms are 
characterized by three key features: Autonomy, circularity and self-reference. These 
features enable living systems to "self-create" or "self-renew." Therefore, the term 
autopoiesis refers to this capacity for "self-production" through a closed system of 
relations. Maturana and Varela assert that the "aim of such systems is ultimately to 
produce themselves: Their own organization and identity is their most important 
product." (Morgan, 1986, p. 236) 
Gareth Morgan explains that "random variations or kicks to the system help spur change 
to the whole, which foster evolution and organizational learning," in which large 
fluctuations trigger instability and quantum leaps capable of transforming the whole 
system of activity into a new order of existence (Morgan 1986, p. 240): 
From an autopoietic standpoint, random variation provides the seed of possibility 
that allows the emergence and evolution of new system identities. Random changes 
can trigger interactions that reverberate throughout the system, the final 
consequences being determined by whether of not the current identity of the system 
will dampen the effects of the new disturbance through compensatory changes 
elsewhere, or whether a new configuration of relations will be allowed to emerge. 
(Morgan, 1986, p. 240) 
4. Daft identified four consequences of the garbage can model: 
1. Solutions may be proposed even when problems do not exist 
2. Choices are made without solving problems 
3. Problems may persist without being solved 
4. A few problems are solved (1986, pp. 365-366) 
5. The following description of organized anarchy is provided by Daft: 
The organized anarchy describes organizations characterized by rapid change .... No 
organization fits the organized anarchy circumstances all the time. Most 
organizations will occasionally find themselves in positions of making decisions 
under unclear, problematic circumstances. (1986, p. 364.) 
6. According to Bradd Hayes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the following changes to 
the rules of engagement after the Stark incident: 
The rules of engagement were changed to encourage anticipatory self-defense; the 
definitions of hostile intent and hostile act were now revised; all aircraft and ships 
were now considered potentially hostile; and all neutral and friendly shipping 
became eligible for U.S. assistance. (1989, pp. 54-5) 
7. The following account is from a letter published in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 
by Commander David R. Carlson with respect to the Vincennes incident: 
During the incident, the Sides was less that 20 NM from the USS Vincennes and 
under the Vincennes' tactical command .... We locked on and illuminated 
the ...[ aircraft] with our missile fire control radar. The aircraft continued climbing 
on a southwesterly course that would take it right over the USS Vincennes' position. 
Based on closest point of approach to the Sides (range and altitude), lack of any 
significant known F-14 anti-surface warfare (ASUW) capability, lack of detected 
radar emissions, and precedent, I evaluated the track as a non-threat. I continued 
to press my TAO for information concerning attempts to warn off. ..[the aircraft] and 
was advised that numerous attempts had been made without success, and that the 
effort was continuing ....[ The aircraft] did not appear to react to the illumination with 
fire control radar, and this was most unusual. The USS Vincennes announced her 
intentions to take [the aircraft] with missiles at 20 miles. I wondered aloud in 
disbelief, but did not do the thing that might have helped. I did not think to push 
for a re-evaluation of IFF. Had I done so, the information might have come 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The catalyst that instigated the analysis of the Vincennes incident stemmed from the 
following research questions: 
1. How is it that a billion dollar warship designed to track and classify multiple 
aircraft in a combat environment shot down a commercial airliner? 
2. How is it that the system data showed the contact to be ascending, while many 
watchstanders in the Combat Information Center (CIC) thought the contact was 
descending? 
3. And finally, how is it that the findings of Rear Admiral Fogarty, the 
investigating officer, differed from the interpretation of Captain Rogers, the Commanding 
Officer of the Vincennes? 
The research process was limited to unclassified materials and sources. The primary 
sources for the analysis were the Fogarty report, unclassified version, Senate Hearing 
before the Committee on Armed Services, and personal interview data obtained from 
several interviews with Captain Rogers. 
The Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655 due to her inability to positively 
identify the contact. By employing the Events Path Model, Dynamic Systems Model, and 
the Cybernetic Model of Mutual Causality, this identification problem was the result of 
a variety of "causal factors": 
Extreme ambiguity and uncertainty as well as time compression coupled with 
chaotic, unpredictable conditions contributed to the fusion of misleading information 
fragments. Not only did the local context set the stage for the eventual downing, but 
mixed IFF readings were added to the ducting conditions and the rniscorrelation of 
Remote Control Indicator information, to make it practically impossible to obtain reliable 
contact identification through the IFF process. 
The watchstanders' concept of reality was an evolutionary process fueled by 
random variations of both internal and external eventslfactors. During the last 189 
seconds, the F-14 context was progressively amplified, culminating in a new order of 
reality; Captain Rogers and his CIC organization engaged what they believed to be an F- 
14. Positive aircraft identification was the real problem that led to the shoot down. 
Practically the entire seven minute air engagement process involved efforts taken by CIC 
personnel to identify the aircraft. 
The inability to determine the size of a contact was another contributing factor. 
Aegis is a highly sophisticated, effective system; however, it was designed to detect 
targets at great range, which sacrificed the ability to distinguish the size of a target. The 
Aegis system was designed for the "open ocean" environment where the size of a contact 
was not as crucial of an issue as in a littoral or confined environment. 
Due to task overload, the organizational structure did not facilitate the verification 
of information as was originally intended with the AAW TAO set up. Since the AAW 
TAO could not perform his primary duties by providing an independent assessment of 
information, a break down in communications, coordination, and information flow were 
experienced, which had ramifications throughout the entire anti-air warfare function up 
through the chain of command to the commanding officer of the Vincennes. 
Captain Rogers' individual decision making process was influenced by numerous 
factors: watchstanders' perceptions, environmental inputs (internal and external) as well 
as his own perceptions to make his decision at the critical 20 NM point of the air 
engagement. Because he was in the middle of an explosive mix of circumstances, his 
decision was only as good as the information he was provided. 
The most advanced system can be rendered useless if it is too difficult to employ 
under normal circumstances let alone combat conditions. A contributing factor in the 
downing of Flight 655 was the poor interface between the Aegis weapon system and the 
operator, especially the procedural complexity and a problematic presentation of 
information illustrated in the auto-correlation and subsequent confusion of track numbers. 
A negative synergy moving towards system failure developed from a combination 
of small errors and their interactions within the system. All worked together to produce 
one large scale error. In sum, the aggregate error resulting from the interaction and 
interdependencies of the various organizational and contextual factors contributed to the 
Iranian Airbus tragedy. 
The Vincennes system was lacking in negative feedback in order to keep the 
system from going out of control. Negative feedback was not a well integrated, automatic 
part of the system organizationally, technologically, or procedurally. 
With respect to the second research question concerning ascending versus 
descending altitude readings, the kinematic information and subsequent analysis indicated 
that two separate aircraft were being tracked, one that was climbing and the other that 
was descending. It is probable that various crew members aboard the Vincennes were 
detecting kinematic information from a second aircraft, an A-6, having the same track 
number as was originally designated to the unknown-assumed enemy contact of interest 
initially detected from Bandar Abbas. Even without Captain Rogers' interview data to 
serve as an avenue for comparison, the graphs and analysis show the existence of a 
second aircraft, but its identity may not have been known. Additionally, the quantitative 
analysis supports the track number sequence as presented by Captain Rogers during his 
interviews with the author. It is the opinion of the author that 49 ADT, AIC-3, IAD, IDS, 
RSC, AAWC, UBS, and MSS were not in all instances "misreading altitude (Senate 
Hearing, 1988, p. 16) due to "stress" and "scenario fulfillment," which were originally 
identified as being primary causes for this divergence between recollected and system data 
entries (Fogarty, 1988, p. 45). The cause of this divergence and subsequent chain of 
events can be attributed to the CIC's inability to identify and detect the two aircraft 
involved. 
Regarding the third research question (differences in interpretation between Fogarty 
and Rogers), the issue of more complex causal modeling enriches one's understanding of 
events and their outcomes. The linear models are useful as a starting point, but should 
not be the sole means by which an diagnosis is made. This was a shortcoming of the 
Fogarty investigation. Unable to reconcile the system and the recollected data regarding 
the disparity in altitude, the Fogarty report attributed the primary cause of the tragedy to 
stress. On the other hand, Captain Rogers emphasized a more complex analysis of the 
Vincennes incident. Building on his observations, we see that complex dynamic systems 
models are useful for identifying interdependencies and understanding how change affects 
other aspects of a system. Then, too, cybernetic models are useful for flow analysis, 
determining the extent of negative feedback or for positive feedback required to facilitate 
a stabilization or change process in a system. Introducing these tools for analysis would 
aid investigation and diagnosis of these types of occurrences, for policy makers who want 
to improve system functioning, Command, Control, and Communications (C3) students 
who need to learn how to design and redesign systems, and for investigators who need 
to go beyond linear models in their diagnostic work.. 
In sum, the research process pertaining to the Vincennes' air engagement of Iran Air 
Flight 655 revealed the followings: 
Rogers' version regarding the existence of two planes and the confusion over 
track numbers was supported. His interpretation was consistent with the data. 
Based on this analysis, the real issue was the confusion over two aircraft and the 
inability of the Aegis system operation to distinguish between them. 
The importance of finding the w r o b l e m  is clearly demonstrated. The 
Fogarty investigation team could not account for the discrepancy in the data and so 
introduced the interpretation of individual stress as the causal factor. Further analysis in 
this thesis opens up the possibility that other factors beside stress were at work. In fact, 
the new problem definition becomes the inability of using the Aegis system to 
differentiate between two aircraft. 
Consequently, if this overall assessment holds. true, then the following specific 
recommendations can be made, which are geared towards the incorporation of negative 
feedback into the system to help prevent another "Vincennes incident": 
Aircraft warnings need to be more specific and descriptive by describing location in 
relation to a geographical point and use of identification modes and codes (Fogarty, 
1988, p. 52) 
Improve communication with Air Traffic Control (ATC) agencies between the U.S. 
and other countries. Commercial air oriented issues are not going to diminish, but 
only get worse as air traffic becomes more crowded. This will help resolve issues of 
identification, communication and procedural problems. (Fogarty, 1988, p. 52) 
Obtain radios that will enable ship personnel to communicate and monitor Air Traffic 
Control frequencies, which will provide immediate feedback as to whether the aircraft 
heard the warnings or not. They could be contacted via local ATC facilities if the 
ship's efforts are unsuccessful. This will also reduce the language barrier, considering 
that it is not clear that the pilot of the Airbus understood English or not. 
Develop an understanding of cultural differences between U.S. cultural values and the 
culture that dominates the area of operation. For example, the concept of time and 
what is considered "late" varies from culture to culture. Being 27 minutes late in an 
aircraft departure may not be considered late, but rather "on time." 
Radio talker responsibilities should be delegated to a less critical position and be 
dedicated, if necessary (Fogarty, 1988, p. 52). The AAW TAO and AAWC could not 
perform the verification function and their primary duties that they originally were 
intended to do. In a generic sense, critical positions should be identified and should 
only be called upon to perform their primary duties as assigned, otherwise they will 
be spread too thin. Since communication is critical to higher headquarters, then 
someone with a less hectic job should be assigned those duties. The command by 
negation still applies. 
Improve operator training to ensure operators are aware of the of the ball tab error in 
relation to range, ducting and its ramifications with respect to radar, as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages regarding the use of the RCI to determine mode and 
code. Until the RCI is slaved to a hooked track through a software or hardware 
change, there is still the propensity for operators to miscorrelate the RCI data with the 
hooked contact. 
Improve procedures and operator training in link protocol applications, such as in the 
proper use of track blocks and numbers. Adherence to procedures is paramount, 
especially as the NTDS gets more complicated and as more "actors" outside of the 
U.S. domain factor into the future battle equation. 
Improve the man/machine interface between Aegis, which will in turn improve user 
performance. These include: procedural simplification, information integration, 
controVdisplay optimization, appropriate use of graphics; and information query. " 
(Osga, nd, p. 2) This also includes the basic human factors principals of reducing user 
shift between multiple displays, provide on going feedback of task progress and 
decrease the impact of task interruptions. An example of this type of change is that 
presently the user must shift between three controls and three displays. The alternative 
would be to co-locate all useful task information on pop-up windows on the same 
display. Graphic representation of trends should be emphasized. (Osga, nd, p. 2) 
To help prevent a "coincidence" in track number application, i.e. the same track 
number used twice to represent two separate tracks, a track number should be "retired" 
after it has been auto-correlated and returned to storage for a reasonable period of 
time. Devise a better means "to keep track" of track numbers vice the "grease pencil" 
method and as well as a means to communicate this information, particularly on 
contacts of interest, to key decision makers. 
Install or reconfigure a console that will provide "raw" video. Since the Aegis 
symbology is processed, the operator does not know how "big" the contact is. This 
terminal will serve as a back-up or offer another perspective to the tactical picture. 
Aircraft will not always be available to provide a visual identification. 
Improve communications between ships. Sometimes another ship seeing the tactical 
picture from a different angle can provide another perspective or be another source of 
verification particularly where identification is involved. 
Improve link capability so that higher headquarters can see what is going on for 
themselves in a tactical sense vice having to be told through voice channels. A real 
time link will also enable higher head quarters provide feedback or again offer an other 
perspective to the tactical on scene commander. 
Reorient training, whether it be simulated or in the form of exercises, to be more 
geared towards deconfliction issues inherent with a low intensity conflict situation 
where there are no declared enemies, an uncertain task environment, and 
fragmentedfincomplete information availability. This type of training should 
emphasize team decision making, and coordination and communication principles. 
Also, it should be accomplished with and without the commanding officer or partial 
involvement of the commanding officer so that the team would be able to react as if 
the captain was there due to the shared mental model (Orasanu, 1990, p. 4) achieved 
among all CIC members. This is to take in account a full, partial or non-availability 
of the commander in the event a sudden tactical situation should develop. 
Automate negative feedback principles within the Aegis system as much as possible. 
Knowing that combat situations in the future will be extremely time sensitive, the more 
negative feedback or double checking aspects that can be automated the better for the 
operator and decision maker. 
To ensure a wealth of highly trained personnel with Aegis background, apply a 
designator to personnel records so that a person with an Aegis background will always 
be assigned to that type of ship and particular weapon system. Having highly trained 
personnel is one thing, but the combination of highly trained and experienced 
personnel with a particular complicated weapon system is another. Back in the WW 
I1 era, surface warfare officers transferable to other types of ships with relative ease, 
due to the fact that technology was not as complicated. However, with the 
specialization, in depth training and experience required to operate highly sophisticated 
modern day weapon systems, this WW I1 concept can no longer hold. Therefore, 
partition classes and types of ships accordingly, and assign personnel based on their 
specialty with respect to that particular type or class of ship, i.e., an Aegis trained 
officer will always remain on Aegis ships. This concept is similar to the management 
of Air Force pilots. For example, an F-15 will remain an F-15 pilot and will relocate 
to bases where there are F-15s to fly. Provisions are made for cross training if desired 
and meets the needs of the Air Force. The idea here is to keep highly specialized and 
trained officers and crew members within their specialty of weapon systern/platform. 
In addition, other learnings were uncovered as a result of this research process: 
Absence of effectively integrated organizational design factors, such as 
technology, task, people and structure, in a military organization can be a force 
deflator, vice a force enhancer. An impact in any one area causes a compensatory or 
retaliatory change in another, ultimately impacting and transforming the system as a 
whole. These design factors are highly interdependent and their interaction can develop 
a synergy that can positively or negatively impact a combat outcome. Had 
communications, coordination, information flow, and adherence to established procedures 
been more effective, the Vincennes CIC watchstanders may not have confused the track 
numbers. 
Negative feedback is critical to the maintenance of stability within a system. 
Assuming that stability is the goal, the positive deviation-amplification process, in which 
an error becomes more compounded if left unchecked, must be counter-balanced by 
negative feedback to keep the system from going out of control. Negative feedback 
mechanisms in -the form of technical enhancements, organizational modifications, 
particularly in communications, information flow, and procedures, as well as better 
training will enable a system to provide its own "sanity check." Had negative feedback 
been more effectively incorporated, the system may have been able to provide early 
detection of contact mismanagement as well as compensation for human error. 
Manlmachine interface (MMZ) design factors need to be incorporated early into 
the design of a weapon system. For the most part, combat systems are not employed 
under ideal conditions with ideal operators. The worst case scenario dealing with 
conditions of ambiguity, an uncertain task environment, time compression, information 
overload and tension must be considered. To reach maximum combat effectiveness, the 
human factor needs to be designed into the system from the start, to include all hardware 
and software issues. This is particularly important in future weapons systems already in 
the design phase. Had the Aegis weapon system been more user friendly, the operators 
may have been able to use the system to its maximum potential. 
Timely and accurate fusion of information is critical to a positive decision 
outcome. Whether this fusion takes place in a computer or in a commanding officer's 
brain, the quality of the decision outcome is dependent on the accuracy of the information 
provided. Had the commanding officer been better informed and provided with accurate 
and timely information, the decision to engage a civilian airliner may not have 
transpired. 
With respect to C3, another development emerged as a result of this research 
process using the Lawson Command-Control Cycle, or Lawson C2 Cycle (a model to 
diagram command and control flow). It was discovered that the model has no negative 
feedback designed into it to keep the system stabilized as shown in Figure V-1. For 
example, if the ENVIRONMENT is chaotic and unpredictable providing deceiving 
information, and the information from the SENSE function is erroneous, misleading or 
not applicable, or even if the DESIRED STATE is flawed, not applicable or misapplied 
to the situation at hand, there is no mechanism that keeps the Lawson C2 Cycle from 
amplifying the error(s). Although one would surmise that the COMPARE function of the 
Lawson C2 Cycle would serve as a source of verification, it really does not. The 
COMPARE function is only a part of a single-loop process as demonstrated by the single- 
loop learning models presented in Chapter IV. The important aspect of the Lawson C2 
Cycle is the COMPARE function. However, in metaphorical terms with respect to the 
learning process, the COMPARE function is equivalent to that of a thermostat's operating 
I 
Figure V - 1 .  Lawson Conrmand-Control C y c l e  (Hughes, l rao ,  p. 
186; Orr, 1983) 
mechanism. Both are based on a comparison of a DESIRED STATE with the 
ENVIRONMENT as discussed in the following quote: 
The emphasis of the Lawson model is on the comparison of the current (or 
predicted) state to the Desired State. The model is basically an analogy of a control 
system. The Sense function takes measurements of the ... situation for the control 
system, while Process involves driving the ...[ system] model with the measurements 
to determine current state. When there is no difference between the current state and 
the desired state, no change in control is needed. When there is a difference, the 
controller [decision maker] 'Decides' what control signal to send (Act) to 
the ...[ system] to cause it to converge on the desired state. (SAIC, 1989, p. 19) 
Drawing on the learning from this research, and by applying a cybernetic 
approach to the Lawson C2 cycle, a means of verification in the form of negative 
feedback can be provided to keep the cycle from turning into a spiral of destruction. This 
proposed "Cybernetic Adaptation to the Lawson C2 Cycle," as shown in Figure V- 
counters the amplification in the system and also serves as a source of verification and 
a source of organizational or systemic learning. The Cybernetic Adaptation to the 
Lawson C2 Cycle is a double-loop learning process, in which the process of questioning 
whether the operating norms are appropriate is introduced into the system. This 
adaptation allows for both direct and indirect sources of negative feedback through four 
avenues in the form of verification, reporting, guidance and assessment. The most direct 
form of negative feed is the "verification loop" or "double look" process from the 
DECIDE function to the EVALUATE function. The EVALUATE function is a 
combination of the Lawson's COMPARE and DESIRED STATE functions of the C2 







itself in-check automatically, for feedback is used as an input to the EVALUATE 
function. The verification feedback loop is the most direct form of negative feedback to 
the system, whereas assessment, reporting, and guidance are secondary sources of 
negative feedback. 
This overall negative feedback process is characteristic of a cybernetic system. 
By ensuring negative feedback is an integrated, automatic part of the system, then one has 
designed into the system a means by which organizations can learn. According to Cohen 
and Gooch, in Military Misfortunes, the failure to learn is a "taxonomy of misfortune." 
(1990, p. 26) By analyzing the Vincennes incident and incorporating the lessons learned 
from this tragedy, the Navy, other military organizations, as well as the society they are 
chartered to defend and protect, can benefit from this experience.' 
With respect to complex dynamic systems, in the words of Charles Perrow, in his 
book Normal Accidents, if system characteristics, such as interactive complexity and tight 
coupling (no slack or buffer between two items (1984, p. 90) exist, inevitably an accident 
will occur: 
As systems grow in size and in the number of diverse functions they serve, and are 
built to function in ever more hostile environments, increasing their ties to other 
systems, they experience more and more incomprehensible or unexpected 
interactions. They become more vulnerable to unavoidable system accidents. 
(Perrow, 1984, p. 72) 
Although Perrows' statement sounds pessimistic, it is a factor with which the Navy and 
others who design and build complex systems must contend. There is an inherent impulse 
to add and apply more technology to help solve systemic problems, when in fact 
technology can increase "interactive complexity and tighten the coupling," thereby making 
the system more prone to certain kinds of accidents. This inevitable conclusion is further 
elaborated by Perrow: 
I believe we are justified in calling it a normal accident, or a system accident. The 
odd term normal accident is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, 
multiple and unexplained interactions of failure are inevitable. This is an 
expression of an integral characteristic of a system, not a statement of frequency. 
It is normal for us to die, but we do it only once. System accidents are uncommon, 
even rare; yet this is not all that reassuring, it they can produce catastrophes. (1984, 
P. 5 )  
Consequently, by analyzing and learning from the Vincennes incident, preventive 
measures can be undertaken to avoid or mitigate the impact of a future accident of this 
nature, which is a normal outcome of complex dynamic systems. 
NOTES 
1. This event also called into question the definition of failure and the validity of the 
reward/punishment system as to who should carry the blame. As in trying to find a 
singular cause that triggered the Vincennes incident, which is not possible, it becomes 
even more difficult to attribute a singular person, to carry the blame. Traditionally, the 
ship's commanding officer was ultimately accountable. However, Captain Hughes in his 
book, Fleet Tactics, conveys an interesting corollary to the concept of accountability: 
In today's Navy, ship design and manning incorporate more and more the 
requirements for battle under conditions I1 and 111. In such combat, tactical 
commanders and their captains will have to imbue a sense of presence-in-absentia, 
because the action may be over before the captain is at his station, won or lost by 
an officer who asked himself, 'What would the captain do?' (1986, p. 173) 
This description is a reality of the modern battlespace and the speed at which events can 
take place. Although the captain was in control during the Vincennes incident, the event 
only took seven minutes to unfold. Compound this with an environment that is more 
muddled than ever before, with no clear "battlefield" demarcation points and no clear 
delineation as to who one's enemies really are, then it becomes understandable how a 
failure or accident of this magnitude can take place. Even more importantly, the 
Vincennes incident is "just a tip of the iceberg," for the world is no longer bipolar, but 
an even more complicated system of multiple actors. With this systemic view, the 
traditional view of accountability becomes problematic. 
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RM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Radio Monitor 
RNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R a n g e  
ROE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Rules of Engagement 
RP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Republic of the Philippines 
RPO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Radio Physics Optics 
ROS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Remote Optical Site 
RPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Radar Picket Station 
RSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Radar System Controller 
RT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Radiotelephone 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  RTN Return 
RVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Radar Video Processing 
S PLOT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  South Plotter 
SAG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Surface Action Group 
SAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Surface-to-Air Missile 
SAU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Surface Action Unit 
SHF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Super High Frequency 
SHM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Ship Heading Marker 
SITREP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Situation Report 
SIWO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Signals Intelligence Warfare Officer 
SM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Standard Guided Missile 
SM2 BLK 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Standard Guided Missile, Block 2 
SO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Sonar Operator 
SOH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  StraitofHormuz 
SOHWPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Strait of Hormuz Western Patrol Area 
SOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Standard Operating Procedures 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  SP SoundPowered 
SPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Speed 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  SPG Southern Persian Gulf 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  SPY-1A Radar System ANISPY-1A 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  SRBOC Super Rapid Blooming Offboard Chaff 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  SRC Surface Radar Coordinator 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  SSES Ship's Signal Exploitation Space 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  SSSC Surface/Subsurface Surveillance Coordinator 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  SSSS Surface/Subsurface Surveillance Supervisor 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  SSWC Surface/Subsurface Warfare Coordinator 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  STC Sensitivity Time Control 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  STD MSL Standard Missile 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  STIR Surface Track & Illuminating Radar 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ST0 System Test Officer 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  SUCAP Surface Combat Air Patrol 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  SURFPAC Surface Force Pacific 
SVCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Services 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  TACCOM Tactical Communications 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  TACAN Tactical Air Navigation 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  TACON Tactical Control 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  TAO Tactical Action Officer 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  TC Tactical Command 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  TDS Tactical Data System 
TF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  TaskForce 
TG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T a s k G r o u p  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  TIC Tactical Information Coordinator 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  TN Track Number 
TRKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Tracks 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  TS Track Supervisor 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  UHF Ultra High Frequency 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  UNTREP UnitReport 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  USDAO United States Defense Attache' Office 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VAB Variable Action Button 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VCN USS Vincennes 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VECTACS Vector Attack 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VFK Variable Function Key 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VHF Very High Frequency 
VIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Vicinity 
W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W  est 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  WASEX War at Sea Strike Exercise 
WCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Weapons Control Console 
WCCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Weapons Control Console Operator 
WCIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Weapons Control Indicator Panel 
WCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Weapons Control Officer 
XO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Executive Officer 
APPENDIX B 
THE STARK INCIDENT 
A. OVERVIEW 
At approximately 2109 local time, 17 May 1987, the frigate, USS Stark, was hit by 
two Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles fired by an Iraqi F-1 aircraft. This unprovoked, 
indiscriminate attack took place in international waters, 12 miles outside the Iranian 
Exclusion Zone. As a result of the attack, 37 sailors were killed. (Sharp Investigation, 
1987, pp, 1-2) Figure B- 1 shows the geographical location of where the Stark attack took 
place. 
B. HISTORY 
1. Iran-Iraq War 
Hostilities between Iran and Iraq had existed for centuries, with the border 
between the two countries under constant dispute. Hoping to take advantage of internal 
disturbances in Iran that precipitated from the Iranian revolution in 1979, Iraq launched 
a strike into Iran on 22 September 1980. Iraq expected the Iranian Army to collapse and 
the government in Tehran to agree to a cease fire; however, Iran remained steadfast 
despite the advance of Iraqi forces. A year later, in a series of counter attacks, Iran 
regained most of the Iraqi occupied territory and the conflict essentially transformed into 

a static "war of attrition in which the line of battle ... moved little more than a few miles 
from the pre-war border." (Glenn and Warner, 1987, p. 8) 
2. The Tanker War 
During the first three years of the war, the ships that were attacked were 
directly involved with combat resupply (Glenn and Warner, 1987, p. 8). On 27 March 
Iraq escalated the air war, into what has been called the 'Tanker War,' by attacking 
Iran's economic shipping and oil installations. Iraq's objectives were to prevent or 
reduce the importation of vital materials required by Iran for its war effort, to 
reduce or terminate Iran's oil revenues which helped finance the war, and to 
internationalize the war. (Glenn and Warner, 1987, p. 8) 
From 27 March 1984 to 17 June 1987, a total of 248 ships were attacked. 
Iraq initiated 153 of these attacks while Iran conducted 95. Although the Tanker War did 
not cause serious disruptions in oil flow to the West, Kuwait came under increasing 
pressure from Iranian attacks. Kuwait needed protection for her tankers and began to 
explore various options to include assistance from the Soviet Union. (Glenn and Warner, 
1987, p. 9) The U.S. response to Kuwait's requests for assistance was to 
expedite procedures for the registry of eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers under the 
American flag [and] ... to provide appropriate protection by U.S. military forces ... to 
the eleven reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers while operating in the Persian Gulf region 
and transiting the Strait of Hormuz. (Glenn and Warner, 1987, p. 12) 
C. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
1. AWACS Tracking Activities 
3 
- 
An Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft from the 945th 
AWACS Squadron, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, was on a routine mission in the 
I I 
Persian Gulf when, on 17 May 1987, at 1955 local (L), its radar acquired an unknown 
track heading on a southeasterly course. The track was positively identified as an Iraqi 
Mirage F-1 by a joint Saudi-U.S. ground tracking system. (Staff Investigation, 1987, p. 
7)' The AWACS aircraft followed the track, assigned it track number 2202, and provided 
periodic updates every three to five minutes as to its geographic location (Sharp 
Investigation, 1987, pp. 3 and 9)2. Because the aircraft was a Mirage F-1 and considered 
a "critical class track," special reporting procedures were required. This involved 
continuous notification to all ships in the area of this track as well as to the Commander 
of the Middle East Force (COMIDEASTFOR) on the flagship USS LaSalle. Here, the 
reporting was accomplished through the Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) to the USS 
Coontz and relayed to the Stark on a real time basis. (Staff Investigation, 1987, p. 7) All 
position information reported to COMIDEASTFOR and the Stark's Combat Information 
Center (CIC) was based on the data link from AWACS, not on information derived from 
Coontz' own radar system (Sharp Investigation, 1987, pp. 9-10). 
2. Actions by Iraqi Aircraft 
Iraqi pilots did not visually identify their targets prior to firing. According 
to Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, in a 
news release upon completion of his staff investigation of the Stark Incident: 
the greatest danger in the Gulf was an inadvertent attack. The Iraqis normally fue 
at radar blips and do not check them visually even in daylight hours--unlike the 
Iranians who check out each target first. Furthermore, the Iraqi pilot said he did 
not hear either of the radio warnings broadcast by the Stark, indicating he wasn't 
listening. We have indications that the Iraqi Air Force really does not discipline 
its pilots to monitor the international emergency frequencies. In sum, the surprise 
is not that an Iraqi missile fired at an unintended target, but that it did not fire at 
an unintended target before this. (1987) 
The flight path of the Iraqi fighter that fired on the Stark exhibited several 
unusual characteristics. First, the F-1 was flying at least 15 miles closer to the Saudi 
Arabian' coast than normal. Also, "[ilt was flying at night and at a lower altitude and 
slower speed .... In addition, only a handful of Iraqi aircraft had been tracked this far 
south before." (Staff Investigation, 1987, p. 7) Figure B-2 shows an illustration of the 
Iraqi F-1 flight path. 
To add another dimension to this situation, the Iranians had declared a war 
zone called the Iranian Exclusion Zone early in the war: "Its boundary lines effectively 
bisect[ed] the Gulf and the zone encompasse[d] virtually half the waters in the Gulf." 
(Staff Investigation, 1987, p. 10) Basically, any vessel in the war zone was highly 
susceptible to attack by either Iraqi or Iranian forces (Staff Investigation, 1987, p. 10). 
It should be noted that there were discrepancies between U.S. and Iraqi 
accounts as to the position of the Stark and the Iraqi aircraft at the time of the missile 
203 
IRAN 
- Approximate t r a c k  o f  Mirage 
Legend ----- Mirage l a s t  l e g  a c c o r d i n g  t o  Iraq 
I r a n i a n  E x c l u s i o n  Zone 
attack. Although the Iraqi track, as depicted on a map provided by Iraqi military officials, 
placed the Stark within ten miles of the war zone, multiple U.S. sources placed the 
Stark's location 12 miles outside the war zone. These multiple sources demonstrated 
close agreement &2 miles of each other), casting serious doubt as to the accuracy and 
credibility of the Iraqi account of the Stark's location. It was not entirely clear as to what 
actually prompted the Iraqi pilot to fire upon the Stark. (Staff Investigation, 1987, p. 10) 
3. Rules of Engagement 
Prior to the change of operational control (inchopping) to COMIDEASTFOR, 
the Stark received a briefing on the Rules of Engagement (ROE) by MEF staff personnel 
in Djibouti on 28 February 1987. Also, operations and intelligence briefings were 
presented. During these briefings, "[tlhe ROE briefer highlighted that the probability of 
deliberate attack on U.S. warships was low, but that the indiscriminate attack in the 
Persian Gulf was a significant danger." (Sharp Investigation, 1987, p. 6) The ROE in 
effect were originally promulgated on 1 October 1985 by the MEF Commander (Staff 
Investigation, 1987, p. 4). The following is an unclassified synopsis of existing ROE as 
described in the "Report on the Staff Investigation into the Iraqi Attack on the USS Stark 
by members from the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services: 
In general, the rules provide that if an aircraft demonstrates hostile action or hostile 
intent, U.S. commanders are authorized to take proportionate means to defend 
themselves. The determination of hostile intent is within the judgment of each 
ship's commanding officer..,. The rules further provide that aircraft of the 
belligerent Persian Gulf nations, as well as unidentified aircraft, are all to be 
regarded as potentially hostile. Potentially hostile contacts that appear to be 
approaching within specified distances of U.S. units should be requested to identify 
themselves and to state their intentions. The rules recognize that the establishment 
of communications might not be possible, in which event U.S. commanders are 
directed to use any means available to identify themselves and to warn the contact 
to stay clear. Commanders are also directed not to stop if one attempt to attract the 
attention of an approaching contact has not elicited a response to their radio 
warnings. They should take graduated actions in attempting to attract the attention 
of the approaching contact, including training guns and firing warning shots. (1987, 
P. 4) 
4. Events aboard the Stark 
On the evening of 17 May 1987, the Stark was getting ready to conduct a full 
power run in preparation for a Mobile Training Team exercise. The Stark was operating 
in an area along the Iranian Exclusion Zone called Radar Picket Station-South. While the 
engines were at full power, there was some concern over abnormal engine temperature 
readings. This caused the Stark to reduce its speed from 30 knots to 15 knots and to 
change its course to a northwesterly direction of 300 degrees. (Staff Investigation, 1987, 
During this period, the Stark was in alert Condition Three, which was "the 
normal wartime operating state," entailing a battle station manning posture comprising of 
one-third of the ship's crew (Staff Investigation, 1987, p. 12). Figure B-3 shows a 
schematic of the Stark. 
At about 20 12L, (Sharp Investigation, 1987, p. 9) the Stark was informed by 
a U.S. AWACS plane that "an Iraqi Air Force Mirage F-1 aircraft was approximately 200 
miles away flying along the Saudi Arabian coast." (Sagan, 1991, p. 94) The primary 
radar for tracking aircraft, the ANISPS-49 Air Search Radar, has a range that is capable 
of extending to 200 miles; however, "the range is highly dependent on weather conditions 
- 
and target altitudes. Because this radar could not track the Mirage at 200 miles or 

greater, the AWACS aircraft provided a downlink to the USS Coontz and on to Stark. 
(Staff Investigation, 1987, p. 12) The transmission was instantaneously relayed (Staff 
Investigation, 1987, p. 12) and was monitored in the Stark's CIC (Sharp Investigation, 
1987, p. 10). The Stark's Commanding Officer, Captain Glenn R. Brindel, recollected 
the following in his official statement: 
On the evening of the 17th of May at approximately 2015L while in CIC and prior 
to going to the bridge, to conduct a full power trial, I was told of an Iraqi aircraft 
in the Northern Gulf who had been identified by AWACS. It was at well over 200 
miles but heading south. I told the TAO [Lieutenant Basil E. Moncrief, who was 
on watch for over an hour prior to the attack,] to keep a close eye on the contact, 
and reminded him that a number of recent Iraqi sorties had been coming further 
south. While on the bridge, I was notified that Coontz had radar contact on this 
aircraft. I questioned why we did not. I believe the aircraft was 120 miles out at 
this time. CIC responded that Coontz was closer and weather conditions were 
responsible. That was the last I heard of the contact until approximately 25 minutes 
later when we were hit by the missile. At the time of the missile attack I was in 
my cabin adjacent to CIC. I left the bridge at approximately 2100 after the full 
power run had been delayed for engine adjustments. On the way from the bridge 
to CIC, I stopped at my cabin to make a head call. I paused at my desk 
momentarily to look at some paperwork and heard and felt the first hit. I ran 
immediately then into CIC. Before I could ascertain our status or take any 
action ... the second missile hit the ship. (Brindel, 1987, pp. 29-30) 
At approximately 2058L (Sharp Investigation, 1987, p. 11), after shifting the 
ANISPS-49 radar to the 80-mile mode to attempt to acquire the track, "[tlhe Stark picked 
up the fighter on her own air search radar when it was 70 miles from the ship." (Sagan, 
1991, p. 94) However, the Captain was not notified: "Lt Moncrief [the Tactical Action 
Officer (TAO)] assumed the commanding officer had been on the bridge earlier and had 
heard CIC report to the bridge that they detected a radar contact which correlated to the 
Iraqi aircraft." (Sharp Investigation, 1987, p. 32) 
In the meantime, the CIC was not fully manned. FC3 Caulkins, who was both 
the WCC-1 Combined Antenna System (CAS) and Close In Weapon System (CIWS) 
operator in the CIC received permission to from the Fire Control Technician to go to the 
head and left at about 2050L. Fourteen minutes later, Caulkins had not returned to his 
watch, and another member of the CIC was sent to find him (Sharp Investigation, 1987, 
p. 10). While the WCC-1 and CIWS positions were vacant, the Weapons Control Officer 
(WCO) and CICWO positions were also shy one crew member because, "[tlhe 
Commanding Officer's Battle Orders required that one officer fill the WCO and CICWO 
watch stations simultaneously." (Sharp Investigation, 1987, p. 15) 
Meanwhile, at 2102L, an enlisted Electronic Warfare (EW) Technician 
operating the SLQ-32 electronic countermeasures system detected radar emissions that 
correlated to a Cyrano IV, "the air intercept radar carried on an Iraqi F-1 aircraft." (Sharp 
Investigation, 1987, p. 11) The "lock-on" lasted approximately five seconds (Staff 
Investigation, 1987, p. 13). At about 2103L when the track was 43 NM out from the 
Stark, OS1 Duncan, who was at the Anti-Submarine Air Controller (ASAC) console, 
requested permission from Lt Moncrief to transmit a standard warning to the F-1 over the 
Military Air Distress frequency. However, Lt Moncrief responded "'No, wait,"' (Sharp 
Investigation, 1987, p. 11) in anticipation that the Mirage might turn away (Sagan, 1991, 
p. 94). 
While this was going on, Lieutenant Commander Ray J. Gajan, Stark's 
Executive Officer (XO), walked in the CIC at about 2104L. "He was looking for Lt 
Moncrief to discuss administrative matters relating to the Ship Control Department. The 
I 
XO noticed that Lt Moncrief was busy, and so he waited near the chart table to observe 
events in CIC." (Sharp Investigation, 1987, p. 11) 
w 
According to Rear Admiral Grant Sharp's Formal Investigation, the Iraqi -i 
aircraft turned toward the Stark at 2105L at 32.5 NM (1987, p. 12). The Closest Point w 
d 
of Approach (CPA) to the ship was calculated to be around four miles. Although the 
aircraft was rather distant from the ship, "it was flying on a course that would bring it 
within four miles from the ship if the aircraft did not alter its course. The TAO said he 
expected the Mirage would be turning away at any moment, according to the Watch 
Supervisor." (Staff Investigation, 1987, p. 13) The aircraft was on a constant bearing, 
decreasing range, CBDR (Sharp Investigation, 1987, p. 12). 
A minute or so after discovering this change in course and the close proximity 
of the CPA, the TAO directed ENS Wright, who was on watch in the CIC, to notify the 
Captain, but he could not be located. Both the bridge and his cabin were called. (Sharp 
Investigation, 1987, p. 12) 
At about 2107L, numerous other events were taking place. Namely, the Iraqi 
aircraft launched the f i s t  Exocet Missile at the 22.5 NM point, which was well within 
nominal Exocet striking range of 38 NM (Sharp Investigation, 1987, p. 2). At this time, 
the Forward Lookout detected a "bright flash in the distance followed by the appearance 
of a small blue dot on the horizon." (Staff Investigation, 1987, p. 14) This contact was 
about 15 degrees off the port bow and initially identified as a surface contact (Sharp 
Investigation, 1987, p. 12). d 
In conjunction with the forward lookout event, the second radar lock-on was 
detected by the CAS, lasting five to seven seconds. The EW operator asked the TAO for 
permission to arm the ship's chaff launchers, located on the deck above the CIC. This 
task was accomplished in about thirty seconds. (Staff Investigation, 1987, p. 13) 
The following sequence of events transpired concerning the announcement by 
the EW operator that the ship was locked-on by the aircraft fire control radar: 
In the waning minutes prior to the attack, the TAO attempted to increase Stark's 
combat readiness; but it was too late. [intentionally deleted in sanitized report] 
[Vhe positions of CIC Watch Officer (CICWO) and Weapons Control Officer 
(WCO) were combined and filled by a single officer. When the aircraft began its 
attack run, the position of Weapons Control Officer was vacant. Before the position 
could be properly manned, the Mirage had already fired both Exocets and the first 
Exocet was nearing its terminal phase. The Fire Control Technician [FC3 Caulkins] 
assigned to operate the MK-92 STIR fire control radar and Close In Weapon 
System (CIWS) had previously left CIC on personal business; and at the time of the 
attack, that position was also vacant .... Neither Lt Moncrief nor FC2 Collins brought 
CIWS into the [intentionally deleted in sanitized document] mode. CIWS was in 
'stand-by' mode during the entire attack. (Sharp Investigation, 1987, pp. 2-3, 14) 
The F-1 fired a second Exocet missile at the Stark with a weapons release point of 15.5 
NM at approximately 2108L. At this point in time, the equipment did not detect the 
inbound missiles and the crew did not realize they had been fired upon. The TAO 
ordered the ship's Mark 92 Fire Control System--which guides the ship's three inch 
guns, Standard missiles, and Harpoon missiles--to lock-on the aircraft with its 
primary radar, the [Surface Track and Illuminating Radar] STIR. The radar 
operator advised he could not comply because the radar was blocked out by the 
ship's superstructure. The TAO ordered that the secondary radar, the CAS, be 
utilized." (Staff Investigation, 1987, p. 22) 
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Stark (Staff Investigation, 1987, p. 21) 
A minute later, the CAS locked on to the Iraqi aircraft which was about ten 
NM away, and the TAO directed warnings be issued to the Iraqi Aircraft (Sharp 
Investigation, 1987, pp. 12 and 14): 
When the aircraft was approximately 13 miles from Stark, the ship transmitted a 
radio message identifying it as a U.S. Navy ship and asked the plane to identify 
itself. There was no response fiom the aircraft. A similar request for identification 
and intentions was transmitted by Stark when the aircraft was 11 miles from the 
ship. Again, there was no response from the aircraft." (Staff Investigation, 1987, 
P. 3) 
Only seconds before impact, at 2109L, the lookout finally realized that the "blue fireball" 
(Staff Investigation, 1987, p. 14) was an incoming missile and started to scream, 
"MISSILE INBOUND, MISSILE INBOUND" over the JL sound powered circuit. This 
information was relayed to the bridge and to JL phone-talker in the CIC. Unfortunately, 
the TAO did not get this information. At 2109L, the first missile hit the Stark, at which 
time General Quarters (GQ) sounded. Twenty to thirty seconds later, the second Exocet 
hit the ship, port side, and detonated. (Sharp Investigation, 1987, pp. 14-15) 
5. Weapon Systems 
Weapon systems available to Stark but not employed included: Standard 
missiles (SM-1 ME missiles), MK75 76mm gun, Close In Weapon System (CIWS), 50 
Caliber guns, and Super Rapid Blooming Off Board Chaff (SRBOC) (Sharp Investigation, 
1987, p. 16). At the moment of impact, a synopsis of the weapon and radar system status 
consisted of the following according to the officials conducting the Formal Investigation 
for the Navy: 
the STIR fire control radar was in stand-by and was thought to be masked by the 
ship's superstructure; the MK-92 CAS fire control radar was in search mode and 
was never used to lock-on to the aircraft until the missiles were seconds away from 
impact; the Super Rapid Off Board Chaff (SRBOC) was not armed until seconds 
before the first missile hit; and the CIWS was still in stand-by, having not been 
properly brought in to the AAW manual mode .... At the time of the missile launch, 
the ANISPS-49 two dimensional air search radar and the MK-92 CAS search radar 
were the only radars being used to track the aircraft. No fire control radars were 
locked-on and tracking the aircraft. (1987, p. 3) 
NOTES 
1. "Staff Investigation" is a shortened version citing the "Report on the Staff Investigation 
into the Iraqi Attack on the USS Stark," 14 June 1987. The report was based on an 
investigation conducted in the Persian Gulf by Committee Staffers and on hearings of the 
House Armed Services Committee. The conclusions were signed by Reps Les Aspin, 
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, William L. Dickinson (R-ALA), 
Senior Republican on the Committee, and Bill Nichols (D-ALA), Chairman of the 
Investigation Subcommittee. 
2. "Sharp Investigation" refers to Rear Admiral Grant Sharp's unclassified report, 
"Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Attack on the USS Stark 
(FFG 31) on 17 May 1987 (U)," 12 June 1987. 
APPENDIX C 
05-194 PLAN POSITION INDICATOR (PPI) DISPLAY CONSOLE 
The OJ-194 PPI Display Console is the primary input/output device for the UYA-4 
display subsystem of the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS). It provides detection, 
tracking, threat evaluation and engagement control of surface, air, and subsurface contacts 
obtained from own-ship and off-board sensors. The OJ-194 has many versions and is 
found in nearly all NTDS equipped U.S. Navy ships as well as on various ships of NATO 
countries. (Bodziak, Henry, and Viland, 1990, p. 1) 
The console is a cathode ray tube (CRT) display unit, with capabilities tailored to 
the specific function being performed. Table C-1 shows the primary controls and displays 
for CIC consoles and a brief description of their functional use. There are two displays: 
The Plan Position Indicator (PPI), which shows the tactical picture as a two-dimensional 
positional display, and the character read out (CRO), which gives information on specific 
tasks, status information, and menu driven data on an alpha-numeric display. Control is 
provided by key panel and rolling ball to operate a cursor, which is used to point and 
mark items of interest. The primary method of obtaining information on a track is by 
placing the cursor on it and then "hooking" it by button action. Another method is by 
entering the track number on the digital display entry unit. (Rogers, 1992; Moser, 1992; 
Bodziak, Henry, and Viland, 1990, p. 1) Figure C-1 shows a typical OJ-194 lay out 
(Osga, no date, p. 2). 
TABLE C-1 
OJ-194 CONSOLE CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS 




Action Entry Panel 
Category-Select Panel 
DISPLAYS: 
Plan Position Indicator (PPI) 
Local and net communications 
PPI display settings 
Function and data entry or display 
Control NTDS symbols/graphics on PPI 
Geographicltrack position 
Character Read Out (CRO) Alpha-numeric display and entry 
INPUT DEVICES: 
Trackball Control cursor on PPI display 
Trackball Buttons Frequently used for PPI functions 
Digital Data Entry Unit (DDEU) Numeric entry and special functions 
Source: Osga, no date, p. 2 
The OJ-194 console may be used by the most junior seaman recruit on up. The 
most frequent users are the Operations Specialists, who perform tracking, aircraft control 
and similar duties; Sonar Technicians, for certain ASW tracking functions; Electronic 
Warfare Specialists and Cryptological Technicians for electronics surveillance and 
intelligence functions; and by officers for command and control of ASW, AAW, and 
ASUW operations. (Bodziak, Henry, and Viland, 1990, p. 2) 
Selection 1 3 
Pane! 
Figure C-1.  Typical 05-194 Console Lay Out 
APPENDIX D 
COMPREHENSIVE DATA LISTING 
There were two types of data depicting the flight of Iran Air Flight 655 during the 
seven minute air engagement: System or "actual" data which was extracted from the data 
tapes of the Aegis Command and Decision (C & D) system and the recollected data as 
to the "perceived" flight of Iran Flight 655, which was obtained from witness statements 
and testimony. The Fogarty investigation team integrated the actual system data with the 
recollected data to develop a time line of events to form a more comprehensive portrayal 
as to what happened and when. (Fogarty, 1988, p. 2) 
The system and recollected data obtained from the Fogarty report was broken down 
into the following groupings for comparative purposes: 
Group 1--System Data with Outlier 
Group 2--Recollected Data by Witnesses 
Group 3--System Data without Outlier 
Group 4--System Data with Speed Variable and Outlier 
Group 5--System Data with Speed Variable and no Outlier 
Group 6--System and Recollected Data with Speed Variable and Outlier 
Group 7--Refined Recollected Data by Witnesses 
Group 8--Refined Recollected Data with Outlier 
In Groups 1, 4, and 6, all system data identifying Flight 655, entailed all TN 4131 
and TN 4474 hook entries, to include the FC-1 hook of TN 4474 at 1022L. Here, at 
1022L, the system data indicated that a crew member manning the FC-1 position hooked 
TN 4474 with the following kinematics: Range of 110 NM, bearing of 139, altitude of 
11,900 feet and speed of 448 knots (Fogarty, 1988, p. 34). This entry appeares 
"inconsistent" with the rest of the system data regarding Flight 655 and was labelled as 
an "outlier." Therefore, the groupings with the annotation "outlier" means that the FC-1 
hook of TN 4474 was already in the system data as revealed by the system data tapes, 
but was "inconsistent" with the remaining system data points. In some data sets such as 
Groups 3 and 5, the "outlier" was eliminated by the author for comparison purposes to 
see its impact on the correlation coefficient and overall relationship with the data. 
Conversely, in Group 8, the "outlier" was physically incorporated into this data set by the 
author to assess its effect on the overall relationship. 
Another type of grouping that was created included the speed variable as shown in 
Groups 4,5, and 6, in which the relationship of aircraft speed was compared with the rest 
of the variables. Not all entries from both system and recollected data sources as 
presented in the Fogarty report included speed. Only two entries based on witness 
recollection contained the speed variable. 
In the following pages, data set groupings are depicted in consolidated form in 
Tables D-1 to D-8. 
TABLE D- 1 
SYSTEM DATA WITH OUTLIER 
GROUP 1 
Range Altitude Time Speed TN 
47 900 1017 --- 4474 
44 2500 1018 232 4474 
40 4000 1019 303 4131 
34 6160 1020 334 4131 
29 7000 1021 350 4131 
25 8400 1022 --- 4131 
22 9200 1022 --- 4131 
20 10000 1022 360 4131 
110' 1 1900* 1022' 448* 4474' 
16 1 1230 1023 37 1 4131 
15 1 1000 1023 --- 4131 
* -- Denotes "outlier." 
TABLE D-2 




AAWC 30 $ 8500 
OSDA 29 8000 
49 ADT 25 12000 
CSC 22 10300 
IAD 1 20 1 10500 
TIC 1 15 1 11000 
I I 
IAD 1 $ 15 1 7800 
RSC 1 12 1 $ 5500 
IDS ) $ I 1  1 7800 
49 ADT 1 10 1 7800 
TIC 1 10 1 10000 
AAWC 1 % 8  1 $6500 
I I 
MSS I 6 1 7000 
UBS 6 7000 
, Time I Speed I TN 11 
$ -- Several witness accounts were provided in the form of ranges. These ranges were 
averaged to obtain a single value in order to plot the data point. 
% -- "At engagement" was estimated by the author to mean 8 NM. 
TABLE D-3 



























SYSTEM DATA WITH SPEED VARIABLE AND OUTLIER 
GROUP 4 
I 
Time Range IAltitude I Speed 
* -- Denotes "outlier." 
TABLE D-5 
SYSTEM DATA WITH SPEED VARIABLE AND NO OUTLIER 














































SYSTEM AND RECOLLECTED DATA WITH SPEED VARIABLE AND OUTLIER 
GROUP 6 
I I 
* -- Denotes "outlier." 
Time 
TABLE D-7 







$ -- Several witness accounts were provided in the form of ranges. These ranges were 
averaged to obtain a single value in order to plot the data point. 
Altitude 
12000 
% -- "At engagement" was estimated by the author to mean 8 NM. 
TABLE D-8 
REFINED RECOLLECTED DATA WITH OUTLIER 
GROUP 8 
$ -- Several witness accounts were provided in the form of ranges. These ranges were 





% -- "At engagement" was estimated by the author to mean 8 NM. 
* -- Denotes "outlier." 
-- - - - 
Altitude 
12000 






CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SUMMARY 
The method used to study the joint behavior of two variables and to determine 
whether they are related or not involves the computation of their correlation 
coefficient,"r." Here, the correlation coefficient measures the degree of linear relationship 
among the variables in a sample of data. The objective of this appendix is to analyze the 
degree to which various combinations of variables are related, such as speed versus range, 
altitude versus time, etc., to help explain the divergence between system and recollected 
data entries as to the flight path of Flight 655. 
The following rule of thumb was used to determine the strength of the correlation: 
Weak if 0 5 Irl I .5, 
Strong if .8 5 Irl < 1, and 
Moderate otherwise (Devore, 1987, p. 484-487). 
A summary of correlation coefficients as computed by Minitab is provided in Table 
The data list groupings tables from Appendix D are the source from which the 
Correlation Coefficient Summary was created. 
TABLE E-1 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SUMMARY WITH RANGE, ALTITUDE, TIME 
AND SPEED VARIABLES 
SYSTEM DATA WITH OUTLIERa-GROUP 1 
Altitude versus Range - .  293 
Altitude versus Time +.979 
Range versus Time -. 440 
RECOLLECTED DATA BY WITNESSES--GROUP 2 
Altitude versus Range +. 483 
Altitude versus Time - .  488 
Range versus Time -. 980 
SYSTEM DATA WITHOUT OUTLIERa--GROUP 3 
Altitude versus Range - .  997 
Altitude versus Time +. 992 
Range versus Altitude -. 990 
SYSTEM DATA WITH OUTLIERa AND SPEED VARIABLE--GROUP 4 
Speed versus Time +.791 
Speed versus Range +.I71 
Speed versus Altitude +.870 
SYSTEM DATA WITH SPEED VARIABLE AND NO OUTLIERa--GROUP 5 
Speed versus Time +.  927 
Speed versus Range - .  912 
Speed versus Altitude +. 921 
SYSTEM AND RECOLLECTED DATA WITH SPEED VARIABLE AND OUTLIERa--GROUP 6 
Altitude versus Range +.999 
Altitude versus Time -. 866 
Range versus Time -. 833 
Speed versus Time - .  596 
Speed versus Range +.  150 
Speed versus Altitude +.I15 
REPINED RECOLLECTED DATA BY WITNESSES--GROUP 7 
Altitude versus Range +.  813 
Altitude versus Time -. 842 
Range versus Time -.931 
REFINED RECOLLECTED DATA WITK OUTLIERa--GROUP 8 
Altitude versus Range +. 723 
Altitude versus Time -. 899 
Range versus Time -. 708 
....................................................................................... 
a -- Denotes system data outlier for FC-1 hook of TN 4474 
Source for data entries: Fogarty, 1988, pp. 29-39 
Overall, strong correlation coefficients were observed in the following data sets: 
"System Data without Outlier," "System Data with Speed Variable and no Outlier," and 
the "Refined Recollected Data by Witnesses." Highly disparate coefficients ranging from 
weak to strong within a data set category included the following: "Recollected Data by 
Witnesses" and "System and Recollected Data with Speed Variable and Outlier." The 
FC-1 hook of TN 4474 seemed to have the greatest adverse effect on the correlation 
coefficients when it was a part of a data set, except for the last data set entitled, "Refined 
Recollected Data with Outlier." The lack of the FC-1 effect in the last data set is 
significant in that it fits well with the rest of the data as shown by the moderate to strong 
relationship. The FC-1 hook of TN 4474 and the rest of the refined recollected data 
suggest that the kinematic data is characteristic of another aircraft other than Iran Flight 
APPENDIX F 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The objective of regression analysis is to investigate the relationship between two 
variables by assessing the extent of their linearity. The Simple Linear Regression Model 
of y = mx + b was used to analyze the data's relationship, where "b" is the y-intercept 
value and "mu is the slope of the line (Devore, 1987, pp. 450-472). 
To determine the x-intercept between system data and recollected data, especially 
when the graphs are combined, the slope intercept equation was used: 
x = (b2 - bl) i (ml- m,), (Equation 1) 
where the x-intercept is in nautical miles. For the next series of equations, the following 
results were obtained regarding the x-intercept: 
The regression equation for all system altitude versus range data points, to include 
the FC-1 hook of TN 4474, is as follows: 
ALT = 10227 - 45.5 NM, (Equation 2) 
and the regression equation for all recollected altitude versus range recollected data points 
regarding "Iran Flight 655" is as follows: 
ALT = 7070 + 86.5 NM. (Equation 3) 
The x-intercept between system and recollected data is 23.9 17 NM. Even with both 
data in "raw" form, the range is within the 20-25 NM window that represents minute 
encompassing 1022L. 
In the next set of equations, the FC-1 hook of TN 4474 data point was deliberately 
removed to see how the x-intercept was effected. The equation for system data is the 
same for the linear fit drawn in Figure 111-1 as shown in the following: 
ALT = 16097 - 310 NM, (Equation 4) 
while the regression equation for the recollected data points remains the same as Equation 
3. The x-intercept was calculated as 22.767 NM, which, again, is within the 1022L time 
window. 
The next set of equations include the equation of the line for all system data points 
without the FC-1 hook of TN 4474, Equation 4, and the reconstructed recollected data 
equation for altitude versus range: 
ALT = 47 16 + 247 NM. (Equation 5) 
The x-intercept between Equations 4 and 5 is 20.433 NM, an even more refined value 
than 22.917 NM. 
The significance of these x-intercepts is that they occur at a critical time during the 
air engagement. Not only did the Vincennes enter into the 20 NM weapons envelope, but 
it was also at the time when Captain Rogers asked, "What is 4474 doing?" Also, the FC- 
1 hooked TN 4474 at 1022L. This data point was not a part of the Flight 655 flight 
profile, but was most likely the kinematics of the A-6, according to Rogers' speculation. 
In order for the FC-1 to hook TN 4474 and obtain kinematic information associated with 
the A-6, that track number had to already have been re-entered into the Vincennes' 
tactical picture. Therefore, the Manchester could have brought the track back into the 
Southern Persian Gulf link at about 1022L, as suggested by the intersection values, 
Otherwise, the FC-1 would not have been able to obtain any kinematic information about 
TN 4474, because TN 4474 was sent into storage as an unused track number after the 
auto-correlation process that took place where TN 4131 became the new track number for 
Flight 655. 
The following table is a listing of all graphs from Chapter 111 containing fitted lines 
and the equations associated with those lines: 
TABLE F-1 
REGRESSION EQUATIONS 
Figure Number Y =  mx + 
111- la alt -310 nm 
III-2' alt 1750 time 
111-3* nm 1 -5.62 time 
111-4 See Figures ID-1, 2, and 3 for regression equations. 
111-5 I alt 1 -629 time 
111-6 I alt 1 86.5 time 
- - - - 
111-7 alt 1382 time 
111-8 alt -1595 time 
a: alt I b: alt 
ID-10 I alt I -181 mg 
111- 1 1 I rng 1 -246 spd 
- - -- - 
III- 1 2 rng -246 spd 
111- 13 S P ~  20.4 time 
111- 14 a: alt' -310 nm 
1750 time 
1380 time 
111-17 alt -2297 time 
In- 18 a: alt -310 nm 
b: alt -1595 nm 
111-19 a: alt I 1750 time I b: alt 1380 time 
* -- FC-1 hook of TN 4474 was not included in linear fit drawn. Data point not included in regression 
equation. 
alt -- altitude in feet 
rng -- range in nautical miles 
spd -- speed in knots 
time -- time is based on a 24 hour clock 
a: -- line a 
b: -- line b 
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